

181-60
Date

9/25/59

Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name)

SA MYRON E. LIGHT 65-13

Division of Assignment

CINCINNATI

SUGGESTION

It is suggested that copies of communications reflecting negative results of ~~contacts with criminal informants~~ and potentials not be channeled to substantive case files.

Exception: Agent to whom substantive case file is assigned may specifically request negative results be furnished for record purpose, with Supervisory approval.

(Foregoing suggestion is not intended to otherwise alter current rules governing criminal informant contacts and recording results.)

SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENL.

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts)

Manual of Instructions, Volume IV, Section 108, F:(6): Memoranda prepared for requesting Agent reflecting negative contacts with criminal informants are not to be filed but are routed to requesting Agent so he may record

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate) contact in case file; negative contact memorandum then destroyed.

- ADVANTAGES:
- (1) Greatly reduced volume of routing pieces of mail and matching files.
 - (2) Substantial savings of Supervisory, Agent, stenographic, and clerical time for attention to more important matters.
 - (3) Substantial achievement of economy through savings of salaries and cost of paper supplies.

SAVINGS: Inestimable on field-wide basis.

Disadvantages of suggestion

No record of negative criminal informant contacts would appear in substantive case file in most instances.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States)



Myron E. Light, S.A.
Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

This suggestion has considerable merit; consideration of economy to Bureau is more than noteworthy. I recommend adoption.

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

REC-8

66-2542-3

3 10-20

SEP 28 1959

auto 10-20-59

EX-101

52 OCT 28 1959

SEP 28 1959
RECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2542-1

80-60
9/25/59

To: Director, FBI
From: (Suggester's name) SA MYRON E. LIGHT *DS-13*
Division of Assignment Cincinnati

SUGGESTION

It is suggested that memoranda for the SAC showing ~~contacts~~ with informants or potentials be posted according to the date of contact.

SECURITY INFORMANTS GENL.

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts) Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 3, paragraph 7, provides that memos for the SAC showing contacts with informants or potentials should be posted according to the date of the communication.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

Adherence to Bureau 45-day ~~informant~~ contact rule would automatically preclude an informant file from becoming delinquent.

Present system, in effect, almost necessitates a dual tickler system in order to assure (a) informant file does not become delinquent, and (b) that 45-day contact is maintained.

The back of the assignment card would always reflect the last date of contact with informant, thereby negating a review of the file for this purpose. There is no basis on which to determine annual savings.

Disadvantages of suggestion

Determination of the date of communication reflecting contact with an informant would necessitate a review of the informant file.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States)

☒ Mr. ☐ Mrs. ☐ Miss

Myron E. Light
Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

This is an excellent suggestion. I recommend adoption. It is a desirable streamlining technique.

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

EX-101

52 OCT 28 1959

SEP 28 1959

SEP 28 1959

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2542-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue *JD*

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

DATE: October 22, 1959

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 DeLoach _____
 McGuire _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. This authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the month of September, the previous month of August, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	<u>September</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	55	71	4891
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	188	158	19727
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs, and Informants Developed	23	19	1757

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. The program in all offices has now achieved the momentum we feel is necessary to take advantage of the confusion and disillusionment which has developed in Communist Party ranks. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any offices regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3

REG-91

23 OCT 22 1959

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

EX 105

JDD:ras
 (3)

60 OCT 27 1959

Memorandum for Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

This program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development. It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

RWC

DATE OF MAIL 10-26-59

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL *Security Informants - General*

REMOVED BY 3 DEC 1959

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1185

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

F B I

Date: 11/16/59

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (66-2542-3)
 FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES
 RE: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES.

b7D

ReBulet dated 11/10/59.

A survey of all security informants who hold
 any union position is being made, the results of which
 will be submitted to the Bureau not later than 11/19/59.

3 - Bureau (AIR MAIL REGISTERED)
 1 - Los Angeles

HGB:bla
 (4)

cc - 1244

EX 100

REC-99

24 NOV 19 1959

INT. SEC.

Approved: W. B. E.

58 NOV 25 1959

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: November 25, 1959

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 DeLoach _____
 McGuire _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. This authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the month of October, the previous month of September, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	October	September	TOTAL
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	68	55	4951
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	153	188	19880
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs, and Informants Developed	13	23	1770

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. The program in all offices has now achieved the momentum we feel is necessary to take advantage of the confusion and disillusionment which has developed in Communist Party ranks. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any offices regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:frl
 (3)

60 DEC 1 1959

2 NOV 27 1959

Memorandum for Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

This program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development. It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

bk

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (66-2542-3)

DATE: 11/25/59

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (66-1851 C)

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

Summary

b6
b7C

Re San Francisco let 11/12/59 and Bulet 11/20/59.

Bulet questions why [redacted] had been added as a Bureau-approved PSI during the month of October and why [redacted] had been deleted during the same month.

Bulet pointed out that the Bureau had approved an interview with [redacted] and that the Bureau had received no communication deleting [redacted]

The Bureau is correct. The Bureau permission to interview [redacted] in Bulet 10/21/59 was misunderstood by the clerk to mean that Bureau permission to develop had been received. The clerk did not distinguish between the permission to interview and the permission to develop.

[redacted] was evaluated as "poor" during the Inspection of the San Francisco Office on 10/26/59, was the subject of a write-up as "poor" and on the Inspector's instructions was deleted and the case was closed.

- 4 - Bureau (AM-REG)
- 3 - San Francisco
- (1 66-1851-C)
- (1 [redacted])
- (1 [redacted])

HFC:hko #8
(7)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b7D

b7D

REC-4

EX-133

66-2542-3-1188

4 NOV 30 1959

INT. SEC.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 11/20/59

FROM : The Executives Conference

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #214-60
Submitted by SAs [redacted]
and Harry J. Morgan
Investigative Division

b6
b7C

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
DeLoach _____
McGuire _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

SUGGESTION: That the first page only of ~~the duplicate~~ copy of payment request letters received from the field which are stamped "Approved" at the Seat of Government be returned in those matters involving criminal, racial and security informants.

CURRENT PRACTICE: Section 108-J2 of the Manual of Instructions states when requesting authority (Re Informants) to expend an additional sum aggregating \$200 on authority of the SAC, the field is to submit an original and two copies of letter containing requests. If authority is granted, a copy of the letter will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned to the field. This will serve as authority to expend additional sum requested. Section 107 N-9 states when payments as requested by the field are approved, the duplicate copy of the recommendation for authority to make payments will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, of course, correspondence is prepared. At the present when a letter requesting authority to pay an informant in criminal, racial, and security matters is received at the Seat of Government, the duplicate copy in most cases is stamped "Approved" and returned to the field. Some of these letters run as high as 15 or more pages. If this suggestion is adopted, only the first page of the duplicate copy of the payment request letter will be submitted by the field so that if the SAC's payment request is approved, the copy will be so stamped and returned to the field.

OBSERVATIONS: The Investment Administrative and Domestic Intelligence Division ²³ ~~Page 100~~ that the suggestion should be adopted. It appears that adoption of this idea will result in a savings in space in ~~important~~ files and a reduction in the amount of paper being sent to and from the Bureau on these matters relating to the payment

Enclosures (5) *sent* 11-27-79
1-Mr. Clayton
1-Mr. Tamm
1-Personnel file of SA [redacted]
1-Personnel file of SA [redacted]
AGG:neh (7) *Harry J. Mohr*

b6
b7C

REVISION FOR MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

Security Informants - Gen

Section 107 N, Item 9, on page 12a, should be revised to read as follows:

"9. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the second copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field."

Section 108 J, Item 7, on page 9, should be revised to read as follows:

"7. Submit an original and two copies of the letter requesting continued payments to criminal informants, except that one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy of the letter requesting authority will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. This will serve as authority....."

Section 108 M, 8a, on page 13, should be revised to read as follows:

8.

a. All correspondence submitted by the field relative to payments to racial informants should be submitted in triplicate. However, when submitting letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant, one of the required copies should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field are approved, the single-page copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned.

AGG:meh (6). Based on memo from Exec. Conf. to Mr. Tolson dtd 11/20/59 re "Sugg #214-60"; AGG:meh

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
DeLoach _____
McGuire _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

66-2542-1

66-2542-3

NOV 27

NOV 27 1959

145/19

D

If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field. These regulations apply particularly to letters requesting authority to pay an informant on a continuing basis and letters submitted each four months thereafter justifying such payments."

Section 108 J, 2, on page 8, the second paragraph, should be revised to read as follows:

2.

"When requesting authority to expend an additional sum aggregating \$200 on authority of SAC, submit original and two copies of letter containing request; however, one of the copies should consist only of the first page of the letter. If authority granted, the single-page copy of the letter will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned to field office. This will serve as authority to expend additional sum requested. Letter must include statement and information required by paragraphs 3 and 4 (latter covering preceding authorization) of this section. If request not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to field. The last paragraph of letter requesting authority....."

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL

11-25-59

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Sec. Infts.

REMOVED BY

55 DEC 14 1959

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1184

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

F310

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *ffj*

DATE: December 28, 1959

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue *K*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM *- general*

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 DeLoach _____
 McGuire _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the month of November, the previous month of October, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	November	October	TOTAL
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	83	68	5042
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	157	153	20037
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs, and Informants Developed	30	13	1800

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

EX-124 REC-70 66-2542-3-1190

23 DEC 29 1959

This program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development. It saves much

66-2542-3

53 JAN 4 1960

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:cef;djw (3)

ST
1/1/59

(H) - INFORMANTS AND SOURCES - PAYMENTS -- When writing letters to the Bureau requesting authority with regard to making payments to Criminal, Security or Racial Informants, one of the required copies of such letters should consist only of the first page of the letter. This single-page copy will be used by the Bureau when approving the field's request for authority and after being appropriately stamped "Approved" at the Bureau will be returned to the requesting office. This procedure will serve to reduce somewhat the volume of pages being sent to and from the Bureau on these matters. Manual revisions will be furnished in the near future. As in the past, when a request is not approved, separate correspondence will be sent to the field. Consideration is being given to extending this procedure to other similar correspondence. O

SECURITY INFORMANTS - GEN'L

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-1-83 BY SP8B TS/BCE

166-2542-3 -
NOT RECORDED
102 DEC 15 1959

12/1/59
SAC LETTER NO. 59-72

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-2909

67 DEC 17 1959 477

DATE OF MAIL

12-29-57

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Sec. Infs. - gen.

REMOVED BY

55 JAN 6 1960

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1191

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 4, 1960

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM (SIP)GeneralEVALUATION OF PROGRAM

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
DeLoach	_____
McGuire	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Gandy	_____

SYNOPSIS:

Due to success of Toplev Program which was instituted in 1951 (interviews of top-level Communist Party (CP) functionaries), the Security Informant Program was instituted in 1952 whereby persons of lesser importance would be contacted to obtain additional informants in the Party. The primary purpose of the program is to develop persons currently active in the CP into Bureau informants and such individuals, if developed while still in the CP, can immediately produce current information of value whereas persons with no CP affiliation who are willing to be developed as informants, require considerable time before they can produce information of value. In addition, these interviews crystallize the status of security subjects as to attitude and dangerousness and also cause considerable disruption and confusion within the CP itself. In April and May, 1956, this program of approaching active communists was combined with our General Interview Program of contacting security subjects and the resultant current program now embodies contacts not only with active communists but other subversive individuals, the purpose of the interviews being to obtain potential informant material. Since the inception of the program in 1951, 5,042 active communists have been contacted and 20,037 other individuals have been contacted since the extension of the program in 1956. As a result, we have obtained 1800 sources, potential security informants, and informants. Through continued use of this program, our informant coverage will be extended and disruption in the CP will continue and any expansion of Party or new CP activity will be promptly detected.

RECOMMENDATION:

Since program has proved to be worthwhile, it is recommended it be continued under our present policies and procedures and the continuance of the program again be considered in six months.

66-2542-3

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:cef
(4)

62 JAN 11 1960

REC-11

66-2542-3-1192

JAN 7 1960

Donohue

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3

DETAILS:

This memorandum contains the results of a complete review and evaluation of this program and a recommendation that the program be continued.

1. Origin

Due to the success of the Toplev Program instituted in 1951 (interviews of top-level Communist Party (CP) functionaries), the SIP was instituted in 1952 whereby persons of lesser importance in the CP were contacted to obtain additional informants in the CP.

2. Purpose

The primary purpose of instant program is to develop persons currently active in the CP into Bureau informants. Such individuals, if developed while still in the CP, can immediately produce current information of value whereas persons with no CP affiliation, if willing to be developed as CP informants, require considerable time before they can produce information of value. Another factor to be considered in conducting interviews under the SIP is the disruption and confusion such interviews have caused within the CP itself.

3. Scope

In 1952, Agents in 23 field offices were given specialized training (this included 14 offices trained for Toplev interviews). In 1954, the SIP was further extended through the medium of special training sessions whereby additional Agents were trained in all continental offices to make approaches to active communists. In April and May, 1956, our program of approaching active communists was combined with the general interview program of contacting security subjects of all types and the resultant program is known generally as the SIP.

4. Tie-in with Other Programs

This program is handled as a special project. It is noted, however, it is similar to the Toplev Program which deals with the interviews of top-level and hard-core communists whereas the SIP deals with interviews of persons of lesser importance.

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3

5. Case Load

As of 12/1/59, a total of 5,042 active communists and 20,037 other individuals were contacted under the SIP. All continental offices, except 28, submit monthly progress letters showing interviews conducted. The 28 offices have conducted all logical interviews with persons suitable for informant development and are required to submit a six-month progress letter.

6. Magnitude

The provisions and instructions formulated in connection with the SIP govern the interviews of persons considered for security informant development in all continental offices.

7. Weaknesses

There are no known weaknesses in the SIP.

8. Administrative Control

All continental offices (with the exception of 28) must submit monthly progress letters. The 28 offices must submit progress letters every six months.

Through analysis of progress letters an accurate evaluation of the effectiveness of the SIP can be made. Close supervision and control is possible and any weaknesses are immediately corrected by issuance of necessary instructions to the office involved.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the month of November, the previous month of October and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	November	October	TOTAL
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Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

9. Adequacy and Currentness of Instructions

Instructions pertaining to the SIP are contained in Section 87 D of the Manual of Instructions and have been reviewed and have been found to be adequate.

10. Over-all Value

The over-all value of the SIP is clearly emphasized by the fact that 1,800 sources, PSIs, and informants have been developed through this program. Through the continued use of the SIP the Bureau's security informant coverage will be extended, confusion in the CP will continue, and any expansion of or new CP activity will be promptly detected.

11. Contemplated Action

It is contemplated the development of security informants will be continued through the SIP. It will be closely supervised, followed, and afforded tight administrative control.

Date

December 4, 1959

To:

Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name)

SA

Division of Assignment

PHILADELPHIA

b6

b7C

SUGGESTION During the past several years, through the interview program, several CP members have admitted CP membership and furnished information concerning others in the movement at the same time. Before a 134 file is closed, it is necessary to review the file to determine whether the informant could furnish information or be a witness in SGE cases. Therefore, when agent dictates on file where subject is deceased or it is learned subject is deceased, the word "Deceased" should be marked on the file cover or placed on a yellow sheet inside file above the top serial. Also, subject's master index card should be marked "deceased".

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts)

Current practice is the placing of a memorandum in the file which becomes buried as additional information is received and serialized.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

The main advantage to this suggestion would be the great saving of investigative time. An estimate of time saved cannot be determined at this time. However, on one particular case it required a file review of 45 minutes to locate a serial in the file indicating subject was "deceased".

Disadvantages of suggestion

It is felt the time taken by a clerk to stamp the file cover and index card would be minimized in the saving of investigative time in reviewing those files.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of any claim against the United States)

☒ Mr.

☐ Mrs.

☐ Miss

heirs, or

Special

Signature and Title of Suggester: Agent

Recommendations and comments of Division Head: While I feel there is merit to the suggestion as submitted, nevertheless, the procedure would require constant following and could become burdensome. I feel that there are an insufficient number of instances where substantial savings would result. Unfavorable.

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

50 JAN 11 1960

62 JAN 21 1960

50 JAN 6 1960

23 DEC 1959

December 4, 1959

To: Director, FBI From: (Suggester's name) SA [redacted] Division of Assignment: PHILADELPHIA

SUGGESTION During the past several years, through the interview program, several CP members have admitted CP membership and furnished information concerning others in the movement at the same time. Before a 134 file is closed, it is necessary to review the file to determine whether the informant could furnish information or be a witness in SGE cases. Therefore, when agent dictates on file where subject is deceased or it is learned subject is deceased, the word "Deceased" should be marked on the file cover or placed on a yellow sheet inside file above the top serial. Also, subject's master index card should be marked "deceased".

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☒ Mr. ☐ Mrs. ☐ Miss

Special Agent

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(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

ADDENDUM: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

12-28-59

The Domestic Intelligence Division concurs with the recommendation and observations of SAC Carl E. Hennrich that the recommendation of SA [] not be adopted.

b6
b7C

SA [] recommendation, if adopted, would require constant following and could become burdensome. It is believed that there are but few occasions when the file of a deceased security informant is reviewed. The extra work and administrative handling of files in connection with SA [] suggestion would more than offset any benefit to be derived through his suggestion.

BFR:ssh
ssd

BR
R
auths

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *abs*

DATE: January 15, 1960

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*SUBJECT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND~~
~~SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE~~

EVALUATION OF PROGRAM

Tolson	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
DeLoach	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

*Moore**Baumgardner*SYNOPSIS:

As a result of the first Judith Coplon trial in 1949, we re-evaluated the procedures then in effect for the justification and approval of technical installations, mail covers and trash covers in both domestic intelligence and general investigative matters. A complete analysis was also made of our live confidential informant coverage in both security and criminal fields in order to delete worthless informants and to secure accurate figures covering active and productive informants. In accordance with the Director's request and in order to assure prompt monthly submission of such data to the Bureau, this program was instituted whereby each office must furnish by the fifteenth of each month information concerning the total number of technical and microphone surveillances, the total number of mail and trash covers and the number of live confidential informants broken down into specific categories; namely, security, criminal and racial. After receipt of these data a memorandum is prepared by the twenty-fifth of each month for the Director's information. Program provides at a glance progress each office is making in its coverage and summary of all statistics immediately gives the Bureau-wide picture for each category.

RECOMMENDATION:

Since program has proved to be worthwhile it is recommended it be continued under our present policies and procedures and the continuance of the program again be considered in six months.

66-2542-3

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:ssh
(4)

62 JAN 25 1960

REC-32

EX 109

66-2542-3-1194-5
2 JAN 20 1960

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE
66-2542-3

This memorandum contains the results of a complete review and evaluation of this program and the recommendation that the program be continued.

1. Origin

As an outgrowth of the first Judith Coplon trial during 1949 at Washington, D. C., steps were taken to re-evaluate procedures then in use for the justification and approval of technical installations, mail covers, and trash covers in both domestic intelligence and general investigative matters. At the same time a complete analysis was made of the confidential informant coverage in both security and criminal fields throughout the Bureau in order to delete worthless ones and to secure accurate figures covering active and productive informants. In accordance with the Director's request and in order to assure the prompt, monthly submission of such data to the Bureau, SAC Letter #12 dated 2-7-50 instructed each office to submit to the Bureau by 2-15-50 and by the fifteenth of each month thereafter, information regarding the total number of technical and microphone installations, the total number of mail and trash covers, and the number of confidential informants broken down into three categories covering national defense, general investigative, and atomic energy matters. (Separate classification for atomic energy informants not required after 3-20-51).

2. Purpose

This program was instituted to provide a monthly record of the total number of informant sources as described under item one above. After receipt of these letters from the field, a memorandum is prepared by the 25th of each month for the Director's information, showing the breakdown of informant and similar coverage by office and summarizing the over-all picture.

3. Scope

This is an active program in all field divisions of the Bureau. It entails the submission of a letter every month by each field office and the preparation of a memorandum each month by the Security Informants - Special Records Desk, Internal Security Section. After Bureau supervision of security and criminal informants was designated

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE
66-2542-3

separately during 1950 to the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Investigative Division respectively, instructions were issued the field in No. Number SAC Letter dated 3-20-51 to henceforth include only the total number of security informants and potential security informants in monthly letters. However, the summary memorandum prepared by the Security Informants - Special Records Desk, Internal Security Section, has always included statistics concerning the number of criminal informants and potential criminal informants for the Director's information. Since 3-51 these figures have been furnished separately each month by the Investigative Division for inclusion in afore-mentioned memorandum. Effective with the memorandum submitted in March, 1959, the number of racial informants and potential racial informants are also included in the summary memorandum.

4. Tie-in with other Programs

This program is the medium through which the Bureau is kept advised on a monthly basis of the over-all accomplishments by the field in the entire field of live informants and other types of coverage.

5. Case Load

Each field office maintains a control file for instructions and other communications relating to the program.

6. Magnitude

The program receives close personal supervision of the Supervisor-in-Charge and in order that it be maintained properly approximately 5% of the time of one clerical employee is utilized.

7. Past or Present Weaknesses

Analysis of this program has not disclosed any weaknesses existing at the present time.

8. Administrative Controls

The field is required under this program to submit their letters to reach the Bureau by the 15th of each month. This is watched closely and if a letter is not received promptly the particular office involved is requested by airtel to submit its figures immediately.

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE
66-2542-3

9. Adequacy and Currentness of Instructions


The last change relative to this program was issued in No Number SAC Letter #56-A dated 1-16-56. Review of outstanding instructions disclosed they are adequate.

10. Over-all Value

The primary purpose of this program is to provide a current picture, on a month-to-month basis, of the total number of existing informant sources in both security and general investigative matters throughout the Bureau. It affords at a glance the progress each office is making in its coverage, and the summary of all statistics furnished by the field immediately gives the Bureau-wide picture for each component category. It also brings to the attention of the SAC each month the total coverage of various types in his office.

11. Contemplated Action

No action is currently contemplated to either expand or curtail this program.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: January 26, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of December, the previous month of November, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	December	November	TOTAL
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	78	83	5120
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	149	157	20186
C. Results Number of Sources, PSI and Informants Developed	21	30	1821

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

16 JAN 27 1960

ACTION:

This program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development. It saves much

66-2542-3

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:dju:ser (3)

51 FEB 2 1960 440

Security Informants

Donohue

Memorandum to Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.



UNITED STATES

IDENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 12, 1960

FROM : F. A. FROBOSH

SUBJECT: PROTECTING IDENTITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
CONFRONTATION ISSUE

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Gandy _____

Mr. Ingram

"The U.S. Law Week" of 12/8/59 reported that the Supreme Court will hear arguments on two cases involving the right of confrontation. The two cases simultaneously are: Hannah versus [redacted]. Argument is scheduled for 1/19/60.

The cases involve the President's Civil Rights Commission which was established by the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1957 to investigate charges of citizens being discriminatorily deprived of the right to vote. The question raised for the Supreme Court is whether the Civil Rights Act of 1957 authorizes the Civil Rights Commission to conduct hearings wherein state registrars and private citizens accused of depriving others of the right to vote are denied notice of charges against them and confrontation.

Although the hearings held by the Civil Rights Commission are investigative rather than judicial or punitive such as the normal Government hearing, the argument and the Supreme Court decision in these cases could shed some light on the issue of confrontation as well as the investigative agency's right to protect the identity of confidential informants. These are the two cases which the "Washington Post" commented upon editorially on 12/14/59 supporting the Civil Rights Commission's hearing procedures in that it was necessary that the Commission protect their confidential informants from reprisals by segregationists.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

NOT RECORDED

47 JAN 21 1960

JJD:hke (6)

1-Mr. Belmont
 1-Mr. Baumgardner
 1-Mr. L. E. Conroy
 1-Mr. Daunt
 1-Liaison

18 JAN 21 1960

INT. SEC.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-10-16

51 JAN 28 1960

Date

1/14/60

To:

Director, FBI

Division of Assignment
BALTIMORE

b6
b7C

SUGGESTION

Re: Section 108 J, Manual of Instructions - Suggest that letter to Bureau requesting additional authorization for payments to CI merely contain info submitted since last semi-annual report rather than all information paid for since last authorization.

Informants

Security Informants

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts)

See Section 108J, Manual of Instructions, 4 A, B, C, D, E

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

Will save both Agent and Steno time in preparation for, dictating, and transcribing dictation.

Disadvantages of suggestion

NONE

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis assigns upon the United States)

☒ Mr.

☐ Mrs.

☐ Miss

b6
b7C

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

Favorable recommendation since considerable amount of necessary information already obtained by agent, dictated, transcribed and in file both at SOG and in field office in the semiannual reports

EX-100, Signature and Title

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

3 - Bureau

3 - Baltimore

(1 - 66-2269, 1 - 66-2431, 1 - Personnel file SA [redacted])

GTQ:epd

18 JAN 19 1960

50 FEB 3 1960

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2548-3

DATE OF MAIL 1-25-60

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL *Sec. Infts. - General*

REMOVED BY 55 FEB 11 1960

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1197

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

18

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. MC GUTHIE

FROM : L. E. SHORT

SUBJECT: RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(66-18966)

DATE: 10-27-59

Tolson ☒

Belmont ☒

DeLoach ☒

McGuire ☒

Mohr ☒

Parsons ☒

Rosen ☒

Tamm ☒

Trotter ☒

W.C. Sullivan ☒

Tele. Room ☒

Gandy ☒

Marshall

Security Informants - General

Reference is made to SAC Letter 59-43 (C) wherein we requested suggestions and observations to strengthen the Bureau's Records Management Program.

By letter dated 10-2-59, the SAC, San Francisco, points out that often a copy of a lengthy informant report is designated for the file of a subject and actually only one pertinent point relating to the subject is included in the report, i.e., his attendance at a meeting, new address, new employment, etc. The SAC suggests that the agents handling informants be permitted to utilize a special pre-printed memorandum form which will require only a short entry of the pertinent information. The SAC points out that with multilith equipment, it would be a simple matter to prepare pre-printed forms for each productive informant.

RECORDS BRANCH OBSERVATIONS:

This suggestion has merit from a records management standpoint in that it would eliminate the placing of a complete informant report in each subject matter file when only a small portion of the report may relate to the subject of the file. The observations of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Training and Inspection Division should be secured prior to final consideration of this suggestion.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the observations of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Training and Inspection Division be secured prior to final consideration of this suggestion.

66-2542-3-

66-2542-2-

NOT RECORDED

46 NOV 18 1959

SEE ADDENDUM, PAGE TWO

10 NOV 18 1959

JAN 18 1960

TWO

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-18966-123

ADDENDUM - DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

JDD:ssh/ 10-29-59

SAC, San Francisco, suggests that Agents handling informants be permitted to utilize special pre-printed memorandum form which will require only a short entry of pertinent information for channelization to the pertinent file. This would obviate the necessity of channelizing a complete copy of a lengthy informant report which would contain only one pertinent point relating to the subject included in the report; i.e., his attendance at a meeting, new address, new employment, et cetera.

Section 107 G of the Manual of Instructions, requires that all information furnished by informants must be promptly reviewed, recorded, indexed, evaluated, and channelized. Instructions also state that Form FD-306 may be used in lieu of a channelizing memorandum if desired. SAC, San Francisco, does not mention Form FD-306 and it is believed this Form can be used for the purpose indicated. FD-306 contains space to record the manner and date when a report is received, date of activity, date of report, and considerable blank space for remarks. There is no reason why under "Remarks" a short excerpt of the pertinent data relating to a subject may not be included and the form channelized to the appropriate file. There does not appear to be any need for a pre-printed memorandum form as suggested by the SAC and Form FD-306 appears adequate.

In view of the above Domestic Intelligence Division does not recommend that this suggestion be adopted.

ADDENDUM - TRAINING AND INSPECTION DIVISION:

(KWW:mbk 11-13-59)

This division concurs with the observations of the Domestic Intelligence Division and it is recommended that the suggested form not be adopted.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *abw*

DATE: February 9, 1960

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *MB*

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS COVERAGE
(ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CP IN EACH FIELD OFFICE)
 EVALUATION OF PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

This memorandum summarizes review and evaluation of this program and contains recommendation that program be continued.

1. ORIGIN

Bulet 8-7-58 instructed each continental field division, except San Francisco and Los Angeles, to submit detailed survey of Communist Party (CP) organization within its territory setting forth organizational structure, identities of all officers and functionaries from club to district level, identities of each individual CP member, and current informant coverage. Copies of this letter were not directed to San Francisco or Los Angeles inasmuch as they had submitted current information of this type. Replies from the various field offices were thoroughly analyzed and results reflected over-all informant coverage to be good. Certain divisions had areas where additional coverage was needed and instant program has been carried on to emphasize to the field the necessity of expanding security informant coverage to cover these weak areas.

2. PURPOSE

The primary objective of this program has been to pinpoint areas in the field where informant coverage of the Party needs strengthening. It affords a means whereby the Seat of Government can direct concentrated, intensive efforts in those offices where this need for coverage is most urgent, and assures continuous attention to make certain the desired coverage is effected as rapidly as possible.

3. SCOPE

As delinquencies in this respect are overcome in an office, that office is dropped from this program. At present, the program is in effect in the nine following offices:

66-2542-3

1 - Mr. Parsons
 1 - Mr. Belmont *234*
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

51 FEB 16 1960
 JDB:clw (5)

REC-15

66-2542-3-1198

12 FEB 11 1960

114 SEC
 114 SEC

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

Albany	New York
Boston	Pittsburgh
Buffalo	Salt Lake City
Miami	Seattle
Washington	

Each of the above offices has been separately instructed to take immediate steps to obtain additional coverage within those areas needing particular attention.

4. TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This particular program ties in with our other programs whereby we are endeavoring to ascertain and identify membership of the CP and to determine the financial operations and apparatus of the CP, USA. An important adjunct of this intensified program, of course, is the development of additional informants who are in the position of producing valuable intelligence information on individual communists which is of great value to the Security Index Program.

5. CASE LOAD

Each field office maintains a control file for instructions and other communications relating to the program.

6. MAGNITUDE

Each individual office which is being followed under this program is closely supervised by the appropriate supervisor of the Security Informant - Special Records Desk.

7. PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

An analysis and re-evaluation of the program have not disclosed any weaknesses at the present time.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

Each of the nine offices presently being followed under this program is receiving close attention on a periodic basis by the appropriate supervisor. For example, the Seattle Office has excellent coverage except for one area, and under this program Seattle is required to furnish a quarterly letter showing what progress has been made and

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

what steps are being contemplated to effect proper coverage of this area. Similarly, the New York Office is being followed regularly for the same purpose in connection with several specific sections of county organizations covered by that division. As each office reports its progress, the results are carefully analyzed and any necessary instructions and directions are transmitted to the field by the supervisor to make certain this program receives continuing attention.

9. ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of instructions which have been given to each of the field offices under the program discloses that they are adequate and current.

10. OVER-ALL VALUE

The primary purpose of this program is to pinpoint for the field those areas of security informant coverage which need strengthening. In addition, the field has been instructed to take steps to develop additional coverage in those particular areas which will result in obtaining more informants in the security field.

11. CONTEMPLATED ACTION

No action is currently contemplated to expand this program.

RECOMMENDATION:

This program serves a definite purpose in guiding the field toward strengthening areas of weak informant coverage, and it is recommended that the program be continued, with further evaluation to be made again in six months.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 9, 1960

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS COVERAGE
(ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CP IN EACH FIELD OFFICE)

EVALUATION OF PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

Attached memorandum summarizes a review and evaluation of this program and contains a recommendation that it be continued. The primary purpose of this program is to pinpoint areas in the field where informant coverage of the Communist Party needs strengthening. It is a means whereby the Seat of Government directs concentrated, intensive efforts in those offices where this need for coverage is most urgent and assures continuous attention to make certain the desired coverage is effected as rapidly as possible. When program started a year ago, there were 15 offices involved, and this has been reduced to nine at the present time, which are set forth as follows: Albany, Boston, Buffalo, Miami, New York, Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, Seattle, and Washington. Each of these offices has been separately instructed to take immediate steps to obtain additional coverage in those areas needing attention.

ACTION:

Since this program serves a definite purpose in guiding the field toward strengthening areas of weak informant coverage, it is recommended that it be continued with further evaluation again in six months.

Enclosure

66-2542-3

EX 109

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:djw
(5)

REC-15

66-2542-3-1199

12 FEB 11 1960

51 FEB 16 1960

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 2/9/60

FROM : Mr. Malone

SECURITY INFORMANTS

SUBJECT: ~~INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SECURITY~~ *GEN'L* *whittaker*
~~INFORMANTS AND SOURCES, CHANNELIZATION~~ *Belmont*

Tolson	<i>[initials]</i>
Mohr	<i>[initials]</i>
Parsons	<i>[initials]</i>
Belmont	<i>[initials]</i>
Callahan	<i>[initials]</i>
DeLoach	<i>[initials]</i>
Malone	<i>[initials]</i>
McGuire	<i>[initials]</i>
Rosen	<i>[initials]</i>
Tamm	<i>[initials]</i>
Trotter	<i>[initials]</i>
W.C. Sullivan	<i>[initials]</i>
Tele. Room	<i>[initials]</i>
Ingram	<i>[initials]</i>
Gandy	<i>[initials]</i>

SYNOPSIS: Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles and New York offices surveyed relative to procedure proposed by San Juan whereby block stamp would be typed on stencil when sufficient memoranda are needed to prepare one in connection with channelization of information received from security informants and sources. Date used in block stamp would be date typing was completed. All offices surveyed favored procedure and recommended it be adopted. Chicago, Detroit and Los Angeles have been using procedure for some time, but New York has never used it. There were no objections to using date typing was completed in block stamp. New York suggested that copies bearing the block stamp not be sent to other offices as it creates confusion. No action taken on New York's suggestions that supervisor not be permitted to initial stencil in block stamp and that block stamp be obtained which would cut the stencil and be placed on stencil by mimeographer.

RECOMMENDATION: That the enclosed SAC letter advising all offices of the above procedure be approved. No manual changes are recommended.

11-ENCLOSURE
(Suggestions)

[initials]
2/12

[initials]
7/12

[initials]

EX-105

REC-88

66-2542-3-1200

11 FEB 17 1960

Enclosure sent 2-12-60
FMB:meh
(2)

50 FEB 19 1960

2-fmb

Memorandum to Mr. Mohr from Malone
Re: Information Received from Security
Informants and Sources, Channelization

DETAILS

BACKGROUND: San Juan requested Bureau approval UACB to type the block stamp on a stencil when sufficient memoranda are needed to prepare one in connection with channelization of information received from security informants and sources. The date used in the block stamp would be the date the typing was completed. It was pointed out that this procedure would obviate the need for a clerical employee to date stamp the numerous channelization memoranda. It was felt by the Training and Inspection Division that this procedure might be helpful to all offices and a letter dated 1/26/60, was sent to Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Detroit and Atlanta for their views. The results are set out below.

RESULTS OF SURVEY:

ATLANTA: Feels that the procedure would be helpful to all offices.

CHICAGO: Suggestion has definite merit and is recommended favorably. Will obviate need for subsequent individual date stamping of numerous channelization memoranda. Has used a comparable procedure for some time. Memoranda are run off by multilithing rather than mimeographing. Chicago has ascertained that multilith company markets "duplimat stamp pad ink." For some time Chicago has used such stamp pad ink in a regular stamp pad and has used a regular date stamp machine in stamping the date stamp upon the multilith material before it is duplicated. The special ink thus date stamped is fully reproduced when the material is run off.

Chicago also advised that the date when typing was completed would be satisfactory as the date of the block stamp. Chicago requested consideration be given to advising the field of the "duplimat stamp pad ink" for use in connection with multilithing of material.

DETROIT: Has been using this procedure for some time; however, the stenographer has been leaving the day of the month off of the mat and the clerical employee operating the multilith machine has been inserting the date just prior to running the mat off. There would be no objections to having the block stamp show the date typing was completed. Detroit has found this procedure to be most satisfactory in saving a considerable amount of

Memorandum to Mr. Mohr from Malone
Re: Information Received from Security
Informants and Sources, Channelization

clerical time in handling channelization memoranda and believes it is a technique which could be used throughout the field.

LOS ANGELES: Has been using the procedure for many years and has found it most helpful and time saving. The date the typing was completed as used in the block stamp has proved satisfactory to the Los Angeles Division.

NEW YORK: New York has never used this procedure. It has experienced difficulty when other offices have used this procedure and sent a copy of the memorandum prepared with the block stamp thereon to the New York office. New York employees have to cross out block stamp and insert another one; sometimes there is no room for the New York block stamp. Another problem is that some offices will have the supervisor initial the stencil in the block stamp so that it makes it ready for filing; therefore, when it arrives in New York it creates confusion. New York recommends that favorable consideration be given to procedure with following restrictions:

1. That it not be permitted on an intraoffice memorandum sent interoffice.
2. That the supervisor not be permitted to initial the stencil in the block stamp as the Agent to whom the case is assigned is entitled to see the correspondence.
3. That a block stamp be obtained which would cut the stencil and the block stamp be placed on the stencil by the mimeographer.

New York sees no objections to using date typing was completed for the block stamp date.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION: From the comments of the above offices, it is felt that the procedure is a time saving one and that it would be of assistance to all offices. It is felt that the block stamp should not appear on copies being sent to other field offices. It is recommended that an SAC letter be sent to the field advising all offices of this procedure.

No action is being taken concerning New York's suggestion that the supervisor not be permitted to initial the stencil in the block stamp as the Agent to whom the case is assigned is entitled to see the correspondence. It is felt that this matter of initialing the stencil should be governed by the particular circumstances involved and should be handled by the field offices

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Atlanta (134-0)

DATE: 2/2/60

ATT.: TRAINING & INSPECTION DIV.

SUBJECT: INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SECURITY
INFORMANTS AND SOURCES, CHANNELIZATION

ReBulet to Los Angeles, 1/26/60.

Atlanta feels that the procedure of typing the
date stamp on a stencil as recommended by the
San Juan Office, according to relet, would be
helpful to all offices.

REC'D - A-100

FBI

2 Bureau
1 Atlanta

CTH:hs
(3)

EX-105

REC-88

ENCLOSURE

15 FEB 4 1960

17

Transmitted to Atlanta
2-1-60
2-11-60
Jm

TWO

Director, FBI

2/2/60

SAC, Atlanta (134-0)

ATT.: TRAINING & INSPECTION DIV.

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SECURITY
INFORMANTS AND SOURCES, CHANNELIZATION

ReBulet to Los Angeles, 1/26/60.

Atlanta feels that the procedure of typing the
date stamp on a stencil as recommended by the
San Juan Office, according to relet, would be
helpful to all offices.

2 Bureau
1 Atlanta

CTH:hs
(3)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 2-1-60

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

ATTENTION: TRAINING AND INSPECTION
DIVISIONSUBJECT: INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SECURITY
INFORMANTS AND SOURCES, CHANNELIZATION

ReBulet to Los Angeles dated 1/26/60 concerning typing of date stamp on stencil in connection with channelization of information received from security informants.

This suggestion has definite merit and is recommended favorably by this office. As Bureau letter pointed out, procedure will obviate need for subsequent individual date stamping of numerous channelization memoranda.

The Chicago Office has for some time utilized a comparable procedure in connection with the date stamping of numerous channelizing memoranda which are run off by multilithing rather than mimeographing.

With regard to multilith material, Chicago Office ascertained that multilith company markets "duplimat stamp pad ink." For some time Chicago has used such stamp pad ink in a regular stamp pad and has used a regular date stamp machine in stamping the date stamp upon the multilith material before it is duplicated. The special ink thus date stamped on the material is fully reproduced when the material is run off.

This has proven a definite time saver in eliminating the necessity of individually block stamping the voluminous material after it has been reproduced. It is realized that this procedure could not be used on mimeographed reproduction. However, the typing of date stamp data on the stencil as suggested would serve a similar purpose and save appreciable clerical time.

② - Bureau
1 - Chicago
JML:HFM
(3)

REC-88
EX-105

ENCLOSURE

FEB 4 1960

17

memo Malone to Mohr
2-9-60
SAC letter typed
2-11-60
JML

Typed

REC-88
EX-105
FBI

DIRECTOR, FBI

Regarding the question re the date of the block stamp itself, it would appear that use of the date when typing was completed would be satisfactory and would not involve too much delay before the printed copies reached CCO.

It is recommended, therefore, that the suggestion be adopted, and the Bureau may also wish to consider advising the field concerning the availability of "duplimat stamp pad ink" for similar use in connection with multilithing of material.

DIRECTOR, FBI

2-1-60

SAC, CHICAGO

ATTENTION: TRAINING AND INSPECTION
DIVISION

**INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SECURITY
INFORMANTS AND SOURCES, CHANNELIZATION**

ReBulet to Los Angeles dated 1/26/60 concerning typing of date stamp on stencil in connection with channelization of information received from security informants.

This suggestion has definite merit and is recommended favorably by this office. As Bureau letter pointed out, procedure will obviate need for subsequent individual date stamping of numerous channelization memoranda.

The Chicago Office has for some time utilized a comparable procedure in connection with the date stamping of numerous channelizing memoranda which are run off by multilithing rather than mimeographing.

With regard to multilith material, Chicago Office ascertained that multilith company markets "duplimat stamp pad ink." For some time Chicago has used such stamp pad ink in a regular stamp pad and has used a regular date stamp machine in stamping the date stamp upon the multilith material before it is duplicated. The special ink thus date stamped on the material is fully reproduced when the material is run off.

This has proven a definite time saver in eliminating the necessity of individually block stamping the voluminous material after it has been reproduced. It is realized that this procedure could not be used on mimeographed reproduction. However, the typing of date stamp data on the stencil as suggested would serve a similar purpose and save appreciable clerical time.

② - Bureau
1 - Chicago
JML:HFM
(3)

DIRECTOR, FBI

Regarding the question re the date of the block stamp itself, it would appear that use of the date when typing was completed would be satisfactory and would not involve too much delay before the printed copies reached CCO.

It is recommended, therefore, that the suggestion be adopted, and the Bureau may also wish to consider advising the field concerning the availability of "duplimat stamp pad ink" for similar use in connection with multilithing of material.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: January 29, 1960

FROM : SAC, Detroit (134-00)

Attention: Training and Inspection DivisionSUBJECT: INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SECURITY
INFORMANTS AND SOURCES, CHANNELIZATION

ReBulet to Los Angeles dated January 26, 1960.

The Detroit Office has for some time utilized the technique of typing the blockstamp on multilith mats when channelization memoranda were being prepared. The stenographer has been leaving the day of the month off of the mat and the clerical employee operating the multilith machine has been inserting the date just prior to running the mat off.

A review of this matter reflects that there is currently no substantial delay between the time that the mat is originally typed and run off. Therefore, there would be no objections if it was decided that the stenographer would be allowed to completely type the blockstamp at the time she completed her typing assignment.

The Detroit Office has found this to be most satisfactory in saving a considerable amount of clerical time in handling channelization memoranda. It is our observation that this technique could be utilized throughout the field. I have also been advised that there is stamp pad ink available which will reproduce when applied to a multilith mat. Therefore, the possibility exist that multilith mats could be blockstamped at the time they were approved and thus save time for the stenographer.

③ - Bureau
1 - Detroit

WLS/mac
(4)

REC- 88

EX- 105

ENCLOSURE

11 FEB 17 1960

memo Malone to Mohr
2-4-60
SAC letter typed
2-11-60
fmb

THO
fmb

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : *WLS* SAC, LOS ANGELES (134-0)

SUBJECT: INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SECURITY
INFORMANTS AND SOURCES, CHANNELIZATION.

DATE: 1/28/60

ReBulet 1/26/60.

The Los Angeles Office has been using the procedure referred to in reBulet for many years and has found it most helpful and timesaving. As mentioned in reflet, the procedure obviates the need for a clerical employee to date stamp the numerous copies of channelizing memoranda. The date the typing was completed as used in the block stamp has proved satisfactory to the Los Angeles Division, and excessive delay has not been experienced before the printed copy reaches the Chief Clerk's Office.

- ② - Bureau
 1 - New York
 1 - Chicago
 1 - Detroit
 1 - Atlanta
 1 - Los Angeles

EFL:DRU
 (7)

*Memo Malone to Walsh
 2-9-60
 sac letter typed
 2-11-60
 fms*

EX-105

REC-88

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-1200

11 FEB 17 1960

THORNTON

DIRECTOR, FBI

1/28/60

SAC, LOS ANGELES (134-0)

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SECURITY
INFORMANTS AND SOURCES, CHANNELIZATION

ReBulet 1/26/60.

The Los Angeles Office has been using the procedure referred to in reBulet for many years and has found it most helpful and timesaving. As mentioned in reflet, the procedure obviates the need for a clerical employee to date stamp the numerous copies of channelizing memoranda. The date the typing was completed as used in the block stamp has proved satisfactory to the Los Angeles Division, and excessive delay has not been experienced before the printed copy reaches the Chief Clerk's Office.

- (2) - Bureau
- 1 - New York
- 1 - Chicago
- 1 - Detroit
- 1 - Atlanta
- 1 - Los Angeles

KFL:DRU

(7)

Letter to Director

Re: Info. Rec'd from Sec. Infs.
and Sources, Channelization

Another problem is that some offices will have the supervisor initial the stencil in the block stamp so that it makes it ready for filing. Again upon arrival in the New York Office it creates additional confusion in that from all appearances, without a further check, it is ready for filing. Another objection of the New York Office has been that other offices have utilized all remaining space for their block stamp leaving no space for the New York block stamp. The Bureau will note in the sample copy transmitted to the New York Office that the only remaining space for the New York block stamp is in the center or upper part of the channelizing memorandum. To place a block stamp on the center or upper portion of the memorandum is in our opinion undesirable. We have had instances where the only place on the memorandum left to place a block stamp is on the very top of the memorandum.

In conclusion, the NYO recommends that favorable consideration be given to the suggestion of the San Juan Office if the Bureau places certain restrictions, namely:

1. That it not be permitted on an intra-office memorandum sent inter-office.
2. That the supervisor not be permitted to initial the stencil in the block stamp as the agent to whom the case is assigned is entitled to see the correspondence.
3. That a block stamp be obtained which would cut the stencil and the block stamp be placed on the stencil by the mimeographer. The NYO is of the opinion from observation of the copies prepared by the Chicago Office that possibly it has such a stamp. Chicago is requested to advise the Bureau if this is the case.

Letter to Director

Re: Info Rec'd from Sec.

Infs. and Sources, Channelization

With reference to the Bureau requesting that we comment as to whether or not the date the typing was completed will be satisfactory for the block stamp date, the New York Office sees no objection to this. On the other hand, it would be more desirable if an appropriate block stamp were obtained whereby the mimeographing service would handle the dating at the time of running off the stencil.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Branigan
 1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue
 1 - Mr. H. A. Onsgard
 1 - Mr. Linton
 DATE: December 1, 1959

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: ROUTING OF SECURITY INFORMANT MAIL

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 DeLoach _____
 McGuire _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Gandy _____

#337-60

Leonard M.

Supervisor L. Linton has suggested through the Espionage Section Streamlining Committee that the substantive character be placed on all security informant mail in order that the substantive desk will receive this type mail prior to same being forwarded to the security informant supervisors for their handling.

EXISTING PROCEDURE:

Symbol number and other informant mail does not include a substantive character to protect the security of the informants. As a practical matter, some agents prepare informant mail including a substantive character. As a result, there is a lack of uniformity and some mail is routed to the substantive desk prior to the security informant desk, while, at the same time, much highly significant substantive information, furnished under informant captions is routed to the security informant desk, prior to the substantive desk, with the result that the substantive desk experiences some delay and the informant desk must route to the substantive supervisor a volume of mail which should more properly be automatically routed to the substantive desk. It is realized that the security of our informants is of great importance. It is not felt, however, that the omission of substantive or country character from this type of mail provides a degree of security commensurate with delay and lack of uniformity of handling to rule out possible change.

The Files and Communications Division presently routes mail according to the first character shown under the subject. Symbol number mail is routed to the Internal Security Section. It is believed that the addition of the substantive character or country will enable clerical employees of the Files and Communications Division to route all security informant mail to the substantive desk and then to the Internal Security Section. It is believed that this change will provide for the informant desk seeing more mail than they presently see and will provide for the substantive desk to handle its interest prior to the administrative handling of the same piece of mail by the informant desk.

EX-10

REC-35

66-2542-3-1201

Note comments by Internal Security Section page two.

FEB 23 1960

LML:bwd
 (6)

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 4

ack 12/8/59 RUB:ldm

B-68

Memorandum W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont
Re: ROUTING OF SECURITY INFORMANT MAIL

RECOMMENDATION:

That this be referred to the Internal Security Section for their views and thereafter referred to the Division Streamlining Committee in order that the over-all views of the Division may be obtained prior to consideration of appropriate manual changes.

fmk

05

COMMENTS OF INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION:

There is no objection to adding a substantive character on informant mail to assist in routing such mail to the appropriate substantive desk where there is a particular foreign country involved. Since the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections are primarily responsible for approving and handling informants being utilized in those Sections, this may facilitate their operations. This could be accomplished by adding the appropriate country involved to the caption. For example, John Doe, PSI-Nicaragua, and NY 000-S, Cuba. Informants who are being approved and handled by the Internal Security Section and which relate to domestic communist activity and other domestic security matters such as the CPUSA, POC, NOI, NPFR, will not have any particular substantive character and will continue to be designated in the following manner: Jane Doe, PSI; NY 00-S. The latter type of communication is of primary concern to the Security Informant Desk in the Internal Security Section and is handled by that Desk.

Informant mail which is the primary concern of Sections other than the Internal Security Section does contain information on occasion which must be noted by the Security Informant Desk. The first type of mail is the communication from the field designating an individual as a PSI. The Security Informant Desk merely notes that fact for reference purposes in the event an inquiry is received from anyone in the Bureau

Memorandum W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont
Re: ROUTING OF SECURITY INFORMANT MAIL

COMMENTS OF INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION (Continued)

concerning PSIs. The second type of mail which must be routed to the Security Informant Desk is the communication designating a symbol number for the individual either as a PSI or informant. Upon receipt of this communication an index card is prepared for the master security informant index, both symbol card and name card, which is a ready reference for the entire Bureau on all symbolized PSIs and security informants. A third type of communication has been handled by the Informant Desk for all Sections in the Division; namely, payment letters. If this new proposal is adopted it must be understood by all supervisors that letters requesting authority to pay informants and symbol PSIs must be routed to the Informant Desk for recording in the informant index and preparation for transmittal of the Bureau approval to the field. The mail will then be returned to the substantive supervisor for approval and transmission back to the field.

WAB
AB

See Addendum pg 4

1 - Domestic Intelligence Div. (Streamlining Com.)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Stranigan
1 - Mr. J. B. Donohue
1 - Mr. H. A. Casgard
1 - Mr. Linton

ADDENDUM

121:gmh

December 22, 1959

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
STREAMLINING COMMITTEE

The addition of a country character to informant, potential security informant and confidential source mail handled in the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections, providing for routing of this mail to those Sections first and routing to the Internal Security Section later, provides uniformity of character for mail, speeds routing and appropriate manual changes are being prepared in connection with Double Agent Program. Manual changes suggested by Espionage - Internal Security Conference, October, 1959. Review of further background on this suggestion shows Suggestion Number 71-59 (66-16263-1341, 1342) by [redacted] of Files and Communications Division is identical and this should be called to the attention of the Training and Inspection Division in order that [redacted] may be advised of action that may now be taken. It is recommended that this suggestion be adopted and manual changes are being prepared as above.

b6
b7c

Original is at [redacted]
see memo Malone to [redacted]
2/4/60 for approval of [redacted]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 2-4-60

FROM : J. F. Malone

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #337-60
 SUBMITTED BY SA LEONARD M. LINTON
 DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

SUGGESTION: That the substantive character be placed on all security informant mail sent to the Bureau by Field Divisions.

CURRENT PROCEDURE: Symbol number and other informant mail does not include a substantive character to protect the security of the informants. As a practical matter, some Special Agents prepare informant mail including a substantive character. As a result, there is a lack of uniformity and some mail is routed to the substantive desk prior to the security informant desk.

The Files and Communications Division presently routes mail according to the first character shown under the subject. Symbol number mail is routed to the Internal Security Section. By adding the substantive character or country, it will enable the employees routing mail to route all security informant mail to the substantive desk and then to the Internal Security Section. This change will provide for the substantive desk to handle its interest prior to the administrative handling by the informant desk. The Domestic Intelligence Division recommends that this suggestion be adopted. It is realized that the security informants are of great importance. It is not felt, however, that the omission of substantive or country character from this type of mail provides a degree of security commensurate with delay and lack of uniformity.

In view of the fact that there have been delays in mail being routed to the substantive desk, it is felt that this proposal should be adopted. SA Linton's suggestion was acknowledged by letter dated December 8, 1959.

(Continued on page 2)

Enclosure sent 2/4/60.

RWB:mgj; job.

(3)

- Personnel file Leonard M. Linton (sent direct)

REC-35

66-2542-3-1202

19 FEB 23 1960

52 MAR 2 1960

* SEE Notation PAGE 2

2 - PWB

Security Informants - General

Memo to Mr. Mohr
Re: Suggestion #337-60

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That SA Linton's suggestion be adopted and that the attached letter be sent to Mr. Linton.

OK
JPM
5/1
2/14

OK
JPM
5/1
2/14

2. That this memorandum be referred to the Domestic Intelligence Division for the preparation of the necessary manual changes.

Necessary manual changes
affecting only informants
handled in espionage and
foreign nationality sections
submitted in memo
Brannigan to Belmont, 1-25-60.
This has been discussed with
Files and Communications
Division and provides
solution to problem sought
to be corrected and also provides
workable rule for routing
such mail.
LML 2-10-60

OK
JPM
5/1
2/14

OK
JPM
5/1
2/14

JPM
JMB

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. W. Belmont

DATE: February 18, 1960

FROM : F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES
PAYMENTS

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

A review has been made of payments made to security informants and sources since January, 1957.

The following tabulation represents payments made to security informants and sources on a monthly basis for the period January, 1957, through December, 1959:

	1957	1958	1959
Jan.			
Feb.			
Mar.			
Apr.			
May			
June			
July			
Aug.			
Sept.			
Oct.			
Nov.			
Dec.			
TOTAL			
Monthly Average			

Monthly average January, 1957, through December, 1959

The above figures are recorded graphically on the attached

ENCLOSURE
page.

ACTION:

EX 109

REC-28

6 FEB 23 1960

None, for your information.

52 FEB 26 1960

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Rose
 BFR:mar (4)

b7E

46-2542-3-125

1958

1955

b7E

12-Mos

12-485

12 - Mo.

Total

X Average

xxxx 36 Mos Average

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

DATE: February 26, 1960

General

As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of January, the previous month of December, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	January	December	TOTAL
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	77	78	5197
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	181	149	20367
C. Results Number of Sources, PSI and Informants Developed	26	21	1847

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

REC-33

6 FEB 29 1960

EX-131

This program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development. It saves much

66-2542-3-1204
83 MAR 2 1960

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 -- Mr. Donohue

JDD:bge (3)

Memorandum to Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program..

J. E. Hur

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 2-25-60

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL See. Infts.

REMOVED BY 55 MAR 16 1960

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1205

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

5
ph

SECURITY INFORMANTS- genl

(K) INFORMANTS AND SOURCES, CHANNELIZATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM -- When a stencil is prepared to channelize information received from informants and sources to various files in the field office, the block stamp may be typed on the stencil. In such instances, the date to be used in the block stamp is the date the typing was completed.

For the information of those offices having multilith equipment, the Chicago Office has advised that the multilith company markets "duplimat stamp pad ink." Chicago has used such stamp pad ink in a regular stamp pad and has used a regular block-stamp machine in stamping the block stamp upon the multilith material before it is duplicated. The special ink thus block stamped on the material is fully reproduced when the material is run off. This special ink cannot be used for mimeographed reproduction.

If used, the above procedure should be confined to copies for use within your own office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (B) & (I)

2/16/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

66-2542-3-

NOT RECORDED

102 FEB 29 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-83 BY SP8 BTJ/BCE

56 MAR 1960

66-04-2930

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 2/25/60

(Attention: Training and Inspection Division)

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (66-1748)

SUBJECT: STREAMLINING COMMITTEE SUGGESTIONS
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
SUGGESTION #637-60

Enclosed herewith is the proposed letterhead memorandum submitted by SA [] of this office for consideration by the Bureau to be made into mimeographed form.

b6
b7C

It was pointed out by [] that a very high percentage of all security reports contain only data received from informants who are characterized as having furnished reliable information in the past. This proposed form evaluating informants concealed by T symbols would necessitate typing only date, title, character, and agent's name. In the few instances where an informant need be individually characterized, an appropriate letterhead memorandum could be typed.

This suggestion was approved by the Streamlining Committee of this office and I, too, feel it has merit, and therefore am referring it to the Bureau for further study and consideration.

② Bureau (Encs. - 2)
1 San Francisco

DGM:ER
(3)

ENCLOSURE

REC-19

66-2542-3-1203

EX-131

6 FEB 29 1960
3-25

Security Infts - Gen.

ack 3/3/60
BIB:mgj

B. B. Brown

THREE
FILES257
57 MAR 30 1960

PERS. FILES



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

422 Federal Office Building
Civic Center
San Francisco 2, California

(City)

(Date)

(Title)

(Character)

Sources mentioned in the report of Special Agent
_____, dated and captioned
as above at San Francisco, have furnished reliable
information in the past.

This memorandum is loaned to you by the FBI, and
neither it nor its contents are to be distributed
outside the agency to which loaned.

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3

-1206

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: March 29, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM - general

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of February, the previous month of January, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	February	January	TOTAL
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	52	77	5261
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	151	181	20613
C. Results Number of Sources, PSI and Informants Developed	17	26	1874

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

REC- 98
 EX- 105

23 MAR 30 1960

This program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development. It saves much

66-542-8 APR 1 1960

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:bgc:ser (3)

Memorandum to Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

JKPwc
JH

DATE OF MAIL

3-25-60

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

See Inpts - Gen.

REMOVED BY

4159
55 APR 12 1960

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1208

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *7/12*

DATE: April 22, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue *[Signature]*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of March, the previous month of February, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	<u>March</u>	<u>February</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	61	52	5322
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	201	151	20814
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs, and Informants Developed	13	17	1887

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

REC- 87

66-2542-3-1209

This program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the

66-2542-3

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:ssh

(3)

EX-102

23 APR 25 1960

INT. SEC. *[Signature]*

Memorandum for Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

field in sifting prospects for informant development. It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

BP
JH
RW

sw
S.T.

March 29, 1960

To: Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name)

Division of Assignment
Charlotte

SUGGESTION

It is suggested that Bureau permit offices to attach Form FD-237 (printed on pink paper) and Form FD-238 (printed on pink paper) directly beneath the file fronts (FD-245) of Criminal and Security Informant files.

Gen'l

RECEIVED
MAR 30 1960
35

b6
b7c

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts)

Manual of Instructions, Vol. IV, Sec. 108, Page 4, and Vol. IV, Sec. 107, Page 11. "This form is to be kept as the top document in the pertinent informant file and is not to be serialized."

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

This office maintains between three and four hundred Criminal and Security Informant matters. By keeping Forms FD-237 and FD-238 as the top document in the file, it is necessary to continually handle this document and file front separately each time a serial is filed or removed from the file. If attached directly beneath the file fronts, Forms FD-237 and FD-238 would then be handled with the file front in one operation. If adopted, there would be a considerable saving in time. The suggested procedure would not only save considerable clerical time, but would eliminate an exception to customary filing methods, practically eliminate necessity of replacing worn Forms FD-237 and FD-238, all of which contribute to a more efficient operation.

Disadvantages of suggestion

No known disadvantages.

66-3542-3

NOT RECORDED

133 APR 14 1960

APR 12

15 MAR 30 1960

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of any award or assignment upon the United States)

☒ Mr.

☐ Mrs.

☐ Miss

Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

This appears to be a very practical approach; will cut down clerical time, improve efficiency, and I recommend suggestion be given favorable consideration.

W. W. Bromwell, Special Agent in Charge

Signature and Title Charge

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

ack 4/17/60
W. W. Bromwell

9 APR 20 1960

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-3542-1-518

b6
b7c

4/3/60

From: (Suggester's name)
John L. Mulhall

Division of Assignment
Omaha Division

SUGGESTION

Security Informants - and
is suggested that form FD-200 used to report

It is suggested that form FD-209, used to report contacts with CIs and PCIs, be changed to delete the topic "Coverage."

Form FD-237, Informant Review Sheet, can be changed to add the topic, "Coverage."

Attached are ten copies of each form with the suggested changes.

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

See attached forms.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

This will eliminate the necessity of typing the coverage each time a contact is made and reported on form FD-209.

It will aid the supervisory personnel in the review of the file as the coverage will be maintained on the top serial of the file.

Disadvantages of suggestion

I know of no disadvantages.

~~6 APR 6 1960~~

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me or others, or assigns upon the United States)

☒ Mr. ☐ Mrs. ☐ Miss

John L. Inelhall
Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

This suggestion merits consideration.

on: Thomas J. Gearty
Signature and Title

(Do not write in this space - Bureau use only)

write in this space (for Bureau use only)

20-1800-100000
ENCLOSURE
let 4/12/60
RWB: inch

66-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED - photo
141 APR 15 1968

APR 19 1960

DATE OF MAIL

4-26-60

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Sec. Inpts - Gen.

REMOVED BY

⁴²⁴³
55 MAY 6 1960

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1210

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
April 26, 1960 1 - Donohue
1 - Training & Inspection
Div.
1 - Turner

FBI HANDBOOK - PROPOSED REVISIONS

Page 17A of Part I of the FBI Handbook which relates to confidential informants should be revised as indicated below:

A. Security Informants - Genl.

1. Definitions

A security informant is an individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current information on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. A potential security informant is an individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the United States on behalf of a foreign principal and is making an affirmative effort to obtain information for the Bureau. A double agent is a specialized type of security informant who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau.

n. Special problems may limit scope of initial investigation in espionage and foreign nationality cases (see Section 105K, Manual of Instructions).

1. Leads to obtain background data must be handed by auxiliary offices within 30 days.

The following should be added at the end of paragraph 2 on page 18:

(See Section 105K, Manual of Instructions, for exceptions in DESEC matters.)

NOT RECORDED
MAY 3 1960

These changes are involved in these revisions. They are being made merely to bring the Handbook in line with the changes which were previously recommended and approved for the Manual of Instructions.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-1934

Tolson _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Belmont _____
Callahan _____
DeLoach _____
Malone _____
McGuire _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

ETT:cgw

(8)

66-1934

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MAY 6 1960

Q JMW/DEM

EDB

The following should be added to page 19a:

- i. Payments to double agents for services rendered must be made entirely separate from money and property received by the double agents from their principals. Such money and property must be turned over to the Bureau. The double agent should execute a statement describing such money or property and Bureau agents receiving same should make independent records thereof.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *MB*

DATE: May 26, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue *JD*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

Awk

As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of April, the previous month of March, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	<u>April</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	55	61	5377
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	144	201	20958
C. Results			
Number of Sources, PSIs, and Informants Developed	19	13	1906

8

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:EX 109
REC- 5

66-2542-3-1211

This program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the

66-2542-3

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Donohue

1 - Mr. [unclear]

(3)

1960

91

6-5

Memorandum for Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

field in sifting prospects for informant development. It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

RWC

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 3/28/60

FROM : J. F. Malone

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #690-60 AND #637-60
 SUBMITTED BY SA JOHN F. MORLEY
 DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
 AND SA [REDACTED]
 SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

Security Informants

Gen Whittaker

KORZ
Buckman

Form FD-323

SUGGESTION: SA [REDACTED] recommended that the evaluation memorandum attached to security reports be a mimeographed form inasmuch as in the majority of cases all informants listed in the details of the report are characterized as having furnished reliable information in the past. He proposed that in those instances where informants have to be classified otherwise that a separate memorandum be prepared.

SA Morley proposed that a form be prepared similar to that suggestion by SA [REDACTED] but instead of having a separate letterhead memorandum prepared in those instances where the sources are to be characterized as having furnished other than reliable information in the past that this be one form and that if informants are to be characterized other than having furnished reliable information then they are to be set forth on the same form.

SA [REDACTED] proposed form is attached as exhibit A and SA Morley's form as exhibit B. Both suggestions have previously been acknowledged.

CONCLUSIONS: These proposals have been considered by the Domestic Intelligence Division Streamlining Committee and Mr. Sizoo. recommended that SA Morley's suggestion be adopted because considerable time and effort will be saved by utilizing this form which will also result in uniformity throughout the field.

The Manual of Rules and Regulations includes that symbols may be used in applicant, security and other reports to conceal the identity of the person interviewed; that the reliability of such sources is being set forth in letterhead memorandum form suitable for dissemination and that all offices and the Bureau are to be furnished copies of the letterhead in a number equal to the copies or communications to which it relates.

Enclosures (2) near 3-30-60
 1 - Personnel file of [REDACTED]
 1 - Personnel file of John F. Morley

KWW:meh

(4) 66-3482

Manual of Rules & Regulations

761 Handbook + Field Manual

NOT RECORDED

199 MAY 28 1960

FD-323 assigned
 to form and further
 in FBI 3/28/60
 MAY 20 1960

62 MAY 25 1960

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-3482-475

DATE OF MAIL

May 26, 1960

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Informants for

REMOVED BY

61 JUN 17 1960

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1212

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (66-2542-3)

DATE: 6/8/60

FROM : SAC, Buffalo

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ReBulet to Albany dated 4/6/59.

	<u>During Past 30 Days</u>	<u>Total to Date</u>
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	0	99
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	1	356
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs, and Informants Developed	0	24

During May 1960, one interview and one reinterview were conducted.

The eighteen agents assigned to security work have devoted approximately five percent of their time during the month of May to this program.

1cc-1244
(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED)
1 - Buffalo
AGS:MMM
(3)

EX 105 66-2542-3-1213

REC-35 11 JUN 13 1960

FBI

JUN 13 10 50 AM '60

JUN 16 1960

b7D

JUN 13 1960

EXP. PROC.

32

K

[Handwritten signature]

June 23, 1960

PERSONAL

REC-42

66-2542-3 1214

Mr. John C. Manning
Federal Bureau of Investigation
New Haven, Connecticut

Dear Mr. Manning:

Your suggestion proposing that copies of channelizing memoranda be destroyed when a report is prepared has been received. I am sure you will be interested to know that the Bureau has recently granted permission for certain offices to destroy such memoranda on a trial basis. In the event it is found to be advantageous to follow this procedure in all field offices appropriate instructions will be issued.

I want you to know that I appreciate the interest which prompted you to make this suggestion designed to improve our operations.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

1 - SAC, New Haven

RWB:meh (Suggestion #891-60, dated 6/15/60)

NOTE: Suggests that when a report is prepared that the consolidation memorandum include in addition to other pertinent information an instruction that copies of serials in the file which are channelizing memoranda containing information which has been set forth in the report be destroyed.

(continued on page 2)

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

50 JUL

1 1960

TELETYPE UNIT

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-16263

JUN 23 3 12 PM '60

Suggestions similar to the current one date back to September, 1952. Latest consideration given at the Internal Security - Espionage Conference which was held on June 9 - 10/1960. The Conference recommended and it was approved for the Chicago and San Francisco Offices to destroy copies of channelizing memoranda on a 6-month basis. If it is determined to be feasible to destroy copies of such memoranda on a field-wide basis, appropriate instructions will be issued by the Domestic Intelligence Division. In view of this, it is not possible to advise SA Manning whether his suggestion is being adopted.

Handwritten signature/initials

#491-66

Date	June 15, 1960
Division of Assignment	NEW HAVEN

To: Director, FBI	From: (Suggester's name) SA JOHN C. MANNING
-------------------	--

SUGGESTION

It is noted that present Bureau policy, with respect to dissemination of information received from informants and similar sources, is to file in the informant's file the original report, if data is received in the form of a written report, together with a copy of the channelizing memorandum. In those instances where no written report is submitted, a copy of the channelizing memorandum is placed in the informant's sub-file. In either case a copy of the channelizing memorandum is placed in the case file of those subjects who were present at a meeting or concerning whom other pertinent information is reported.

Security informants - gen.

From time to time reports are prepared on a particular subject and

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts)
The current Bureau practice is to retain in the file of the subject the copies of the channelizing memoranda containing information concerning the subject which has been furnished by an informant.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis (or estimate))
It is felt that the adoption of this suggestion throughout the Bureau will result in substantial saving in space required for filing purposes. As an example, it is noted that during 1959 one informant of the New Haven Office submitted thirty-one reports which were disseminated to various files of this office. A total of approximately 600 serials were routed to different files as a result of information furnished by this informant. If the above suggestion is adopted, in this one instance, the 600 serials could be destroyed resulting in the saving of space of approximately five to six average volumes.

Disadvantages of suggestion
It is recognized that it will be necessary to account for serials which have been destroyed. Consideration was given to recommending that sub-files be established which would have contained therein only channelizing memoranda from informants which would subsequently be destroyed. It is felt, however, that this system would prove unwieldy. Accordingly, the

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for any justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

☒ Mr. ☐ Mrs. ☐ Miss

John C. Manning, S.A.
Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and Comments of Division Head
The suggested procedure, if adopted, would result in saving considerable volume of filing space. To be considered is the question of whether the

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

REC-42

EX-107

E. J. McCABE, Special Agent in Charge

ack 6/23/60
RWB
JUL 24 1961

66-2342-3-1214

3 - Bureau
JCM:mvy 2 - New Haven (1-66-3236) (1-67-Personnel SA JOHN C. MANNING)

JUN 20 1960

66-16263

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

PERS. FILES

SUGGESTION CONTINUED

when this is done the Agent preparing the report reviews the case file on the subject. The file frequently contains numerous serials in the form of channelizing memoranda. Pertinent information is extracted and summarized for inclusion in the report. In accordance with Bureau practice the cover page of the report will reflect the location of the original document which contains the information which has now been included in the report. At this point the information from the informant is located in three places in our files:

- (1) Sub-file of the informant
- (2) The copy of the channelizing memorandum routed to the case file of the subject
- (3) The report prepared concerning the subject.

It is noted that the document containing the original information from the informant is never destroyed and is, therefore, always available for reference. The location of the information from an informant, which is included in a report, is set forth in the cover page of the report as a particular serial in the sub-file of the informant. The continued retention of the serials in the case file of the subject which contain the same information is, therefore, unnecessary.

It is recommended that in the future when a report is prepared that the consolidation memorandum include, in addition to other pertinent information, an instruction that copies of serials in the file, which are channelizing memoranda containing information which has been set forth in the report, be destroyed.

DISADVANTAGES OF SUGGESTION CONTINUED

present Bureau practice of inserting a charge out slip to indicate the destruction of these particular serials would continue to be followed. It is pointed out, however, that considerable saving in space will still be effected since most channelizing memoranda consist of several pages and frequently a number of them are filed in numerical sequence, which will permit the recording of the destruction of several serials on one charge out slip.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS OF DIVISION HEAD

amount of filing space saved would be of sufficient volume to warrant the clerical time involved in pulling the channelizing memoranda from the files and inserting the charge-outs. (Note that procedure would not entail extra pulling of file - as file would be on Chief Clerk's desk for serializing and filing the investigative report and correlation memorandum.) Considering the rather large volume of channelizing memoranda which we have in this office, and assuming that other offices with equal or greater number of security cases have a proportionate large volume of channelizing memoranda, it is believed that the suggested procedure would save a sufficient volume of filing space to warrant the expenditure of the clerical time involved. The suggestion seems to have merit and it is recommended that it be given careful consideration.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *ABe*

DATE: June 27, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue *JDD*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM
Gen

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34- dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of May, the previous month of April, and the grant total from the inception of this program.

	May	April	TOTAL
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	37	55	5414
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	179	144	21137
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs, and Informants Developed	14	19	1920

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

This program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the

66-2542-3

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:mar

66-2542-3-1215
 JUL 1 1960

REC-16

JUN 28 1960

EX-111
 REC.
[Signature]

Memorandum for Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

field in sifting prospects for informant development. It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: June 27, 1960

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

FROM : Mr. Belmont

JUNE

SECURITY INFANTS
GENLSUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

This is a monthly memorandum setting forth the total number of the Bureau's confidential informants and trash and mail covers as set forth in the attached pages.

Technical surveillances are only utilized when necessary and are discontinued when they are no longer productive. Their number varies and as of this date we are operating 79 technical surveillances and two are in the process of being installed making a total of 81. All but one are being used on security investigations. Forty-seven microphone surveillances are presently installed and all but seven are concerned with security investigations.

During May, 1960, 20 security informants were added and 21 were deleted making a total of 1,046 security informants. Potential security informants during the same period decreased from 486 to 472.

During May, 1960, 41 criminal informants were added while 62 criminal informants were deleted. This changes the number of approved criminal informants from 2,664 to 2,643. Also, during May, 1960, the number of potential criminal informants changed from 7,278 to 7,066.

During May, 1960, three racial informants were added while four were deleted. This produced a net figure of 77 approved racial informants. Also, during the month, six new potential racial informants were added while ten were deleted leaving a total of 45.

As of June 1, 1960, the field was operating 69 trash covers. As of June 27, 1960, the Bureau had in operation a total of 86 mail covers. Of this number two are maintained in criminal fugitive cases. There are 84 mail covers in security cases.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

EX-105

Enclosure

JDD:pwf (10)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
 1 - Mr. Tamm
 1 - Mr. Rosen
 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner

- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fippin
 1 - Mr. Woodcock
 1 - Mr. Englestad
 1 - Mr. Donohue

ENCLOSURE

JUL 5 1960

REC-52 66-2542-3-1216

ENCLOSURE 1216
46-2542-3

ENCLOSURE 1216
46-2542-3

SECURITY INFORMANTS - SI
POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS - PSI
CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - CI
POTENTIAL CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - PCI
CRIMINAL INFORMANTS (RAC) - CI (RAC)
POTENTIAL CRIMINAL INFORMANTS (RAC) -
PCI (RAC)

OFFICE	TS	MS	TSMC	FMC	TC	OMC	SI	PST	CT	PCT	(RAC) CT	(RAC) PCT
MILWAUKEE	1	2	0	0	0	0	8	22	25	136	0	0
MINNEAPOLIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	14	50	99	0	0
MOBILE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	30	61	7	2
NEWARK	1	2	4	0	1	0	33	25	61	305	0	0
NEW HAVEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	18	23	62	0	0
NEW ORLEANS	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	72	123	0	0
NEW YORK	37	13	28	0	9	0	130	78	109	617	0	0
NORFOLK	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	19	63	0	0
OKLAHOMA CITY	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	26	111	0	1
OMAHA	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	40	58	0	0
PHILADELPHIA	1	3	0	0	15	0	42	10	57	184	0	0
PHOENIX	0	0	1	0	0	0	17	12	25	68	0	0
PITTSBURG	0	1	2	0	0	0	14	6	44	148	0	0
PORTLAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	3	27	83	0	0
RICHMOND	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	51	135	0	0
ST. LOUIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	1	64	133	0	0
SALT LAKE CITY	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	1	63	87	0	0
SAN ANTONIO	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	4	26	93	0	0
SAN DIEGO	0	0	0	0	0	0	31	5	36	67	0	0
SAN FRANCISCO	3	3	4	0	3	0	69	26	89	265	0	0
SAN JUAN	0	0	1	0	0	0	24	18	28	74	0	0
SAVANNAH	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	46	133	8	1
SEATTLE	2	3	2	2	0	0	34	17	52	251	0	0
SPRINGFIELD	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	36	104	0	0
TAMPA	Figures for Tampa will be included beginning next month.											
WASHINGTON FIELD	25	7	17	0	37	0	45	51	46	166	2	1
TOTAL	79	47	84	2	69	0	1046	472	2643	7066	77	45

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/30/60

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (134-0)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

PSI - R

Enclosed are five copies of self-explanatory letterhead memorandum of above date and caption.

Enclosed memorandum has been classified confidential since unauthorized disclosure of [REDACTED] desire to act in an intelligence capacity could be detrimental to the defense interests of the nation.

Inquiry in this matter was conducted by SA KEITH G. TEETER with the exception of credit check at Oakland, California, conducted by IC [REDACTED] and check of Oakland Police Department, conducted by IC [REDACTED]

Inasmuch as [REDACTED] does not appear to have any potential as a security informant or double agent within the areas of the Bureau's interest and jurisdiction, it is suggested that the Bureau may desire to disseminate copies of enclosure to other government agencies which might be interested in using his services.

Upon interview [REDACTED] was advised that the Bureau could offer no intelligence training and could not give him any intelligence assignments [REDACTED]. He was advised that if he is approached for intelligence purposes during his stay in [REDACTED] he should advise us upon his return.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 5)(REG)

1 - San Francisco (134-0)

KGT:mal
(3)

ENCLOSURE

REC-15 66-2542-3-1217

JUL 5 1960

AGENCY C/A
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW 7-12-60
HOW FORW 1-14P
BY [REDACTED]

51 JUL 12 1960

Security Informants - General

b7D

b7D

b6

b7C

b7D

b7D



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

422 Federal Office Building - Civic Center
San Francisco 2, California
June 30, 1960

RE: [redacted]

b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
On June 10, 1960 [redacted] advised that he is
employed [redacted] with offices at [redacted]
[redacted] and resides at [redacted]
[redacted] His wife is
[redacted] who was born in [redacted] and is
[redacted]
[redacted] who lives in [redacted] and who
[redacted]

[redacted] advised that in [redacted] he will make
a trip to [redacted] accompanied by his wife and her father, for
the purpose of visiting [redacted] relatives.
These relatives are located in the town of [redacted]

[redacted] advised that he has never had any military
service or training in intelligence matters but desired
to offer his services in the event the Government wished to
give him any assignment to be carried out during his trip
[redacted] He desired to know if any training courses were
offered for this purpose and stated he would be glad to undergo
such training. He stated that he was not making this offer
in an attempt to have expenses of the trip paid by the
Government, since he has the money for the trip and intends
to make it whether his services are used or not. [redacted] said
his father-in-law does not know that he has made this offer
and he has no intention of telling him since he does not
want [redacted] to come involved and possibly endanger himself
and compromise the safety of his relatives.

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-1217
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: [REDACTED]

b7D

On June 13, 1960 records of the Credit Bureau of the Greater East Bay, Oakland, California, contained a credit report dated March, 1959 for [REDACTED] age [REDACTED] wife [REDACTED] who had resided at [REDACTED] since [REDACTED] and who had previously lived at [REDACTED]. He had been in business for himself as [REDACTED] since [REDACTED] and his credit rating was satisfactory. He was previously employed as [REDACTED] by the [REDACTED] as a [REDACTED] for one year and as an [REDACTED] for one year. His wife had been employed as a [REDACTED] for six months and as a [REDACTED] for one and one-half years.

On June 22, 1960 [REDACTED] Eden Sub-Station, Alameda County Sheriff's Office, Hayward, California, advised that [REDACTED] had received three traffic citations. The first of these was on September 20, 1950 while he resided on [REDACTED]. The remaining two occurred on June 12, 1958 and May 20, 1959 during residence at his present address. On June 29, 1955 a complaint was received that [REDACTED] drove his automobile up and down [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] at excessive speeds. He received a reprimand for this infraction.

b6
b7C
b7D

On June 22, 1960 records of the Police Department, Oakland, contained no criminal information concerning [REDACTED]

b7D

The files of the San Francisco Office of the FBI contain no information concerning [REDACTED]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 1 - Donahoe
 - 1 - J. D. Donohue
 - 1 - Nasca
 - 1 - Cotter
 - 1 - James
 - 1 - Mulling, 1960

SAC, Miami

6

Director, FBI (66-2542)

CUBAN MATTERS
 SOURCES AND INFORMANTS

SECURITY

During recent months a number of individuals, including both Cuban and U. S. nationals, have voluntarily contacted Bureau to furnish information regarding the Cuban situation and, in some instances, to volunteer their services on a continuing basis as sources or informants. A number of such individuals have indicated plans to visit Cuba and have offered to secure information on behalf of the Bureau during such travel. Others have reported connections with Cuban officials or pro-Castro followers in the U. S. and have expressed a willingness to obtain data of interest to the FBI through such contacts.

We have secured considerable worthwhile information as a result of such voluntary contacts and we have, in some cases, been able to develop the person involved into a source or informant of continuing value. There is no question but that the majority of such individuals are genuinely concerned about conditions in Cuba and are sincere in their desire to assist the FBI. Nevertheless, such contacts should be handled with the utmost circumspection and discretion. The Castro regime is known to be interested in penetrating the FBI, through fake defections or otherwise. Moreover, as the record clearly shows, the Cuban Government has frequently sought to provoke incidents to support its anti-U. S. campaign and would obviously welcome the opportunity to embarrass the FBI or other U. S. investigative agencies. Under these circumstances it can be expected that Cuban intelligence services will seek to put individuals in touch with the Bureau who are actually working for the Castro regime.

The field should be continually on the alert for such efforts to "plant" informants or sources with the FBI and should exercise caution in dealing with persons who volunteer actively to assist the Bureau until their reliability has been clearly established.

EX. - 135 REC- 24

66-2542-3-1218

2 - New York

2 - Newark

2 - WFO

1 - 66-2542 Sub 29 (Miami Security Informants)

1 - 66-2542 Sub 34 (New York Security Informants)

1 - 66-2542 Sub 53 (WFO Security Informants)

1 - 105-80787 (Cuban Intelligence Activities)

1 - 66-2542 Sub 31 (Newark Security Informants)

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

MAILED 6
 JUL - 6 1960
 COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____

57 JUL 14 1960

RDC:jlw

(20) ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

MAIL ROOM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-80787-3-1218

Letter to SAC, Miami
Re: CUBAN MATTERS
SOURCES AND INFORMANTS
66-2542

The following observations are set forth as guides in the handling of contacts of this type and should be closely adhered to in the absence of compelling reasons which would justify other actions:

(1) During initial contact, any information volunteered should be accepted and, if logical, the individual should be asked to expand on the data furnished. The FBI's investigative jurisdiction should be generally indicated; however, the interviewing agents should be careful not to disclose any specific areas of FBI interest and interviewing agents should avoid giving the impression that we have an investigative interest in activities in Cuba or even in Cuban activities within the U. S. other than activities indicating possible violations of laws within our jurisdiction.

(2) During initial contact, particular efforts should be made to explore the individual's motives and to determine the underlying basis for his offer of assistance. This should normally be done in a tactful manner and it is not desired that the interviewing agents antagonize the person involved by open suspicion of his motives. At the same time, however, the individual's expressed motive for contacting the FBI should not be simply accepted at face value, and questioning should be conducted in such a manner as to indicate possible discrepancies in the avowed motive or reveal possible hidden reasons.

(3) No commitments should be made to the individual in question nor should any steps be taken during initial interview to direct or control his activities. Although appreciation should be expressed for the information furnished and no statements made which would discourage the individual from furnishing additional data, no active encouragement should be given to the individual to undertake any assignment on behalf of the Bureau. This is particularly true in a case of those individuals who are planning to visit Cuba. It should be clearly indicated to such individuals that Bureau has no desire to have the source engage in any activities while in Cuba on our behalf.

(4) Immediately following the initial interview, a thorough inquiry should be undertaken concerning the source's background along the lines of a potential security informant investigation. During this investigation, stress should be placed

Letter to SAC, Miami
Re: CUBAN MATTERS
SOURCES AND INFORMANTS

66-2542

on verifying the source's claimed motives and any contacts the source might have with Cuban officials or pro-Castro adherents should be explored in detail.

(5) The Bureau should be advised promptly following the initial interview of such persons and such notification should include the field's appraisal of the individual's motives, his potential for future development and what investigative action is planned concerning the source's background and activities.

(6) Following a thorough investigation, the field should submit results of its inquiries to the Bureau together with its recommendations for possible future utilization of the individual involved as a source in Cuban matters.

These instructions are in no way intended to discourage the field from taking advantage of voluntary contacts to secure information of interest concerning the Cuban situation and, at the same time, considering the potential future usefulness of such contacts as sources or informants. This letter is intended simply as a reminder of the risks involved in an uncritical acceptance of information volunteered by individuals with whose backgrounds we are not familiar and as a caution that the development of such sources should be approached not only with enthusiasm but also with a proper degree of skepticism.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 12, 1960

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM (SIP)
 General
 EVALUATION OF PROGRAM

Due to success of Toplev Program which was instituted in 1951 (interviews of top-level Communist Party (CP) functionaries), the Security Informant Program was instituted in 1952 whereby persons of lesser importance would be contacted to obtain additional informants in the Party. The primary purpose of the program is to develop persons currently active in the CP into Bureau informants and such individuals, if developed while still in the CP, can immediately produce current information of value whereas persons with no CP affiliation who are willing to be developed as informants, require considerable time before they can produce information of value. In addition, these interviews crystallize the status of security subjects as to attitude and dangerousness and also cause considerable disruption and confusion within the CP itself. In April and May, 1956, this program of approaching active communists was combined with our General Interview Program of contacting security subjects and the resultant current program now embodies contacts not only with active communists but other subversive individuals, the purpose of the interviews being to obtain potential informant material. Since the inception of the program in 1951, 5,414 active communists have been contacted and 21,137 other individuals have been contacted since the extension of the program in 1956. As a result, we have obtained 1,920 sources, potential security informants, and informants. Through continued use of this program, our informant coverage will be extended and disruption in the CP will continue and any expansion of Party or new CP activity will be promptly detected.

RECOMMENDATION:

Since program has proved to be worthwhile, it is recommended it be continued under our present policies and procedures and the continuance of the program again be considered in six months.

66-2542-3

JDD:pwr
(5)

EX 109

18 JUL 14 1960

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

59 JUL 19 1960

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3

DETAILS:

This memorandum contains the results of a complete review and evaluation of this program and a recommendation that the program be continued.

1. Origin

Due to the success of the Toplev Program instituted in 1951 (interviews of top-level Communist Party (CP) functionaries), the SIP was instituted in 1952 whereby persons of lesser importance in the CP were contacted to obtain additional informants in the CP.

2. Purpose

The primary purpose of instant program is to develop persons currently active in the CP into Bureau informants. Such individuals, if developed while still in the CP, can immediately produce current information of value whereas persons with no CP affiliation, if willing to be developed as CP informants, require considerable time before they can produce information of value. Another factor to be considered in conducting interviews under the SIP is the disruption and confusion such interviews have caused within the CP itself.

3. Scope

In 1952, Agents in 23 field offices were given specialized training (this included 14 offices trained for Toplev interviews). In 1954, the SIP was further extended through the medium of special training sessions whereby additional Agents were trained in all continental offices to make approaches to active communists. In April and May, 1956, our program of approaching active communists was combined with the general interview program of contacting security subjects of all types and the resultant program is known generally as the SIP.

4. Tie-in with Other Programs

This program is handled as a special project. It is noted, however, it is similar to the Toplev Program which deals with the interviews of top-level and hard-core communists whereas the SIP deals with interviews of persons of lesser importance.

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3

5. Case Load

As of 7-12-60, a total of 5,414 active communists and 21,137 other individuals were contacted under the SIP. All continental offices, except 29, submit monthly progress letters showing interviews conducted. The 29 offices have conducted all logical interviews with persons suitable for informant development and are required to submit a six-month progress letter.

6. Magnitude

The provisions and instructions formulated in connection with the SIP govern the interviews of persons considered for security informant development in all continental offices.

7. Weaknesses

There are no known weaknesses in the SIP.

8. Administrative Control

All continental offices (with the exception of 29) must submit monthly progress letters. The 29 offices must submit progress letters every six months.

Through analysis of progress letters an accurate evaluation of the effectiveness of the SIP can be made. Close supervision and control is possible and any weaknesses are immediately corrected by issuance of necessary instructions to the office involved.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the month of May, the previous month of April and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	May	April	TOTAL
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	37	55	5414
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	179	144	21137
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants Developed	14	19	1920

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP).
66-2542-3

9. Adequacy and Currentness of Instructions

Instructions pertaining to the SIP are contained in Section 87 D of the Manual of Instructions and have been reviewed and have been found to be adequate.

10. Over-all Value

The over-all value of the SIP is clearly emphasized by the fact that 1,920 sources, PSIs, and informants have been developed through this program. Through the continued use of the SIP the Bureau's security informant coverage will be extended, confusion in the CP will continue, and any expansion of or new CP activity will be promptly detected.

11. Contemplated Action

It is contemplated the development of security informants will be continued through the SIP. It will be closely supervised, followed, and afforded tight administrative control.

W. B.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 19, 1960

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGEEVALUATION OF PROGRAM

Tolson	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
DeLoach	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

Security Informants - General

As a result of the first Judith Coplon trial in 1949, we re-evaluated the procedures then in effect for the justification and approval of technical installations, mail covers and trash covers in both domestic intelligence and general investigative matters. A complete analysis was also made of our live confidential informant coverage in both security and criminal fields in order to delete worthless informants and to secure accurate figures covering active and productive informants. In accordance with the Director's request and in order to assure prompt monthly submission of such data to the Bureau, this program was instituted whereby each office must furnish by the fifteenth of each month information concerning the total number of technical and microphone surveillances, the total number of mail and trash covers and the number of live confidential informants broken down into specific categories; namely, security, criminal and racial. After receipt of these data a memorandum is prepared by the twenty-fifth of each month for the Director's information. Program provides at a glance progress each office is making in its coverage and summary of all statistics immediately gives the Bureau-wide picture for each category.

RECOMMENDATION:

Since program has proved to be worthwhile, it is recommended it be continued under our present policies and procedures and the continuance of the program again be considered in six months.

66-2542-3

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:bgc
(5)

59 JUL 22 1960

JUL 20 1960

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE
66-2542-3

This memorandum contains the results of a complete review and evaluation of this program and the recommendation that the program be continued.

1. Origin

As an outgrowth of the first Judith Coplon trial during 1949 at Washington, D. C., steps were taken to re-evaluate procedures then in use for the justification and approval of technical installations, mail covers, and trash covers in both domestic intelligence and general investigative matters. At the same time a complete analysis was made of the confidential informant coverage in both security and criminal fields throughout the Bureau in order to delete worthless ones and to secure accurate figures covering active and productive informants. In accordance with the Director's request and in order to assure the prompt, monthly submission of such data to the Bureau, SAC Letter #12 dated 2-7-50 instructed each office to submit to the Bureau by 2-15-50 and by the fifteenth of each month thereafter, information regarding the total number of technical and microphone installations, the total number of mail and trash covers, and the number of confidential informants broken down into three categories covering national defense, general investigative, and atomic energy matters. (Separate classification for atomic energy informants not required after 3-20-51).

2. Purpose

This program was instituted to provide a monthly record of the total number of informant sources as described under item one above. After receipt of these letters from the field, a memorandum is prepared by the 25th of each month for the Director's information, showing the breakdown of informant and similar coverage by office and summarizing the over-all picture.

3. Scope

This is an active program in all field divisions of the Bureau. It entails the submission of a letter every month by each field office and the preparation of a memorandum each month by the

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE
66-2542-3

Security Informants - Special Records Desk, Internal Security Section. After Bureau supervision of security and criminal informants was designated separately during 1950 to the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Investigative Division respectively, instructions were issued the field in No Number SAC Letter dated 3-20-51 to henceforth include only the total number of security informants and potential security informants in monthly letters. However, the summary memorandum prepared by the Security Informants - Special Records Desk, Internal Security Section, has always included statistics concerning the number of criminal informants and potential criminal informants for the Director's information. Since 3-51 these figures have been furnished separately each month by the Investigative Division for inclusion in afore-mentioned memorandum. Effective with the memorandum submitted in March, 1959, the number of racial informants and potential racial informants are also included in the summary memorandum.

4. Tie-in with other Programs

This program is the medium through which the Bureau is kept advised on a monthly basis of the over-all accomplishments by the field in the entire field of live informants and other types of coverage.

5. Case Load

Each field office maintains a control file for instructions and other communications relating to the program.

6. Magnitude

The program receives close personal supervision of the Supervisor-in-Charge and in order that it be maintained properly approximately 5% of the time of one clerical employee is utilized.

7. Past or Present Weaknesses

Analysis of this program has not disclosed any weaknesses existing at the present time.

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE.
66-2542-3

8. Administrative Controls

The field is required under this program to submit their letters to reach the Bureau by the 15th of each month. This is watched closely and if a letter is not received promptly the particular office involved is requested by airtel to submit its figures immediately.

9. Adequacy and Currentness of Instructions

The last change relative to this program was issued in No Number SAC Letter #56-A dated 1-16-56. Review of outstanding instructions disclosed they are adequate.

10. Over-all Value

The primary purpose of this program is to provide a current picture, on a month-to-month basis, of the total number of existing informant sources in both security and general investigative matters throughout the Bureau. It affords at a glance the progress each office is making in its coverage, and the summary of all statistics furnished by the field immediately gives the Bureau-wide picture for each component category. It also brings to the attention of the SAC each month the total coverage of various types in his office.

11. Contemplated Action

No action is currently contemplated to either expand or curtail this program.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: July 25, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34- dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of June, the previous month of May, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	<u>June</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	43	37	5457
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	146	179	21324
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs, and Informants Developed	36	14	1931

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

This program, whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

66-2542-3

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Donohue

REC-53

66-2542-3-12251
5 JUL 26 1960

3 AUG 1 1960 (3)

Memorandum for Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

JW 7/8/66

DATE OF MAIL

July 25, 1960

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Informants - General

REMOVED BY

61 AUG 3 1960 /js

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1222

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 9, 1960

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: ~~SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE~~
~~(ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CP IN EACH FIELD OFFICE)~~EVALUATION OF PROGRAM
SECURITY INFORMANTS

Bulet 8-7-58 instructed each continental field division, except San Francisco and Los Angeles, to submit detailed survey of Communist Party (CP) organization within its territory setting forth organizational structure, identities of all officers and functionaries from club to district level, identities of each individual CP member, and current informant coverage. Copies of this letter were not directed to San Francisco or Los Angeles inasmuch as they had submitted current information of this type. Replies from the various field offices were thoroughly analyzed and results reflected over-all informant coverage to be good. Certain divisions had areas where additional coverage was needed and instant program inaugurated as a means of emphasizing to the field the necessity of expanding security informant coverage to cover these weak areas. Through the program the Seat of Government directs concentrated intensive efforts in those particular offices where the need for coverage is most urgent and assures continuous attention to make certain the necessary coverage is effected as rapidly as possible. Program involves nine offices which are set forth as follows: Albany, Boston, Buffalo, Miami, New York, Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, Seattle, and Washington. Each of these offices has been separately instructed to take steps to obtain additional coverage in those areas needing attention.

RECOMMENDATION:

Since this program serves a definite purpose in guiding the field toward strengthening areas of weak informant coverage, it is recommended that it be continued with further evaluation again in six months.

66-2542-3

JDD:pwf
(5)

REC-63

66-2542-3-1223
12 AUG 10 1960

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

62 AUG 12 1960

Tolson _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Belmont _____
Callahan _____
DeLoach _____
Malone _____
McGuire _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

This memorandum contains the results of a complete review and evaluation of this program and a recommendation that the program be continued.

1. ORIGIN

Bulet 8-7-58 instructed each continental field division, except San Francisco and Los Angeles, to submit detailed survey of CP organization within its territory setting forth organizational structure, identities of all officers and functionaries from club to district level, identities of each individual CP member, and current informant coverage. Copies of this letter were not directed to San Francisco or Los Angeles inasmuch as they had submitted current information of this type. Replies from the various field offices were thoroughly analyzed and results reflected over-all informant coverage to be good. Certain divisions had areas where additional coverage was needed and instant program has been carried on to emphasize to the field the necessity of expanding security informant coverage to cover these weak areas.

2. PURPOSE

The primary objective of this program has been to pinpoint areas in the field where informant coverage of the Party needs strengthening. It affords a means whereby the Seat of Government can direct concentrated, intensive efforts in those offices where this need for coverage is most urgent, and assures continuous attention to make certain the desired coverage is effected as rapidly as possible.

3. SCOPE

As delinquencies in this respect are overcome in an office, that office is dropped from this program. At present, the program is in effect in the nine following offices:

Albany	New York
Boston	Pittsburgh
Buffalo	Salt Lake City
Miami	Seattle
Washington	

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

Each of the above offices has been separately instructed to take immediate steps to obtain additional coverage within those areas needing particular attention.

4. TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This particular program ties in with our other programs whereby we are endeavoring to ascertain and identify membership of the CP and to determine the financial operations and apparatus of the CP, USA. An important adjunct of this intensified program, of course, is the development of additional informants who are in the position of producing valuable intelligence information on individual communists which is of great value to the Security Index Program.

5. CASE LOAD

Each field office maintains a control file for instructions and other communications relating to the program.

6. MAGNITUDE

Each individual office which is being followed under this program is closely supervised by the appropriate supervisor of the Security Informant - Special Records Desk.

7. PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

An analysis and re-evaluation of the program have not disclosed any weaknesses at the present time.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

Each of the nine offices presently being followed under this program is receiving close attention on a periodic basis by the appropriate supervisor. As each office reports its progress, the results are carefully analyzed and any necessary instructions and directions are transmitted to the field by the supervisor to make certain this program receives continuing attention.

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE

9. ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of instructions which have been given to each of the field offices under the program discloses that they are adequate and current.

10. OVER-ALL VALUE

The primary purpose of this program is to pinpoint for the field those areas of security informant coverage which need strengthening. In addition, the field has been instructed to take steps to develop additional coverage in those particular areas which will result in obtaining more informants in the security field.

11. CONTEMPLATED ACTION

As each office develops the necessary coverage, it will be dropped from the program. At the same time we will remain alert for any additional areas in the field which may become weak and place such offices under the program to make certain those weaknesses are eliminated and the necessary coverage is obtained.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB* DATE: August 25, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue *JDD*

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM *En*

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of July, the previous month of June, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	<u>July</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	61	43	5518
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	166	146	21490
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs, and Informants Developed	11	36	1942

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

This program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

66-2542-3

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Donohue

REC-42

12 AUG 26 1960

JDD:lal (3)
58 AUG 31 1960

EX 109

66-2542-3-1224

M

J Donohue

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: 8/1/60

FROM : T. J. McAndrews

SUBJECT: FD-209
PROPOSED REVISION

Tolson	
Mohr	
Parsons	
Belmont	
Callahan	
DeLoach	
Malone	
McGuire	
Rosen	
Tamm	
Trotter	
W.C. Sullivan	
Tele. Room	
Ingram	
Gandy	

Form FD-209, revised 10/23/59, is used in the field to record each contact made by an Agent with a criminal (CI) or security (SI) informant as well as contacts with potential criminal informants (PCI) or potential security informants (PSI). At the bottom of this form (copy attached) is a block to be checked by Agents contacting SIs or PSIs which certifies that the SI or PSI furnished all information obtained by him since last contacted by the Agent.

It is being recommended that the contacts with CIs and PCIs also have a certification paragraph. To accomplish this, it is proposed that the word "security" be deleted from the certification sentence thus making the sentence apply to all informants. SA J. D. Donohue, Security Informant Desk, Domestic Intelligence Division, advised that there was no objection to this proposed change.

There are 57,775 copies of FD-209 on hand. It is estimated that this supply will be exhausted in approximately 2 months.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That the word "security" be deleted from the bottom of the page on FD-209. (See sample attached). By so doing, the sentence will be applicable for the certification of any CI or PCI as well as SI or PSI.

(2) That if above recommendation is approved, this memorandum be referred to the Forms Management Desk, Training and Inspection Division, for appropriate handling.

ABF/sjc

(8)

66-3482

SEE ADDENDUM, PAGE TWO

See Addendum of Training and Inspection Division, page 2.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-3482

NOT RECORDED

199 AUG 24 1960

5 AUG 23 1960

ADDENDUM: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

8-3-60

BFR:pwf *pwf*

The Domestic Intelligence Division has considered instant suggestion and it interposes no objection to the deletion of the word "security" from the certification at the bottom of FD-209.

It is noted the identifying blocks at the upper-right-hand corner of FD-209 identifies the type of informant contacted and the deletion of the word "security" in the certification would make the certification applicable to the informant checked in these blocks.

BR
JR
JGB/r
AB
JS

ADDENDUM: HLE:fk *N* 8/4/60

Training and Inspection Division concurs with the Investigative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions concerning revision of Form FD-209, "Memorandum for Recording Contacts with Criminal Informants and Security Informants." Approval is requested to revise FD-209.

HLE
Am
OK
9/14
8/4
25

1-Parsons 1-Baumgardner
Assistant Attorney General-Belmont 1-Hall August-27-1960
J. Walter Yeagley


Director, FBI

LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 -
SECURITY MATTER

The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 prohibits persons who have been members of the Communist Party (CP) within five years from holding office or employment with a labor organization or a group or association of employers dealing with any labor organization, except in a clerical or custodial capacity, and from acting as labor relations consultants. It also prohibits any labor organization or officer thereof from knowingly permitting any such person to assume or hold any such position. Investigations have been instituted by this Bureau on all individuals known to be in apparent violation of this provision of this law.

In connection with our investigation of communist infiltration of labor unions, we are utilizing confidential informants who are members of the CP and hold positions covered by the law. These informants not only provide information on CP activity but also communist infiltration in unions. The Department is requested to advise what, if any, action by the FBI is necessary in view of the informants' CP membership and their positions in unions coming within the purview of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.

158-00



66-2542-3 -
NOT RECORDED
117 AUG 22 1960

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Investigations have been opened in the field on all individuals known to be in apparent violation of the communist membership provision of the LMRDA of 1959. Since we have about 30 informants and sources who hold positions in unions and who are members of the CP, we should determine from the Department what action, if any, is necessary with regard to our informants.

62 AUG 23 1960 (1) 66-2542-3 (Security Informant File) (9)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 158-00

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*

DATE: August 24, 1960

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES
PAYMENTS *sun*

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

The following tabulation of expenditures represents payments made to security informants and sources on a monthly basis for the period of January, 1958, through June, 1960.

	1958	1959	1960
Jan.			
Feb.			
Mar.			
Apr.			
May			
June			
July			
Aug.			
Sept.			
Oct.			
Nov.			
Dec.			
TOTAL			(6 mos.)
Monthly Average			
Monthly average January, 1958, through June, 1960			

b7E

The above figures are recorded graphically on the attached

page.

ACTION:

None, for your information.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Rose

BFR:mar:ser (4)

52 AUG 31 1960

25 AUG 29 1960

EX-112

REC-52

66-2542-3-51225

66-2542-3-1225

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6
				19	58											19	59										19	60	

Total Total Total - 6 no's
 * Average • Average * Average - 6 no's
 ■ aren all 30 no Average

- aren all 30 Mo Average

DATE OF MAIL

Aug 25, 1960

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

See Inft. Serl

REMOVED BY

61 SEP 1 1960

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-2-1226

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

DATE OF MAIL 9-22-60

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL *Security Informants, Gen.*

REMOVED BY 61 OCT 3 1960

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1227

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FB* DATE: September 26, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue *GENL*

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of August, the previous month of July, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	<u>August</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	50	61	5593
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	151	166	21772
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs, and Informants Developed	18	11	1974

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

This program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

66-2542-3

REC-91

66-2542-3-1228

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

EX-105

11 SEP 28 1960

62 OCT 3 1960
 JDD:frl (3) *frl*

mg
Donohue

Memorandum for Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

K. Ruc
mmz

Memorandum

Tolson _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Belmont _____
Callahan _____
DeLoach _____
Malone _____
McGuire _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 9-19-60

FROM : J. F. Malone

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #99-61
SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED]
TAMPA OFFICE

b6
b7C

SUGGESTION: That Forms FD-238 and FD-209 be revised to include appropriate blocks to be checked for racial informants and potential racial informants when forms are used for such individuals. Form FD-238 (Security Informants Review Sheet) is attached for your information. Form FD-209 is used by field to record contacts with informants and a copy of this form is also attached.

CURRENT PRACTICE: [redacted] advised that when these two forms are used for racial informants, the information must be written on the form.

ADVANTAGES: The advantages would be that it would preclude having to write information on the forms and it makes the forms more uniform.

CONCLUSIONS: SAC Santoiana stated that there is a specific need for these changes and feels that the idea should be adopted. Messrs Sizoo and Evans recommend against adoption on the basis that there are only approximately 120 informants and potential informants in the racial field (2% of total utilized by Bureau in all fields) confined to less than 20 offices, principally in the South. AS of 8-1-60, the Tampa Office had only four racial informants and five potential informants in this field.

Form FD-238 was designed to provide ready access to a number of items of information concerning active informants, potential informants and confidential sources. It is kept as the top serial in the informant's file and serves as an index. FD-209 is used as an alternative to a memorandum, recording contacts with informants and potential informants.

RWB:bmw

(2)

(Quest P: 21 1960

ENCLOSURE

57 SEP 26 1960

F264

66-2542-3

NOT RECORDED

133 SEP 22 1966

PERC-2120

ORIGINAL FILED IN
66-88 4542-1-532

Memo to Mr. Mohr

Re: Suggestion #99-61

Submitted by

Tampa Office

b6
b7C

The Training and Inspection Division believes that for the relatively small number (120) of cases involved it would be much more practical to write in or type in the necessary racial designation when either of these forms is to be used. Accordingly, we are opposed to the adoption of the suggestion.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this suggestion not be adopted. Upon approval no further action is necessary since has previously been thanked for making this suggestion.

b6
b7C

OK
JPM
5/12/20

JR
JW
JPM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *just*

DATE: September 6, 1960

FROM : DIVISION STREAMLINING COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 99-61

Tolson	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
DeLoach	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

Training and Inspection Division has requested Domestic Intelligence Division comments on above suggestion by [redacted] Tampa Office, that Forms FD 238 and 209 be revised. After considering this suggestion the Committee feels that the changes are not warranted.

b6
b7C

The suggestion is that Form FD 238 (Security Informants Gen) Review Sheet), a copy of which is enclosed, be revised to include blocks for Criminal Informant (Racial) and Potential Criminal Informant (Racial), pointing out that the form is used in connection with such informants.

It is also suggested that such blocks be added for Security Sources of Information and Security Confidential Sources. With regard to Form FD 209, the suggestion is that similar blocks be placed on that Form. (Copy of FD 209 is also enclosed) In making the suggestion, it is pointed out that when these forms are used for racial informants, information must be written in on the form and that revision of the forms would obviate this and make the forms more uniform.

FD 238 was designed to provide ready access to a number of items of information concerning active security informants, potential informants and confidential sources. It is kept as the top document in the individual field office file. FD 209 is used in the field as an alternative to a memorandum, recording contacts with informants or potential informants.

66-2542-3
NOT RECORDED

In coming to the conclusion about the suggestion being not worthy of adoption, the Committee has considered that there are only approximately 120 informants and potential informants in the racial field confined to 15 offices, principally in the South, as against a total of approximately 10,000 security and criminal informants and potential informants throughout the field. The small number of cases in which the racial designation would be helpful does not appear to warrant changing the forms to accommodate only those relatively few cases. For example, as of August 1, 1960, the Tampa Office had only 4 racial informants and 5 potential informants in the racial field. The Committee feels that, for the relatively small number of cases involved, it will be much more practical to write in, or type in, the necessary racial designation when either of these forms is to be used.

ENCLOSURE

1-Belmont 1-Rosen
1-Training & Inspection Division 1-Liaison 1-Fitzgerald

56 SEP 28 1960
Enclosures 2

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-1-533

Memo Division Streamlining Committee to Belmont
RE: SUGGESTION NUMBER 99-61

RECOMMENDATION:

That these comments be directed to the attention
of the Training and Inspection Division, and the Investigative
Division which are also considering this suggestion.

for
an

he

gm

9/7/60

Suggestion made by Clerk in Tampa Office that Forms FD-238 and FD-209 (copies attached for information) be amended to include appropriate blocks to be checked for racial informants and potential informants when forms are used by such individuals. FD-238 is used by field as top serial in informant file to record various pertinent items of information. FD-209 is used by field to record contacts with informants.

While these forms are used for all types of informants and now contain blocks for criminal and security informants and potential informants, it is noted that informants and potential informants in the racial field constitute less than 2% of the total informants and potential informants utilized by the Bureau in all fields. It is further noted that less than 20 field offices have racial informants and/or potential informants. Since the proposed changes would thus benefit only a few offices and would not be widely used in the field it is recommended that they not be adopted.

Re *above* *JW*

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3

~~ENCLOSURE~~*2-Pratt*

DATE OF MAIL

9/26/60

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Informants: General

REMOVED BY

¹⁴⁵²
61 OCT 21 1960

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-2-1229

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Director, FBI (100-3-9)

10/5/60

SAC, Pittsburgh (100-577)

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA DISTRICT
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

SECURITY INFORMANTS

ReBulets to Pittsburgh, 8/19/58, and 9/19/58, and mylet to Bureau, 9/6/60.

In accordance with instructions set forth in reBulet, 9/19/58, this letter is furnished to advise of Pittsburgh's efforts concerning the development of potential security informants (PSIs) within the Communist Party of Western Pennsylvania (CPWP).

It is noted that the Pittsburgh Office continues to afford intensified coverage of the activities of HERBERT KRANSDORF, Organizer, CPWP, and ALEX STEINBERG, CPWP member, through technical and physical surveillances. Sources have furnished information indicating that KRANSDORF during the past few months has contacted several individuals (former members of CPWP and CP sympathizers) in an attempt to reactivate the CP in this area but, by his own admission, he has received a cool reception from several of these individuals. In August, KRANSDORF, while in contact with GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA, indicated that he had two groups, one negro and one white, with three members each operating in the Pittsburgh area. The activities of KRANSDORF and STEINBERG are being followed closely in order to identify their contacts and evaluate them for possible development as PSIs.

As previously reported, four cases have been opened on contacts noted during surveillances of KRANSDORF. Two of these cases concern security subjects who have moved into Pittsburgh from other divisions and their cases are being investigated leading toward possible interviews with them. The other two cases in this category have been developed to the point where they are presently being utilized as neighborhood sources concerning KRANSDORF.

3 - Bureau (RM)

(1) 66-2542-3 SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM)

2 - Pittsburgh

(1 - SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM)

JWS/jep

(5)

57 OCT 13 1960

66-2542-5 -
NOT RECORDED
150 OCT 10 1960

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-3-9-1722

b7D

PG 100-577

No additional PSIs relating to CPWP activities have been developed during the past month. At the present time, the Pittsburgh Office has three PSIs being developed as possible future security informants regarding the CPWP.

The Pittsburgh Office will continue its program for the development of PSIs as described previously and the Bureau will be advised of any pertinent developments regarding the reactivation of the CPWP, the activities of HERBERT KRANSDORF and ALEX STEINBERG, and Pittsburgh's efforts to increase its security informant coverage.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *gbc*

DATE: October 25, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue *X*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM *Sen*

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of September, the previous month of August and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	<u>September</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	60	50	5653
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	190	151	21962 <i>le</i>
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants Developed	21	18	1995

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

This program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

66-2542-3

59 NOV 1 1960

REG-30

66-2542-3-1239

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

5 OCT 26 1960

JDD:fri:lel (3) *le*

EX-102

Donohue

Memorandum for Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

*WLB
/ma*

DATE OF MAIL

Oct 25, 1960

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

See Inft Gen

REMOVED BY

61 NOV 14 1960

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1231

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

30

October 26, 1960

PERSONAL

66-2542-3-

Mr. Edward Leo Breen, Jr.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Seattle, Washington

Dear Mr. Breen:

Mr. Milnes has forwarded to me your suggestion that form FD-329 be revised to provide for furnishing certain information to the Bureau in connection with our informant programs. I am sure you will be interested to know that consideration has previously been given to making provisions for the proposed data on this form. Form FD-329 is designed for the purpose of computing both averages and percentages while it is only necessary to report a total figure of the time spent on the informant programs.

Although your idea is not being adopted in this instance, I want you to know that your interest in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

RWB:blw (Suggestion #203-61, dated 10-12-60)
(5)

- 1 - Personnel file of SA Edward Leo Breen, Jr.
1 - SAC, Seattle - The reasons for not adopting this suggestion are as follows: 1 - It is only necessary to furnish a total figure on the time spent on the informant programs and such totals can be obtained by using an adding machine. The automatic data processing equipment is used for computing averages and percentages of overtime and time spent in office and is not a practical means for making simple additions.

(Continued on next page)

MAILED 2
OCT 26 1960
COMM-FBI

NOV 1 1960

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-2542-1540

- Tolson
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Belmont
- Callahan
- DeLoach
- Malone
- McGuire
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

51 NOV 4 1960 TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SAC Note (con't)

2 - The major portions of the reports of the time spent on criminal informants and the time spent on potential security informants are narratives on the programs. 3 - Space limitations on FD-329.
4 - Not all offices make reports to the Bureau on time spent on security informants and those required to make them change from time to time.

NOTE: Form FD-329 has been recently approved for use in computing averages and percentages for voluntary overtime and time spent in office. When the procedure was approved, consideration was given to making provisions for including time spent on potential security informants and time spent on potential criminal informants but it is not practical for reasons indicated in the note to the SAC.

#203-61

Date

10-12-60

To:

Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name)

EDWARD L. BRENN, JR.

Division of Assignment

SEATTLE

SUGGESTION

Re SAC Letter 60-46, Para. B. It is suggested that in addition to including on FD-329 the VOT and TIO the form be revised to include the TOPCI and TOPSI. This information is compiled by the Agents daily and incorporated on their No. 3 locator cards, and monthly it is tabulated and the Bureau informed monthly of the time spent by the office on the development of Potential Criminal Informants. This information could be compiled much easier by the Bureau on IBM equipment and thereafter provided to the field.

Security informants - Jan.

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts)

This information is tabulated in the field manually, and the total TOPCI is provided to the Bureau monthly.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

A considerable savings of time in the field without a proportionate expenditure of time at the SOG in computing the total TOPCI and TOPSI would be effected. There would be no additional expenditure of Agents time since Agents now have to compute this information initially anyway.

66-2542-3-

NOT RECORDED

170 OCT 31 1960

Disadvantages of suggestion

None.

OCT 19 1960

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.) I understand that I will be considered for any justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.

☐ Mr.

☐ Mrs.

☐ Miss

Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head I recommend that this suggestion be favorably considered. It would save considerable time in the field and would be a simple, expeditious way of compiling the information and making it available to the Bureau.

Signature and Title

SAC

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

*ALL 10/26/60
Brenn: fms*

*1X 6-1
10-31-60
132*

Brenn

100

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-2542-1-540
OCT 18 1960

DATE OF MAIL 11-25-60

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL *Security Informants Gen.*

REMOVED BY 61 DEC 2 1960

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1232

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: November 28, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

General

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of October, the previous month of September and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	<u>October</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>Total</u>
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	50	60	5703
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	187	190	22149
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants Developed	10	21	2005

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

66-2542-3

REC-35

66-2542-3-1233

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Donohue

12 NOV 30 1960

62 DEC 2 1960

JDD:blw

(3)

EX-102

Donohue

Memorandum for Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

for RWC
Jab


UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Rosen ✓

DATE: December 6, 1960

FROM : C. L. McGowan ✓

SUBJECT: NEW ORLEANS CONFERENCE ON
DEVELOPMENT AND HANDLING OF
SECURITY AND RACIAL INFORMANTS

Tolson _____
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 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
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 DeLoach _____
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At the recent informant conference held in New Orleans, representatives of the field recommended that the Bureau's current policy relating to racial informants be changed to eliminate the "probationary period" in the development of such informants. (After extensive background investigation is conducted Bureau authority is obtained to contact an individual under consideration for development as a racial informant during a probationary period to receive information volunteered and to critically evaluate his stability and reliability. During this period no affirmative steps may be taken to direct his activities, such authority being withheld until the SAC certifies as to the individual's stability and reliability.)

The "probationary period" was established in November, 1959, as an added safeguard to prevent emotionally unstable individuals from becoming informants in the highly sensitive and explosive racial field. The need for such an added safeguard was pointed up by the case of former Potential Security Informant (PSI) [redacted] testified in Domestic Relations Court in a child custody case that he had served as an Agent for the FBI. [redacted] actually served as a PSI from [redacted]. At that time the Director noted that in view of [redacted] background it appeared our procedures in developing such informants required re-evaluation. Establishment of the "probationary period" as an added safeguard in developing such informants was approved by the Director and the Executive Conference.

The recommendation of representatives of the field that the probationary period be eliminated has been fully considered and there appears to be no reason to change our present policy.

JGK:ers

(5) *ers*

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(B) SECURITY INFORMANTS -- A series of five two-day conferences in the field on the developing and handling of security informants was recently completed. These conferences were held in the Chicago, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Philadelphia and New York Offices, with 107 selected Special Agents from all offices except Anchorage, Honolulu and San Juan participating. The results of these conferences are set forth herein containing changes in procedure effective immediately. These changes were recommended by the conferences.

USE OF CURRENT INFORMANT TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL HIGH-LEVEL COVERAGE IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY (CP) USA

In order to insure continuation of high-level informant coverage in the CPUSA, all offices having informants on a district level or higher should consider utilizing one or more of such informants to bring along new informants in the Party. This will be accomplished through the cooperation of the high-level informant who will be told that he will be contacted by another informant. The new informant will not know the individual he is contacting is an FBI informant. The high-level informant will then introduce the new informant to Party functionaries, et cetera, eventually working him into top Party activity. Through this plan the CP leadership will grow to trust the new informant and in a relatively short time we should be able to continue our high-level coverage in the event anything should happen to our current top informant. Until that time we will also have the services of the new informant who will be assisting the high-level informant in the Party. This plan has been informally discussed with several top-level informants who have stated it can be accomplished without jeopardizing their positions. Bureau authority should be obtained before discussing this plan with any informant and details of any proposed operation should be set forth in a letter to the Bureau with appropriate recommendations.

LONG-RANGE PROGRAM TO DEVELOP HIGH-LEVEL INFORMANT COVERAGE

We have live informant coverage on high levels in the CPUSA at the present time, but we should plan now for the future when our present informants through unforeseen circumstances may no longer be able to furnish the assistance which they are now rendering. Under our current programs we are developing as informants individuals who are active or inactive.

12/6/60
SAC LETTER NO. 60-56

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CP members or other subversive individuals. Since we are planning for the future, we should consider selecting as potential informants individuals who possess the qualifications for future leadership and pick such prospects not so much from the ranks of the CP or related subversive activity, but from the college and post-graduate levels. Since the majority of communist activity is concentrated in large metropolitan areas such as New York City, that office should begin a careful selection of college students or recent graduates of colleges in New York having active student organizations made up of individuals of radical tendencies. Selection of prospects should be based on above-average intelligence and qualities of leadership which would permit them to advance to the top of the CPUSA. A very limited number of potentials will be involved in this project and each cooperative individual will be thoroughly checked. Payments will be made commensurate with the individual's potential and compensation will be increased as he progresses in the Party. On a long-range basis such an individual will achieve a top position in the CPUSA. The New York Office is instructed to open a control file for this project and begin selecting individuals who should be considered under this plan. Each prospect should be investigated in accordance with Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions, and the Bureau will consider in each case whether approval should be given to attempt development under this long-range plan.

YOUTH PROGRAM OF THE CPUSA

At the 17th National Convention of the CPUSA held in New York City December 12-14, 1959, the CPUSA set up a program which was designed to produce a communist youth organization in the United States. The Party implemented this program by naming Daniel Mortimer Rubin as National Secretary for Youth, and Rubin has been touring a large part of the United States in order to complete the organization of a communist youth group. This organization will encompass all classes of young people, including college students. The Party hopes that in addition to other groups it will eventually have communist youth groups on college campuses.

All offices were alerted to this program by letter of June 21, 1960, entitled "CPUSA, Youth Matters, Internal Security - C" and to the necessity to have complete coverage of CP activity in youth matters. The Party is expected shortly to establish this youth organization, and we must be ready for this eventuality. If you have not already done so, alert

12/6/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-56

established informants so we will be advised immediately of the location of any youth groups set up anywhere in the country. Consideration should be given to making contacts with cooperative officials of institutions of learning so that we may become aware of the emergence on campuses of groups dominated by the CP. In addition, through a review of campus publications information may be elicited concerning the formation of communist youth groups on campuses. The Party is keenly aware of the need to develop an effective program among youth, and you should be alert to develop and maintain the necessary informant coverage of this activity.

TOPLEV PROGRAM

Through this program of contacting high-level communists as potential informants it has been possible to obtain the services of many excellent informants. By contacting carefully selected subjects and utilizing new specific approaches, additional informants can be developed which would insure continuation of high-level coverage of the CPUSA. By separate communication all 14 Toplev offices are being instructed to conduct an analysis of subjects previously approached and select individuals for reinterview at this time by utilizing specific new approaches.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

Any office where there is any degree of concentration of communists (although not a regular participant in the Program) should consider the possible application of counterintelligence techniques specifically aimed at causing disruption or disillusionment inside Party circles. Bureau approval must be obtained before any action can be taken. All proposals must be carefully evaluated prior to submission so it can clearly be stated that the action recommended will not embarrass the Bureau or jeopardize informants, sources of information or special investigative techniques. Communications in this regard should be captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C," Bureau file 100-3-104.

12/6/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-56

- 4 -

CONTROL - INTERVIEW OF FORMER INFORMANTS BY SAC

Strict control over informants is absolutely necessary to prevent embarrassment to the Bureau and jeopardizing our informant program. In order to minimize situations which could arise after discontinuance of informants, whenever the contacting Agent feels a discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to the Bureau arrangements should be made to have the former informant come to the field office where he will be personally met by the SAC. At that time he should be impressed with the fact that his services were appreciated and were of considerable assistance to the national defense of the country, and he will be reminded that he signed an agreement when he was active as an informant to maintain his relation with the Bureau on a confidential basis. The SAC will stress the necessity for the informant to maintain this confidence. This procedure should be placed in effect immediately.

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNDERGROUND OPERATIONS

CP leaders have discussed the possibility of the Party going underground in the event the forthcoming Supreme Court decision on the Internal Security Act of 1950 requires the CPUSA to register with the Attorney General. Party leaders feel the decision may be against the Party and it will have to go underground. Betty Gannett, member of the National Committee and educational director of the New York State CP, has been instructed to formulate a plan which could be used to establish an underground apparatus. All offices were advised by letter of November 2, 1960, to be alert for all activities of the Party throughout the country in this connection and efforts should be concentrated on developing sources and informants among individuals on the fringe of communist activity as such persons were used to great advantage by the Party when it went underground in the 1950s. Efforts should be made to obtain the actual blueprint which the Party will follow if it goes underground. Current informants should be alert for any discussion of this matter in the Party and be ready to place themselves in positions whereby they can provide information regarding the development of any underground activity.

MONOGRAPHS AND "THROWAWAYS"

The Agents who attended all five conferences were unanimous in their statements that the material being sent

12/6/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-56

- 5 -

to the field in the form of monographs and "throwaways" was of considerable assistance to them in the informant development program. The value of research material should be kept in mind at all times in making contacts with potential informants and in handling informant problems which are constantly arising.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

12/6/60
SAC LETTER NO. 60-56

- 6 -

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. PARSONS

DATE: 11/9/60

FROM : A. H. Belmont

cc Mr. Parsons

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - General
FIELD CONFERENCES ON THE DEVELOPMENT
AND HANDLING OF SECURITY INFORMANTS

Mr. Rosen
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sullivan
Inspir. Williams
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Bly
Mr. Donohue

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Sullivan
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

We have just completed a series of five two-day field conferences during which many problems relating to the development and handling of security informants were discussed. These conferences were very effective and much was accomplished by this clear-cut exchange of ideas. The conferences made the following recommendations:

(1) In order to insure continuation of our top-level coverage in the Communist Party (CP), USA, we select a suitable current informant and place this new informant in touch with one of our top-level informants who will bring along the new informant by introducing him to Party functionaries and eventually working him into Party circles. It was the firm opinion that this could be done without jeopardizing our present top informants.

(2) That we institute a long-range program to develop high-level informants in the CPUSA by selecting potential informants from college or post-graduate levels having leadership qualifications, and work them up in the Party, which would involve a very limited number of individuals and payments would be made to them commensurate with their potential.

(3) That we alert the field to the plan of the CPUSA to establish a national youth organization, and the necessity to establish live informant coverage of this phase of the Party's activities.

(4) That we reactivate our Toplev Program to obtain additional informants on high levels by utilizing new approaches to hard-core communists.

JDP:ssh:csb

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DEC 20 1960

3-14

Memorandum for Mr. Parsons
RE: FIELD CONFERENCES ON THE DEVELOPMENT
AND HANDLING OF SECURITY INFORMANTS

(5) That our Counterintelligence Program, which is causing disruption and disillusionment inside the CPUSA, be extended wherever possible with due care to insure full security of this delicate operation. *Spec letter 60-56 12-6-60*

(6) As a control measure we consider where necessary bringing former informants to the field office and have the SAC impress on the former informant the necessity to maintain his relation with the Bureau on a confidential basis. *Spec letter 60-56 12-6-60*

(7) That we exert all possible efforts to obtain any plans of the CPUSA to go underground if the Supreme Court rules against the Party during the current court session and to plan now with the placing of our informants in positions to obtain any information regarding underground activity in which the Party may engage. *Spec letter 60-56 12-6-60*

(8) That specific research monographs and throwaways be prepared by the Central Research Section which may be used by the field in the development and handling of security informants. *Spec letter 60-56 12-6-60*

(9) That we consider another series of conferences on security informants within one year. *Tully sent 12-6-60*

If approved, the necessary instructions will be issued to the field regarding the above recommendations. Concerning the recommendation for another series of conferences within a year, we will consider such conferences dependent on conditions at the time.

JE 12/8 *[Signature]* *[Signature]*

RA

Security Informants General December 15, 1960

PROPOSED CHANGES IN MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

Section 107 Q relating to discontinued informants should have one more subsection added to read as follows:

16. Whenever contacting Agent feels a discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to the Bureau, arrangements should be made to have the former informant come to the field office where he will be personally met by the SAC. At that time, he should be impressed with the fact that his services were appreciated and were of considerable assistance to the security of the country and remind him that he signed an agreement when he was active as an informant to maintain his relation with the Bureau on a confidential basis. The SAC should stress the necessity for the informant to maintain this confidence.

Manual of Instructions
Revised.
grob

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25 DEC 21 1960

2. Buchanan
fmb
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FFS
51 DEC 23 1960

cc 66-1934

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: November 23, 1960

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FBK*

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - General

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
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There is attached a proposed SAC Letter summarizing the results of a series of conferences recently held in the field on problems relating to the developing and handling of security informants. Details of the results of these conferences were set forth in memoranda dated November 7 and November 9, 1960, and recommendations based upon these conferences were approved. Appropriate manual and handbook changes are being prepared.

It is realized that the SAC Letter is lengthy; however, it is recommended that it be transmitted in full in view of its importance to our security informant program.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, it is recommended that the attached SAC Letter be transmitted to the Training and Inspection Division for appropriate handling. Manual and handbook changes, where necessary, will be handled separately.

Enclosure - *sac letter detached*
frnt

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Training and Inspection Division
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:djw
 (9)

REG-92

66-2542-3-1236

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EX-137

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DEC 27 1960

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*

DATE: December 15, 1960

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *ffbe*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - Gen.
CONTROL - INTERVIEW OF FORMER
INFORMANTS BY SAC

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SAC Letter 60-56 (B) dated 12-6-60 pointed out that strict control over informants is absolutely necessary to prevent embarrassment to the Bureau and jeopardizing our informant program. The field was instructed that in order to minimize situations which could arise after discontinuance of informants whenever the contacting Agent felt a discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to the Bureau, arrangements should be made for the former informant to be interviewed personally by the SAC in the field office at which time the former informant would be impressed of the necessity to maintain his relation with the Bureau on a confidential basis.

ACTION:

For approval there is attached for transmittal to the Training Section of the Training and Inspection Division, appropriate changes in Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions. FBI Handbook changes not necessary.

Enc.

- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Malone
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:lel
 (7)

EX 100

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Manual of Instructions
 Revised
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25 DEC 21 1960

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: December 28, 1960

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAMGENL

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As the result of our conference on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of November, the previous month of October and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	<u>November</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>Total</u>
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	64	50	5767
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	162	187	22311
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants Developed	18	10	2023

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

66-2542-3

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:blw;djlw

(3)

50 JAN 4 1961

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INT. SEC.

Memorandum for Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

JJB

DATE OF MAIL 12-28-60

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Informants

REMOVED BY

61 JAN 13 1961

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1239

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 11, 1961

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)

EVALUATION OF PROGRAM

Due to success of Toplev Program which was instituted in 1951 (interviews of top-level Communist Party (CP) functionaries), the Security Informant Program was instituted in 1952 whereby persons of lesser importance would be contacted to obtain additional informants in the Party. The primary purpose of the program is to develop persons currently active in the CP into Bureau informants and such individuals, if developed while still in the CP, can immediately produce current information of value whereas persons with no CP affiliation who are willing to be developed as informants, require considerable time before they can produce information of value. In addition, these interviews crystallize the status of security subjects as to attitude and dangerousness and also cause considerable disruption and confusion within the CP itself. In April and May, 1956, this program of approaching active communists was combined with our General Interview Program of contacting security subjects and the resultant current program now embodies contacts not only with active communists but other subversive individuals, the purpose of the interviews being to obtain potential informant material. Since the inception of the program in 1951, 5,767 active communists have been contacted and 22,311 other individuals have been contacted since the extension of the program in 1956. As a result, we have obtained 2,023 sources; potential security informants, and informants. Through continued use of this program, our informant coverage will be extended and disruption in the CP will continue and any expansion of Party or new CP activity will be promptly detected.

RECOMMENDATION:

Since program has proved to be worthwhile, it is recommended it be continued under our present policies and procedures and the continuance of the program again be considered in six months.

66-2542-3-1219

JDD:djw
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

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REC-57

EX-113

12 JAN 13 1961

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3-1219

DETAILS:

This memorandum contains the results of a complete review and evaluation of this program and a recommendation that the program be continued.

1. Origin

Due to the success of the Toplev Program instituted in 1951 (interviews of top-level Communist Party (CP) functionaries), the SIP was instituted in 1952 whereby persons of lesser importance in the CP were contacted to obtain additional informants in the CP.

2. Purpose

The primary purpose of instant program is to develop persons currently active in the CP into Bureau informants. Such individuals, if developed while still in the CP, can immediately produce current information of value whereas persons with no CP affiliation, if willing to be developed as CP informants, require considerable time before they can produce information of value. Another factor to be considered in conducting interviews under the SIP is the disruption and confusion such interviews have caused within the CP itself.

3. Scope

In 1952, Agents in 23 field offices were given specialized training (this included 14 offices trained for Toplev interviews). In 1954, the SIP was further extended through the medium of special training sessions whereby additional Agents were trained in all continental offices to make approaches to active communists. In April and May, 1956, our program of approaching active communists was combined with the general interview program of contacting security subjects of all types and the resultant program is known generally as the SIP.

4. Tie-in with Other Programs

This program is handled as a special project. It is noted, however, it is similar to the Toplev Program which deals with the interviews of top-level and hard-core communists whereas the SIP deals with interviews of persons of lesser importance.

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3-1219

5. Case Load

As of 1-11-61, a total of 5,767 active communists and 22,311 other individuals were contacted under the SIP. All continental offices, except 30, submit monthly progress letters showing interviews conducted. The 30 offices have conducted all logical interviews with persons suitable for informant development and are required to submit a six-month progress letter.

6. Magnitude

The provisions and instructions formulated in connection with the SIP govern the interviews of persons considered for security informant development in all continental offices.

7. Weaknesses

There are no known weaknesses in the SIP.

8. Administrative Control

All continental offices (with the exception of 30) must submit monthly progress letters. The 30 offices must submit progress letters every six months.

Through analysis of progress letters an accurate evaluation of the effectiveness of the SIP can be made. Close supervision and control is possible and any weaknesses are immediately corrected by issuance of necessary instructions to the office involved.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the month of November, the previous month of October and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	November	October	TOTAL
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	64	50	5756
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	162	187	22311
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants Developed	18	10	2023

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3-1219

9. Adequacy and Currentness of Instructions

Instructions pertaining to the SIP are contained in Section 87 D of the Manual of Instructions and have been reviewed and have been found to be adequate.

10. Over-all Value

The over-all value of the SIP is clearly emphasized by the fact that 2,023 sources, PSIs, and informants have been developed through this program. Through the continued use of the SIP the Bureau's security informant coverage will be extended, confusion in the CP will continue, and any expansion of or new CP activity will be promptly detected.

11. Contemplated Action

It is contemplated the development of security informants will be continued through the SIP. It will be closely supervised, followed, and afforded tight administrative control.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 13, 1961

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS COVERAGE *GENERAL*
~~ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CP IN EACH FIELD OFFICE~~

EVALUATION OF PROGRAM

Bulet 8-7-58 instructed each continental field division, except San Francisco and Los Angeles, to submit detailed survey of Communist Party (CP) organization within its territory setting forth organizational structure, identities of all officers and n functionaries from club to district level, identities of each individual CP member, and current informant coverage. Copies of this letter were not directed to San Francisco or Los Angeles inasmuch as they had submitted current information of this type. Replies from the various field offices were thoroughly analyzed and results reflected over-all informant coverage to be good. Certain divisions had areas where additional coverage was needed and instant program inaugurated as a means of emphasizing to the field the necessity of expanding security informant coverage to cover these weak areas. Through the program the Seat of Government directs concentrated intensive efforts in those particular offices where the need for coverage is most urgent and assures continuous attention to make certain the necessary coverage is effected as rapidly as possible. Program involves ten offices which are set forth as follows: Boston, Chicago, Miami, New York, Pittsburgh, Portland, Salt Lake City, Seattle, Springfield, and Washington. Each of these offices has been separately instructed to take steps to obtain additional coverage in those area needing attention.

RECOMMENDATION:

Since this program serves a definite purpose in guiding the field toward strengthening areas of weak informant coverage, it is recommended that it be continued with further evaluation again in six months.

66-2542-3

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(5)REC-42
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66-2542-3-1241

25 JAN 16 1961

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

63 JAN 19 1961

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

This memorandum contains the results of a complete review and evaluation of this program and a recommendation that the program be continued.

1. ORIGIN

Bulet 8-7-58 instructed each continental field division, except San Francisco and Los Angeles, to submit detailed survey of CP organization within its territory setting forth organizational structure, identities of all officers and functionaries from club to district level, identities of each individual CP member, and current informant coverage. Copies of this letter were not directed to San Francisco or Los Angeles inasmuch as they had submitted current information of this type. Replies from the various field offices were thoroughly analyzed and results reflected over-all informant coverage to be good. Certain divisions had areas where additional coverage was needed and instant program has been carried on to emphasize to the field the necessity of expanding security informant coverage to cover these weak areas.

2. PURPOSE

The primary objective of this program has been to pinpoint areas in the field where informant coverage of the Party needs strengthening. It affords a means whereby the Seat of Government can direct concentrated, intensive efforts in those offices where this need for coverage is most urgent, and assures continuous attention to make certain the desired coverage is effected as rapidly as possible.

3. SCOPE

As delinquencies in this respect are overcome in an office, that office is dropped from this program. At present, the program is in effect in the ten following offices:

Boston	Portland
Chicago	Salt Lake City
Miami	Seattle
New York	Springfield
Pittsburgh	Washington

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

Each of the above offices has been separately instructed to take immediate steps to obtain additional coverage within those areas needing particular attention.

4. TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This particular program ties in with our other programs whereby we are endeavoring to ascertain and identify membership of the CP and to determine the financial operations and apparatus of the CP, USA. An important adjunct of this intensified program, of course, is the development of additional informants who are in the position of producing valuable intelligence information on individual communists which is of great value to the Security Index Program.

5. CASE LOAD

Each field office maintain a control file for instructions and other communications relating to the program.

6. MAGNITUDE

Each individual office which is being followed under this program is closely supervised by the appropriate supervisor of the Security Informant - Special Records Desk.

7. PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

An analysis and re-evaluation of the program have not disclosed any weaknesses at the present time.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

Each of the ten offices presently being followed under this program is receiving close attention on a periodic basis by the appropriate supervisor. As each office reports its progress, the results are carefully analyzed and any necessary instructions and directions are transmitted to the field by the supervisor to make certain this program receives continuing attention.

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

9. ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of instructions which have been given to each of the field offices under the program discloses that they are adequate and current.

10. OVER-ALL VALUE

The primary purpose of this program is to pinpoint for the field those areas of security informant coverage which need strengthening. In addition, the field has been instructed to take steps to develop additional coverage in those particular areas which will result in obtaining more informants in the security field.

11. CONTEMPLATED ACTION

As each office develops the necessary coverage, it will be dropped from the program. At the same time we will remain alert for any additional areas in the field which may become weak and place such offices under the program to make certain those weaknesses are eliminated and the necessary coverage is obtained.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *MB*

DATE: January 30, 1961

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue *JDD*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAMGeneral

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of December; the previous month of November, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	<u>December</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>Total</u>
A. Number of active communists contacted	49	64	5816
B. Number of other individuals contacted	148	162	22459
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants developed	12	18	2035

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION::

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

66-2542-359 FEB 6 1961

1 - Mr. Baumgardner *MB*

1 - Mr. Donohue

REC-85

66-2542-3-1242

FEB 1 1961

JDD:blw;sed *sed*

(3)

EX-102

AF-1
15-5

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month, and the grand total from the inception of the program.

J. R. R. R.

DATE OF MAIL

Jan 25, 1961

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

See Infts Gen

REMOVED BY

61 FEB 10 1961

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1243

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

8266

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont ☒
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Trotter _____
 Evans _____
 W. C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 17, 1961

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*SUBJECT: *O* *General*
SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES
PAYMENTS

The following tabulation of expenditures represents payments made to security informants and sources on a monthly basis for the period of January, 1958, through December, 1960.

	1958	1959	1960
Jan.			
Feb.			
Mar.			
Apr.			
May			
June			
July			
Aug.			
Sept.			
Oct.			
Nov.			
Dec.			
TOTAL			
Monthly Average			

b7E

Monthly average January, 1958, through December, 1960 - *66-2542-3-1274*

REC- 75

The above figures are recorded graphically on the attached page.

ACTION:

EX-113


5 FEB 21 1961

None, for your information.

Enclosure
 BFR:dds (4)

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner

62 FEB 28 1961



66-2542-3-10
 ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: February 28, 1961

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAMGeneral

Boyd
Boyd

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for month of January, the previous month of December, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	<u>January</u>	<u>December</u>	<u>Total</u>
A. Number of active communists contacted	48	49	5864
B. Number of other individuals contacted	162	148	22621
C. Results			
Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants developed	12	12	2047 <i>Cp</i>

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

REC-55

66-2542-3-1245

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

66-2542-3

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:had

(3)

6 MAR 1 1961

EX-117

50 MAR 6 1961

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month, and the grand total from the inception of the program.

JH Rive

st
jsh
(E)-3 STREAMLINING PROCEDURES - CHANNELIZING MEMORANDA -- Numerous channelizing memoranda, particularly in large offices operating a large number of live informants, are presenting an increasingly critical space problem and demands for extra file cabinets.

In June, 1960, the Chicago and San Francisco Offices were authorized to destroy channelizing memoranda following submission of reports in security cases on an experimental basis to determine the feasibility of adopting this practice throughout the field.

SECURITY INFORMANTS - GEN'L

Based upon the favorable results obtained in these offices, particularly in savings in file space and streamlining of case files, the Bureau is authorizing the destruction of these channelizing memoranda following submission of reports in both individual and organizational security cases.

In devising procedures for the handling of this matter you should be guided by the following:

(1) The current procedure with regard to filing the original informant report, the filing of the master channelizing memoranda in the informant file and the serializing of channelizing memoranda in the substantive case files will be continued as at present.

(2) The Agent, at the time he dictates the report, will prepare a memorandum listing the channelizing memoranda to be destroyed by serial or serial scope and requesting the Chief Clerk's Office to destroy. The memorandum should indicate that pertinent information contained in the serials to be destroyed was incorporated in the report. It will not be necessary to set forth in this destruction memorandum the file and serial number of original informant reports or master channelizing memoranda as this information will be listed in the cover pages to the report. In the case of multiple volumes, the destruction memorandum should be prepared by the Agent in sufficient numbers so that one copy will appear in each volume of the multiple volume file being stripped.

(3) Prior to destruction, the Agent's recommendations with respect thereto are to be reviewed and approved by the Supervisor at the time he reviews and approves the report.

(4) Following destruction of the channelizing memoranda the Chief Clerk will so note on the memorandum. Thereafter, the memorandum will be filed in the case file as a permanent record of the serials destroyed.

2/21/61
SAC LETTER NO. 61-8

- 4 -

66-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
102 FEB 28 1961

57 MAR 1 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-2717

(5) Technical and microphone surveillance channelizing memoranda may be destroyed without the necessity of identifying in the cover pages of the report the exact location in the office files of the original information. The use of an asterisk identifies the source and the original information can be readily located.

The channelizing memorandum should not be destroyed in the following instances:

(1) When the original information is not contained elsewhere in your office.

(2) Do not destroy serial one of a file regardless of its nature.

(3) Do not destroy any serial containing indexing. It would appear that if indexing was necessary to channelizing memoranda, such indexing would only be done in the main case file as set forth in the title of the communication.

(4) Do not destroy serial showing "action" information. For example, opening, closing, posting, or instructions given by a Supervisor to an Agent concerning the case.

The destruction of these channelizing memoranda should be subject to close supervisory control by you to insure that all pertinent information contained in these memoranda is reported in the investigative report.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (C)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *amb*

DATE: February 23, 1961

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAMPOSTING REQUESTS FOR SAC AUTHORITY TO
INTERVIEW SUBJECTS OF SECURITY CASES

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Malone
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. McNerney

Tolson _____
Parsons _____
Mohr _____
Belmont _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

Inconnection with the Security Informant Program (SIP), our New York Office (NYO) has requested the Bureau to authorize the field to post memoranda reflecting the results of investigative efforts which have been prepared in lieu of investigative reports.

Current posting instructions contained in Section 3, Part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations, does not permit the field to post memoranda to the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) which are prepared in connection with "attitude" interviews of the subjects of closed or pending security files. Bureau instructions (Section 87 D, Manual of Instructions) provide that such interviews under the SIP can be authorized by the SAC, when certain conditions exist, upon the preparation of a memorandum to him setting forth the results of complete file reviews, credit checks, and investigations made to determine the subject's current residence and employment.

COMMENTS:

The investigative activity of the Agent preparing for an "attitude" interview is frequently substantial. It is believed only proper that a memorandum to the SAC setting forth the results of such investigative activity be posted to the file.

ACTION:

1. Attached for your approval are appropriate changes in Section 3, Part II, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations. It is recommended these changes be transmitted to the Training Section of the Training and Inspection Division. FBI Handbook changes are not necessary.

REC-76

EX-100

17 MAR 7 1961

57 MAR 10 1961

Also attached for your approval is a letter to NYO advising of this change in posting procedure.

Enclosures (2)

DJM:had

(8)

ENCLOSURE

Manual of Rules & Regulations
Revised Feb

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-1934

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Malone

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. McNerney

February 23, 1961

PROPOSED CHANGES IN MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 7 (page 19), relating to posting procedures, should have the following underscored addition inserted at the place shown:

.....Communications to the Bureau or to another field office which furnish the results of investigative activity in report form or in some other form in lieu of an investigative report, or request investigation based on investigative activity, should be posted. Memos for the SAC containing the results of investigation conducted prior to requesting SAC authority to interview an individual, as described in Section 87 D, 6, b, (7), (d) of the Manual of Instructions, may be posted if they contain the results of all the investigation required. Memos containing only a portion of the requirements, such as the results of file reviews, or a credit check, will not suffice for posting purposes.

NOTE: See memo Baumgardner to Belmont, captioned "Security Informant Program; Posting Requests for SAC Authority to Interview Subjects of Security Cases," 2-23-61, DJM:had.

DJM:had
(9)

1585
3 14 11 21

Tolson _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Belmont _____
Callahan _____
DeLoach _____
Malone _____
McGuire _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-1246

DATE OF MAIL

Feb 27, 61

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

See Syfts Gen 1243
363

REMOVED BY

61 MAR 15 1961

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1247

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

AA Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: March 22, 1961

FROM : J. F. Malone

Security Informants - Gen.

SUBJECT: ~~ANNUAL FORMS SURVEY~~~~Form FD-306~~~~Cover Sheet for Informant Report or Material~~

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Trotter _____
 Evans _____
 W. C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

Form FD-306, "Cover Sheet for Informant Report or Material," is used as a cover sheet which is filed on top of an informant report or similar material and indicates necessary identifying data. The form is prepared on bond paper, and on Mimeograph paper and preprinted masters for reproducing processes. A copy of the form on bond paper is enclosed.

In response to the Bureau's request to review the FD- forms in the FBI Form Book for the annual forms survey, the Charlotte Office, by letter 2/14/61 (66-3482-5480), proposes that Form FD-306 be preprinted on manifold paper (thin white paper). Comments of five field offices were solicited. The San Francisco Office indicates that it does not use FD-306 for channelizing memoranda. The Philadelphia Office advises it prepares only one copy of FD-306 and recommends no changes in the present types of papers used. The Atlanta, Chicago, and New York Offices are in favor of having FD-306 on manifold for occasions on which the desired number of copies does not exceed the number of legible copies which can be prepared through one run on the typewriter, thereby eliminating or at least reducing the preparation of additional copies by means of the Mimeograph or preprinted masters. The Atlanta and Chicago Offices also indicate manifold paper requires less filing space. It is to be noted that at the time that FD-306 was devised favorable consideration was not given to printing FD-306 on manifold for the reason that the quality of manifold is not sufficiently durable to withstand the excessive handling which the form receives, both before and after it is filed. Three official suggestions in the past to print FD-306 on manifold have been disapproved. Training and Inspection Division is of the opinion that present reproducing processes available for FD-306 are adequate, and the form should not be made available in manifold paper. If you approve, proposal of the Charlotte Office will not be adopted.

66-2542-3-1249

RECOMMENDATION:

REC-113

5 MAR 27 1961

That proposal to preprint Form FD-306, "Cover Sheet for Informant Report or Material," on manifold paper not be adopted.

Enclosure (1)

66-3482

(3 copies) B

fk

2

ENCLOSURE

77

62 MAR 31 1961

3-23

OK

JPM

XEROX

MAR 29 1961

VPS

2-K

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 6

Date received	Received from (name or symbol number)	Received by
Method of delivery (check appropriate blocks) <input type="checkbox"/> in person <input type="checkbox"/> by telephone <input type="checkbox"/> by mail <input type="checkbox"/> orally <input type="checkbox"/> recording device <input type="checkbox"/> written by Informant		
If orally furnished and reduced to writing by Agent: <div>Date _____</div> <div>Dictated _____ to _____</div> <div>Transcribed _____</div> <div>Authenticated by Informant _____</div>		Date of Report _____ Date(s) of activity _____ File where original is located if not attached _____
Brief description of activity or material _____ _____ _____		

Remarks:

Block Stamp

ENCLOSURE
66-2542-3 - 1249

CURRENT FD-306 (on-bond)

March 1, 1961

PERSONAL

66-2542-3-

*Received 3/6/61
in Dir's Personal Book.
3/6/61
x*

Mr. Theodore P. Rosack
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rosack:

I have received your suggestion regarding a revision of Form 5-24 to make it serve more efficiently the purpose for which it is used. I am indeed pleased to advise you that your proposal has been adopted and the necessary steps are being taken to place it into effect.

I want to thank you very much for the interest you manifested in giving me the benefit of your idea.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

MAILED 31
MAR - 1 1961
COMM-FBI

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
 - 1 - Personnel file of Mr. Theodore P. Rosack
- Suggestion #449-61, dated 2/23/61

JER:pls (5)

NOTE: Suggests that Form 5-24, used to disseminate information received from Bureau informants to agencies, etc. outside the Bureau, be revised to provide more space and limit its use to reporting information from one informant rather than several. Training and Inspection Division has objection to the proposed revision and, in view of the fact that Mr. Belmont recommends favorable consideration and Domestic Intelligence Division is the one which prepares these forms, it is recommended that the suggestion be adopted. On approval the proposed revision should be directed to the Forms Division Training and Inspection Div for handling.

REC'D - FBI
MAR 13 4 03 PM '61

REC'D - ATTORNEY
FBI

REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI
MAR 1 10 54 AM '61

*W. C. Sullivan
B-110*

Handwritten signatures and initials

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

XEROX

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

449-61

Date
February 23, 1961

To: Director, FBI	From: (Suggester's name) Theodore P. Rosack	Division of Assignment Domestic Intelligence
----------------------	--	---

SUGGESTION

It is suggested that the use of Form 5-24 (Rev. 11-12-58), copy attached, be discontinued and the use of a revised form, a sample of which is attached, be approved for use in the dissemination of TT-1 reports (TT-1 reports are furnished by informants outside the Bureau through Mr. John P. Mohr). The basic instructions in Form 5-24 are being retained in the new form with the exception that the instructions therein will now pertain to a single informant report rather than two or more. If approved, the new form will use Optional Form 10 rather than the currently used Bureau black-letterhead type of communication.

Security Informants - gen

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts)
Form 5-24 is being used to disseminate TT-1 reports to field offices with specific instructions regarding the use of the information contained therein.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

Savings: None

Advantages: Will result in more efficient dissemination of TT-1 reports. The space on Form 5-24 in the center of the page is currently, for the most part, wasted. Additional space is urgently needed at the bottom of the page for designation of copies for Bureau and field office files. The additional space at the bottom of the page can also be utilized for any special instructions to the field and should more space be required a second page can be added, which cannot be done with the present form.

Disadvantages of suggestion

None

66-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
170 MAR 28 1961

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States)

☒ Mr. ☐ Mrs. ☐ Miss Theodore P. Rosack, SA
Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head
I think there is merit in this suggestion and that it should be considered.

A.H. Belmont
Signature and Title
A.H. Belmont, Assistant Director

ENCLOSURE

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

XEROX
MAR 29 1961
25 MAR 27 1961

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-3482-527

DATE OF MAIL

March 27, 1961

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Info Gen

REMOVED BY

61 APR 12 1961

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1250

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

7/17

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: March 31, 1961

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM - beni

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the month of February, the previous month of January, and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	<u>February</u>	<u>January</u>	<u>Total</u>
A. Number of active communists contacted	54	48	5927
B. Number of other individuals contacted	123	162	22947
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants developed	19	12	2106

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past month to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

66-2542-3

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:had

(3)

3 APR 11 1961

66 APR 14 1961

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and next month another memorandum be prepared showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current month, the preceding month, and the grand total from the inception of the program.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 10, 1961

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: ~~DEFENSE PLANS - VITAL RECORDS TO QUANTICO~~

In accordance with instructions issued by the Executives Conference memorandum dated 9-14-54, the attached Photostats should be placed in the index at Quantico alphabetically and by field offices as follows:

Chicago
 Chicago
 Cleveland
 Cleveland
 Houston
 Houston
 Indianapolis
 Los Angeles
 Milwaukee

Newark
 New York
 New York
 New York
 New York
 New York
 San Francisco
 Washington Field

b7D

Also in accordance with above instructions, the following Photostats now in Quantico should be destroyed as the informants are no longer active:

Detroit
 Los Angeles
 New Orleans
 Seattle

b7D

ACTION:

Recommended this memorandum and its enclosures be sent to Quantico for necessary action and that the memorandum be returned to the Security Informant Desk for filing.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Sloan (SAC, Quantico)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD:had
 (5)

REC-64

NOT RECORDED

3 APR 14 1961

EX-132

56 APR 19 1961

Security IN FORMANTS - Genl, J

RMB

Jhe

Jhe

Jhe

Jhe

D

Handled at Quantico

4-12-61 - Jhe

66-2542-3-1252

Jhe

DATE OF MAIL

April 25, 1961

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

See Infts - Gen

REMOVED BY

61 MAY 12 1961

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1253

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr *11-616*DATE: April 20, 1961 *JM*FROM : J. F. Malone *JFM*

SUBJECT: FBI HANDBOOK

O SECURITY INFORMANTS

Tolson	_____
Parsons	_____
Mohr	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

Buchanan

Attached are two suggested changes for the Agents' Handbook, prepared for the purpose of bringing the subject matter up to date.

RECOMMENDATION:

That these handbook changes be approved, printed and distributed.

*Manual + Handbook
Revised
JFM*

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures (2)
DJD:mgj
(3) *mgj*

56 MAY 11 1961 *cc-66-1934*

3 XEROX
MAY 5 1961
Ype

166-2542-3
NOT REC
126 MAY 5 1961

12 MAY 1961 *3*

2-JFM

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-73212-921

April 20, 1961

PROPOSED CHANGE FOR AGENTS' HANDBOOK

Item E., Page 45, Part II.

The identity of an informant is privileged from disclosure except in the unusual case where his identity is relevant to the defense of the accused or is essential to a fair determination of the cause. Roviaro v. U. S., 353 U.S. 53 (1957). Where the informant did not participate in the crime there is no need to reveal his identity to the defense. Anderson v. U. S., 273 F2d 75 (1959), cert. den. 80 S. Ct. 95.

DJD:mgj
(4)

NOTE:

Based on memo J. F. Malone to Mr. Mohr, dated 4/20/61, re: FBI HANDBOOK, DJD:mgj.

fmh

gpm
fmh
th

Tolson _____
Parsons _____
Mohr _____
Belmont _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
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66-2542.3-

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Gurley

REC-87

66-2542-3-1254 April 24, 1961

EX-112

Dr. John R. Tufft
110 Woodrow Street
Taft, California

Dear Dr. Tufft:

Your letter to the Attorney General dated March 23, 1961, has been referred to me.

In response to your inquiry, I can advise that individuals who have in the past furnished information to the FBI on a confidential basis and are no longer serving in this capacity are not under the control or direction of the FBI. I am sure you can understand, and agree, that the FBI cannot be held responsible for any statements made or articles written by them.

While the menace of communism is indeed serious, I feel it is necessary for all of us to confront this threat in a calm, realistic, rational and law-abiding manner. The label of "communist" is too often indiscriminately attached to those whose views differ from the majority. Those whose lives are not lived according to what one segment of society might decree the "norm" are too frequently challenged as "Reds." If we are to effectively combat this evil conspiracy, it is imperative that all citizens of this Nation endeavor to exhibit in more positive ways the value and superiority of our form of government over any foreign ideology.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

1 - Los Angeles (Enclosure) (SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE TWO

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FBI

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FBI - LOS ANGELES
REC'D - MAY 1 1961

Handwritten signature/initials

Handwritten notes: OB 5/16, TJB/r, etc.

MAY 1 1961

Dr. John R. Tufft

ATTENTION: SAC, LOS ANGELES:

One copy of correspondent's letter to the Attorney General is attached for your information. The Attorney General did not acknowledge receipt of the letter.

Bufiles contain no identifiable references to correspondent.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

The Los Angeles Office is being advised of this matter in view of Dr. Tufft's allegation concerning former undercover agents of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: April 7

J. Walter Yeagley

Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security DivisionSUBJECT: Public letter from
Mr. John R. Tufft*Security Informants - see 1*

Enclosed for your information and any action which you may deem appropriate is a self-explanatory letter addressed to the Attorney General dated March 23, 1961, from a Mr. John R. Tufft, Ph.D. of Taft, California.

The receipt of Mr. Tufft's letter has not been acknowledged.

Enclosure

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Ingram	
Miss Gandy	

EXP. PROC.

APR 14 1961

REC-86 66-2542-3-1254

7 MAY 5 1961

EX-112

5/10/61
JESAck Let
1-24-61 (2 wks)
4-24-61 (1 wks)
LTB/100/100

ENCLOSURE

XEROX

MAY 12 1961

PERS. FILES

110 Woodrow Street
Taft, California
March 23, 1961

Hon. Robert Kennedy, Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Would you kindly indicate what is the authorization, if any, for certain citizens to publicly advertise themselves as "former undercover agents for the F. B. I." and conduct a campaign of villification of the public school system and certain educators in particular, including the organization of student groups to report on what is said in the classroom and to report secretly to a local leader?

Being a teacher of political science and American history in higher education, I am deeply disturbed about some so-called "patriots" who in the name of seeking out Communists do gross damage by innuendo to loyal American citizens trying to uphold our Constitutional government and the American system. This has been greatly troublesome to my students, particularly when the honored name of the F. B. I. is used and by implication involves the authority of the U. S. Department of Justice in their disruptive activities.

Sincerely yours,

1254
John R. Tufft

John R. Tufft, Ph. D.

ENCLOSURE

cc to Congressman Harlan Hagen

1cc made for LA
by let 4-5-61
KTR:agc

(Original on Plastiplaste)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

SAC, Albany

April 14, 1961

EX-116

REC-9

Director, FBI (66-2542-3) 1255

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

Re SAC Letters 56-34, 56-56 and Bulet 4-6-59 to all offices concerning progress letters submitted monthly on this program.

Offices receiving copies of this letter should submit progress letters on a quarterly basis by the tenth of June, September, December and March of each year in the present form. You should continue to set forth an analysis of your progress, the number of Agents contributing to the program, the approximate amount of time being spent on the program and the total number of interviews and reinterviews conducted with active communists and other individuals.

Even though it will no longer be necessary to furnish this information monthly, it will be incumbent on all offices to continue to utilize this important program to the fullest extent to make certain we obtain potential informants who can furnish necessary coverage on communist and related matters.

2 - Baltimore
2 - Boston
2 - Buffalo
2 - Charlotte
2 - Chicago
2 - Cleveland
2 - Detroit
2 - Indianapolis
2 - Los Angeles
2 - Milwaukee
2 - Minneapolis

2 - Newark
2 - New Haven
2 - New York
2 - Philadelphia
2 - Phoenix
2 - Pittsburgh
2 - St. Louis
2 - San Francisco
2 - San Juan
2 - Seattle
2 - Washington

MAILED 20

APR 14 1961

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Gandy _____

JDD:had
(51)

NOTE

See memorandum Baumgardner to Belmont, dated 4-13-61, captioned as above, JDD:had.

56 MAY 12 1961

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
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 Ingram _____
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TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 13, 1961

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

The Security Informant Program was inaugurated in September, 1952, as a means of approaching active communists to obtain potential informants. In 1956 it was combined with our general interview program of security subjects; and as a result, approaches are now being made under the Program not only to active communists but also to former communists and individuals with subversive backgrounds who appear to have informant potential. Twenty-three offices submit monthly progress letters containing a tabulation of the results of the Program for the current month, and as a streamlining measure, it is suggested that this report be submitted quarterly. The other 32 offices submit this information on a semiannual basis as they only conduct interviews under this Program from time to time and the report is only necessary on an infrequent basis.

The progress letters will continue to receive close supervision and any weakness or lack of interest on the part of an office will be immediately corrected by issuance of necessary instructions to the office involved to make certain that this effective means of obtaining potential informants is continuously and thoroughly explored. If this change is approved, the monthly memorandum now prepared on the basis of these monthly letters will be submitted quarterly in the future.

ACTION:

In line with the above, there is attached an appropriate letter to the 23 offices involved (original on Plastiplate) setting forth these new instructions. We will still follow each office closely to make certain that full attention is given to this vital Program in order that we may continue to obtain potential informants who can furnish necessary coverage in communist and related matters.

66-2542-3

Enclosure

JDD:had
(4)

REC-9

EX-116

66-2542-3-1255

25 MAY 8 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
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 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*

DATE: May 2, 1961

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Malone
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. McNerney
- 1 - Manual of Instructions
- 1 - FBI Handbook

SUBJECT: PROPOSED MANUAL CHANGES
 SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

GENERAL

The sections pertaining to our Security Informant Program in the Manual of Instructions (M of I) and the FBI Handbook have been completely reviewed and the following changes and deletions are recommended. No policy changes are involved.

Section 107, Table of Contents (M of I)

Many questions arise concerning the use of Form FD-209 (reporting contacts with informants), and a recommendation is being made to add "Form FD-209" under item 4 in the table of contents showing the page number in the Manual where information concerning this form can be found.

Section 107C, 2 (M of I)
 Section 26A, 2, b (Handbook)

Instruction now stands to make discreet canvass of other informants in conducting background investigation of a potential security informant (PSI). Substitution of the word "logical" for "other" will eliminate unnecessary work in contacting informants who live in areas so far removed from the PSI they would be unaware of his activities anyway.

Section 107D, 6 (M of I)
 Section 26A, 4 (Handbook)

This section relates to the submission of progress letters on unpaid PSI's. As a streamlining measure, it is being recommended these letters be submitted on a UACB basis. It is also recommended, for the sake of uniformity throughout the field, that such letters be submitted in the same format as is required in the submission of justification letters on security informants.

66-2542-3

Enc.

DJM:plb/blw

(8)

ENCLOSURE

2 enc. detached &

REC-81

66-2542-3-1256

Filed with COPY

EX-130

MAY 15 1961

manual of instructions

FBI Handbook

58 MAY 19 1961

cc-66-1934

2-100

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

66-1934

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: PROPOSED MANUAL CHANGES
SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

Section 107I, 1, a (M of I)
Section 26A, 5 (Handbook)

This section deals with the assignment by the field of permanent symbol numbers to informants. For additional clarity an instruction that no symbol can be reissued to another informant, which instruction now appears under Section 107Q, M of I, is being deleted from that section and inserted under the above-captioned sections of the Manual and the Handbook.

Section 107I, d and e (M of I)

Current instructions allow for the designation to an informant of both a cover name and a cover number. Due to the increasing number of informants and symbols assigned, it is felt the use of a cover number can lead to confusion. Therefore, it is recommended that the instruction, as it pertains to cover numbers, be deleted.

Section 107J, 1, (M of I)

This same reference to the phrase "cover number" is being deleted from this section which pertains to the indexing of names and aliases of informants.

Section 107N, 3, b, (10) (M of I)
Section 26A, 8, b (Handbook)

This section relates to the proper headings for items covered in justification letters. (Item 10) is headed "Informant's Potential for Advancement." It is felt this caption is too general and it is recommended that the heading "Steps Being Taken to Advance Informant" be substituted.

Section 107N, 4 (M of I)
Section 26A, 8, d (Handbook)

Instructions in these sections relate to the four-month submission of evaluation letters concerning informants not being paid on Bureau authority. These letters call for the recommendation of

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: PROPOSED MANUAL CHANGES
SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

the SAC regarding continuance of the informant. Because it will save an answering communication from the Bureau in some instances, it is recommended that the phrase "UACB" be included in SAC's recommendation in these evaluation letters.

ACTION:

Attached for your approval are the specific changes outlined above for the Manual of Instructions and the FBI Handbook.

DTM
q
JH *kur*
AB
11/4



May 2, 1961

PROPOSED CHANGES IN FBI HANDBOOK

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Malone
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. McNerney

PART I

Section 26 A, 2, b, (p. 17a), relating to the background investigation of PSIs, should have the following underscored word substituted:

b. Discreet canvass of logical informants

Section 26 A, 4, second paragraph on page 18, relating to progress letters concerning PSIs, should have the following underscored portions added or substituted as indicated:

Advise Bureau of progress being made with potential security informants at least every four months. Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authority should be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These letters should follow the form indicated under 8b below, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation. (See M. of I., vol. IV, Sec 105 K for exceptions in deseco matters.)

Section 26 A, 5, (p. 18), relating to the assignment of symbol and cover number to informants, should have the sentence added as underscored below. In addition, the phrase "or number" should be deleted from line six and again where it appears commencing on line nine of this paragraph:

5. Symbol numbers

Informants should be designated by a permanent symbol number of which the Bureau must be advised. Once a symbol number is assigned, it must not subsequently be reassigned to another informant. An informant must

NOTE: See cover memo Baumgardner to Belmont, dated 5-2-61,
captioned "Proposed Manual Changes, Security Informant
Program," DJM:ple/blw

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

Proposed Changes in FBI Handbook

Section 26 A, 8, b, (p. 19), relating to the proper headings for items covered in justification letters, should have the following underscored substitution made:

(10) Steps being taken to advance informant

Section 26 A, 8, d, (p. 19a), relating to communications transmitted to the Bureau on informants not being paid on Bureau authorization, should have the following underscored addition made at the end of subsection d:

.....regarding continuance of informant UACB.

1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Malone
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Baumgardner

May 2, 1961

**PROPOSED CHANGES IN
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS**

1 - Mr. McNerney

VOLUME IV

Section 107, Table of Contents, (p. 1). The following underscored addition should be made under item F:

Page

4. Contacts by Agent 7
Form FD-209 8

Section 107 C, 2, (p. 4), relating to the background investigation of potential security informants (PSIs) should have the following underscored word substituted:

2. Discreet canvass of logical informants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office.

Section 107 D, 6, (p. 5), relating to progress letters concerning PSIs, should have the following underscored portions added or substituted as indicated:

6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months. Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months and must include certifications regarding potential informant's stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These letters should follow the form indicated under Section 107N, 3, b, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation. (Refer to Section 105 K, 6h, (3), (b), volume IV, of this Manual for exception to this rule in deseco matters.)

Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. Parsons.....
Mr. Mohr.....
Mr. Belmont.....
Mr. Callahan.....
Mr. Conrad.....
Mr. DeLoach.....
Mr. Evans.....
Mr. Malone.....
Mr. Rosen.....
Mr. Tavel.....
Mr. Trotter.....
Mr. W.C.Sullivan.....
Tele. Room.....
Mr. Ingram.....
Miss Gandy.....

NOTE: See 5-22-61 memo from Baumgardner to Belmont, dated 5-2-61, captioned "Proposed Manual Changes, Security Informant Program," DJM:ple/blw.

DJM:blw

REC'D - INVOICE

ENCLOSURE

Proposed Changes in Manual of Instructions

Section 107 I, 1, a, (p. 13), relating to the assignment of symbol and cover numbers to informants, should have the following underscored sentence added:

- a. All informants should be designated by a permanent symbol number of which the Bureau must be advised. Once a symbol number is assigned, it must not subsequently be reassigned to another informant.

In paragraphs d and e of this same Section the phrase "or number" should be deleted from line one of each paragraph.

In Section 107 J, 1, (p. 14), relating to the indexing of names and aliases of informants, the phrase "or number" appearing in line two of this paragraph should be deleted.

Section 107 M, 3, b, (10), (p. 19), relating to the proper headings for items covered in justification letters, should have the following underscored substitution made:

(10) Steps being taken to advance informant

Section 107 M, 4, (p. 20), relating to the submission of evaluation letters concerning informants not paid on Bureau authority, should have the following underscored addition made at the end of the sentence finishing on line 6:

.....should also be set forth UACB.

Under Section 107 Q, 2, (p. 24), relating to discontinued informants, delete the second sentence of this paragraph which reads as follows:

"The symbol number shall not be subsequently reassigned to another informant."

DATE OF MAIL

May 25, 1961

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Informants - General
128

REMOVED BY

61 JUN 14 1961

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1257

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

b6
b7C

June 13, 1961

PERSONAL

[Redacted]
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Chicago, Illinois

Dear [Redacted]

I have received your suggestion that the Manual of Instructions be revised with regard to certain indexing procedures. Your proposal is receiving careful consideration and you will be advised if it is adopted.

The interest which prompted you to submit this idea to me is indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover


1 - SAC, Chicago
1 - Personnel file of [Redacted]
ML:het (Suggestion #661-61 dated 6/7/61)
(5)

NOTE: Referred to the Domestic Intelligence, General Investigative and Special Investigative Divisions for views and recommendations.

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JUN 14 1961



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FBI
REC'D - HYATONE

661-61

Date

June 7, 1961

To:

Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name)

Division of Assignment

FBI, Chicago - CCO

b6
b7c

SUGGESTION

That Section 107 J of the Manual of Instructions, page 14, item #1, and Section 108 of the Manual of Instructions, Sub-section G, item #7, relating to the indexing procedures on security and criminal informants respectively, be changed in the interest of uniformity and to provide the same security regarding the identity of security informants as is provided concerning the identity of criminal informants General

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts)

See attached page A

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

1. Uniformity in the rules relative to indexing of criminal informants and security informants would be provided.
2. Additional security regarding identity of security informants would be provided.

Annual savings: None

Disadvantages of suggestion

None

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States)

☐

Mr.

☐

Mrs.

☒

Miss

Clerk
Clerk

b6
b7c

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

I feel this suggestion has some merit and should be fully considered.

James H. Gale
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE Title

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

③ - Bureau (REGISTERED)

2 - Chicago (66-4468)

1 - Personnel File, *[redacted]*

CNF:njb:gal

JUN 14 1961

REC-24

66-2542-3-1258

EX-113

JUN 12 1961

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Current Practice or Rule:

Section 107 J of the Manual of Instructions, page fourteen, item #1, concerning indexing procedures on security informants, states as follows:

"True names and aliases of all informants, as well as the cover name or number assigned to them for informants' use in submitting their statements, but not their permanent Bureau symbol numbers, shall be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name."

Section 108 of the Manual, Sub-section G, item #7, relating to indexing of criminal informants, states as follows:

"Index names of criminal informants in the general field office indices in the same manner as any other name. If the informant is one with whom contact is restricted, where he is a paid informant, the indices card in the general field office index shall not contain the informant's field office file number but merely the words 'See SAC'."

Recommended Change

It is noted in reading these sections that with regard to paid criminal informants, the indices card in the general field office indices does not contain the informant's field office file number but merely refers to seeing the SAC. On the other hand, the instructions relating to indexing of permanently symbolized Bureau security informants, requires that they be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name.

It is felt that under current indexing rules a higher degree of security is given to criminal informants than to security informants by virtue of the fact that index cards on security informants contain both their name and file number, although they do not contain the Bureau symbol number. It is felt that the rule relating to indexing of criminal information affords criminal informants more security, and it is recommended that consideration be given to standardizing the instructions relative to indexing of both types of informants along the lines contained in Section 108, Sub-section G, item #7 of the Manual of Instructions.

b7D

DATE OF MAIL

June 26, 1961

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Infts - Genl

REMOVED BY

61 JUL 3 1961

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1259

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: June 26, 1961

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. DonohueSUBJECT: ~~SECURITY~~ SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
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As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field has been submitting progress letters monthly under this program but, effective 4-14-61, letters are now being furnished to the Bureau by the field on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 5-31-61, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	Three months ending 5-31-61	Three months ending 2-28-61	Total
A. Number of active communists contacted	201	151	6128
B. Number of other individuals contacted	483	433	23430
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants developed	62	43	2168

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3
JDD:had

EX-113

REC-94

JUN 28 1961

(3) 50 JUN 30 1961

Security Informants - Ben 1

Donohue

Crr

66-2542-3-1260-5

Memorandum to Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and another memorandum be prepared by 9-25-61 showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current quarter, the preceding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.

June 27, 1961

PERSONAL

REC-3
EX-105

100-2542-3-1261

[Redacted]
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Chicago, Illinois

Dear [Redacted]

Reference is made to your suggestion concerning a revision of instructions in regard to certain indexing procedures. I am pleased to advise you that a modification of your proposal has been adopted and the necessary steps are being taken to place it into effect.

I want to thank you for initiating this idea which will result in greater uniformity in our indexing operations.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

1 - SAC, Chicago

1 - Personnel file of [Redacted]

JER:het (Suggestion #661-61)

(5)

NOTE: Based on memorandum from J. F. Malone to Mr. Mohr dated 6/26/61, re: Security Informants, Suggestion #661-61 Submitted by [Redacted] Chicago Office. JER:het

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MAILED 25
JUN 27 1961
COMM-FBI

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JUN 23 1961

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MEMORANDUM MALONE TO MOHR
RE: SUGGESTION #661-61

The Special Investigative Division, noting that the only difference in handling criminal informant index cards and racial and security informant index cards in the field was that the criminal informant cards had the words "See SAC" in place of the file number which appeared on the cards of the other two types, recommended that the words "See SAC" be dropped and the appropriate file number be used in all cases. They felt that this would achieve uniformity in the indexing of all three types of informants and would not affect the security of criminal informants so long as good judgment and tight control continued to be exercised in handling the informant files.

The Training and Inspection Division agrees that the use of the notation "See SAC" on the index cards for criminal informants should be replaced by the appropriate file number as is now the case with security and racial informants. Further, it is felt that while this change is the antithesis of that proposed by the suggester, she should receive credit since her suggestion initiated the action which resulted in the modification and since uniformity in the preparation of the index cards for the three categories of informants will be achieved.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the suggestion as modified by the Special Investigative Division, to eliminate the words "See SAC" on index cards for criminal informants and in their place to insert the appropriate file number, be adopted and the attached letter of appreciation be sent to . Her suggestion was acknowledged by prior letter.

b6
b7C

2. That this memorandum serve as the authority for the Manuals Desk, Training and Inspection Division, to make the appropriate manual changes.

Addendum of
General Investigative Division

FCW:jam

6/15/61

It is noted that although racial informants are considered in the criminal informant category, files and indexing relative to racial informants are handled in accordance with the provisions of Section 107, Manual of Instructions, relating to security informants. It is believed that adequate security is provided for racial informants even though their file number appears on cards in the general indices. The security is provided in that all pending files on racial and security informants are maintained under lock and key under the personal supervision of the Field Office official or Supervisor maintaining the security and racial informant indices. (See Sections 107M Number 9 and 108M Number 4, Manual of Instructions.) Thus the files on these informants are not available except to those who should reasonably have access to them. In addition the index card for racial and security informants contains no special notation such as "See SAC" which would arouse the curiosity of anyone observing the card. By not having such a notation, it is unnecessary to go back and remove same from the index card when the individual involved no longer fits in the category of informant which requires such a notation.

The General Investigative Division does not feel that any change is necessary.

clm
JRM
RAW

28

ADDENDUM: Domestic Intelligence Division, 6-15-61, MJR:had
RE: Suggestion No. 661-61

A careful consideration of the suggestion indicates that very little, if any, additional security would be provided regarding the identities of security informants if the notation "See SAC" was used on index cards rather than a [] file number. For instance, while the [] file number on an index card may indicate that the subject is a security informant, substitution of the notation "See SAC" would denote that the subject is in a special category, such as that of a security informant. Furthermore, in view of a large number of security informants who are paid and with whom contacts are restricted to certain Agents, if this suggested procedure of indexing was adopted it could conceivably lessen the security afforded criminal informants whose special category makes it necessary that their index cards contain the notation "See SAC."

While the adoption of the suggestion would bring about a uniformity in the rules relative to indexing of criminal and security informants, there would actually occur less uniformity in the indexing of security informants since there would be two types of indexing involved. One would be where the [] file number would be used and the other where the notation "See SAC" would be necessary. This would require clerical personnel in the Chief Clerk's Office to make a determination whether the file number should be included or whether the notation "See SAC" should be used. This would cause additional work in the Chief Clerk's Office. Furthermore, the use of the suggested procedure would require reindexing of the cards whenever an informant is no longer in the category requiring the use of the notation "See SAC."

b7D

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) In view of the above observations that little or no additional security would be afforded security informants by using the notation "See SAC" on index cards and the fact that there would be less uniformity in indexing those cards with the resultant additional work involved, the Domestic Intelligence Division recommends that the suggestion not be adopted.

(2) This be forwarded to Training and Inspection Division for any further consideration.

MJR 7931K

MC 74

2.8.62

ADDENDUM: Special Investigative Division
Re: Suggestion Number 661-61

ABF:mac

6/21/61

The suggestion submitted by the Chicago Office recommends that security and racial indexing conform to the rules of criminal informant indexing in the field so that there will be uniformity and additional security.

Security and racial informant desks do not concur with this suggestion. The only difference in the handling of criminal informant index cards in the field, as distinguished from the security and racial index cards, is that instead of the file number criminal index cards have the words "See SAC"; whereas, the other two index cards have the field office file number thereon.

For the sake of uniformity throughout the field, the Special Investigative Division recommends that the words "See SAC" no longer be placed on criminal informant index cards and that in lieu thereof, the field insert the appropriate file number. By so doing, there will be uniformity of the three different informant index cards. This recommended change will in no way affect the security of the criminal informants so long as good judgment and tight control continues to be exercised by the field in the handling of the informant files.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: July 12, 1961

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM (SIP)EVALUATION OF PROGRAM *G.M.*

Due to success of Toplev Program which was instituted in 1951 (interviews of top-level Communist Party (CP) functionaries), the Security Informant Program was instituted in 1952 whereby persons of lesser importance would be contacted to obtain additional informants in the Party. The primary purpose of the program is to develop persons currently active in the CP into Bureau informants and such individuals, if developed while still in the CP, can immediately produce current information of value whereas persons with no CP affiliation who are willing to be developed as informants, require considerable time before they can produce information of value. In addition, these interviews crystallize the status of security subjects as to attitude and dangerousness and also cause considerable disruption and confusion within the CP itself. In April and May, 1956, this program of approaching active communists was combined with our General Interview Program of contacting security subjects and the resultant current program now embodies contacts not only with active communists but other subversive individuals, the purpose of the interviews being to obtain potential informant material. Since the inception of the program in 1951, 6,128 active communists have been contacted and 23,430 other individuals have been contacted since the extension of the program in 1956. As a result, we have obtained 2,168 sources, potential security informants, and informants. Through continued use of this program, our informant coverage will be extended and disruption in the CP will continue and any expansion of Party or new CP activity will be promptly detected.

RECOMMENDATION:

Since program has proved to be worthwhile, it is recommended it be continued under our present policies and procedures and the continuance of the program again be considered in six months.

66-2542-3-1219

JDD:djw:edm
(5)

REC-23

66-2542-3

EX-105

JUL 17 1961

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

62 JUL 19 1961

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3-1219

DETAILS:

This memorandum contains the results of a complete review and evaluation of the program and a recommendation that the program be continued.

1. Origin

Due to the success of the Toplev Program instituted in 1951 (interviews of top-level Communist Party (CP) functionaries), the SIP was instituted in 1952 whereby persons of lesser importance in the CP were contacted to obtain additional informants in the CP.

2. Purpose

The primary purpose of instant program is to develop persons currently active in the CP into Bureau informants. Such individuals, if developed while still in the CP, can immediately produce current information of value. Another factor to be considered in conducting interviews under the SIP is the disruption and confusion such interviews have caused within the CP itself.

3. Scope

In 1952, Agents in 23 field offices were given specialized training (this included 14 offices trained for Toplev interviews). In 1954, the SIP was further extended through the medium of special training sessions whereby additional Agents were trained in all continental offices to make approaches to active communists. In April and May, 1956, our program of approaching active communists was combined with the general interview program of contacting security subjects of all types and the resultant program is known generally as the SIP.

4. Tie-in with Other Programs

This program is handled as a special project. It is noted, however, it is similar to the Toplev Program which deals with the interviews of top-level and hard-core communists whereas the SIP deals with interviews of persons of lesser importance.

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3-1219

5. Case Load

As of 7-1-61, a total of 6,128 active communists and 23,430 other individuals were contacted under the SIP. All continental offices, except 32, submit quarterly progress letters showing interviews conducted. The 32 offices have conducted all logical interviews with persons suitable for informant development and are required to submit a six-month progress letter.

6. Magnitude

The provisions and instructions formulated in connection with the SIP govern the interviews of persons considered for security informant development in all continental offices.

7. Weaknesses

There are no known weaknesses in the SIP.

8. Administrative Control

All continental offices (with the exception of 32) must submit quarterly progress letters. The 32 offices must submit progress letters every six months.

Through analysis of progress letters an accurate evaluation of the effectiveness of the SIP can be made. Close supervision and control is possible and any weaknesses are immediately corrected by issuance of necessary instructions to the office involved.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the period ending 5-31-61, the previous period ending 2-28-61 and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	Three Months Ending 5-31-61	Three Months Ending 2-28-61	TOTAL
A. Number of Active Communists Contacted	201	151	6128
B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted	483	433	23430
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants Developed	62	43	2168

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3-1219

9. Adequacy and Currentness of Instructions

Instructions pertaining to the SIP are contained in Section 87 D of the Manual of Instructions and have been reviewed and have been found to be adequate.

10. Over-all Value

The over-all value of the SIP is clearly emphasized by the fact that 2,168 sources, PSIs, and informants have been developed through this program. Through the continued use of the SIP the Bureau's security informant coverage will be extended, confusion in the CP will continue, and any expansion of or new CP activity will be promptly detected.

11. Contemplated Action

It is contemplated the development of security informants will be continued through the SIP. It will be closely supervised, followed, and afforded tight administrative control.

RA
ST

EX-101
I

SAC, Washington Field Office 12th MA 21

June 7, 1961

Director, FBI

66-2542-3-

PROPOSED FORM

INFORMANT AND SOURCE MATTERS

RECEIVED
F.B.I.
JUL 3 2 12 PM '61

Reurlet 5/1/61 and Bulet 5/9/61 concerning proposed form to be used in the preparation and maintenance of the Informant Index.

The Bureau has given further consideration to proposed form and it is authorized for use in your office. Preparations are being made for its printing. Advise the Bureau immediately of the form number to be indicated on the form and of the supply you desire to have printed at this time. Upon receipt of the forms, insure that a copy is placed in the appropriate section of the FBI Form Book in your office. A similar copy will be placed in the form folder of the Washington Field Office at the Bureau.

- 1 - Domestic Intelligence Division, Att.: (1) Mr. Donohue, 1244 (sent
(2) Mr. Lenz, 1244 direct)
(3) Mr. Lenihan, 2710
- 1 - General Investigative Division, Att.: (1) Mr. Woodcock, 4706 (sent
(2) Mr. Freund, 4706 direct)
- 1 - Special Investigative Division, Att.: (1) Mr. Fipp, 4264 (sent
(2) Mr. Brown, 4266 direct)

1 - 66-3482 (Forms)

(8 copies)

fkK

NOTE: Based on memorandum from Mr. J. F. Malone to Mr. Mohr 6/6/61
"Proposed Form, Informant and Source Matters." JER

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Mohr _____
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Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
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JUN - 7 1961
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JUL 7 1961

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62 JUL 12 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-1-565

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/12/61
12:11 PM 6/12/61FROM : *[Signature]* SAC, WFO (66-2184)SUBJECT: PROPOSED FORM
INFORMANT AND SOURCE MATTERSWFO-45*Security Informants - Gen*

ReWFOlet 5/1/61 and Bulet 6/7/61 approving the use of the proposed form to be used in the preparation and maintenance of the Informant Index.

WFO form number to be used is 45. It is desired that 500 copies of the form be furnished this office.

Trickler copy attached.

2-Bureau
1-WFO
BR:sgl
(3)

*Noted by Lorne Deck
Supplies ordered 6/15/61.*

66-3482

ENCLOSURE

2 XEROX
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66-3542-3-
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128 JUL 10 1961

12:11 PM 6/12/61

FBI
REC'D-WFO*2-2*

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-1-525

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: June 6, 1961

FROM : J. F. Malone

SUBJECT: PROPOSED FORM
INFORMANT AND SOURCE MATTERS

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By letter 5/1/61, Washington Field Office (WFO) requested approval for a form to be used in the preparation and maintenance of the Informant Index. On the basis of comments by the Domestic Intelligence, General Investigative, and Special Investigative Divisions, Bulet 5/9/61 (66-2542-1-53-168) disapproved proposed form for the following reasons: (1) Forms FD-209, "Memorandum for Recording Contacts with Criminal Informants and Security Informants," "FD-237, "Criminal Informant Review Sheet," and FD-238, "Security Informant Review Sheet," include items necessary for recording data developed on informants; (2) proposed form, in addition to the above-mentioned forms, will cause duplication of effort; (3) proposed form presents a security hazard through its traffic in the office; and (4) if there is any doubt by personnel concerning the preparation of index cards, the Manual of Instructions is available for reference.

During SAC Marlin W. Johnson's recent 2-day conference at the Bureau, he discussed the matter further with the interested divisions, making the following observations (copy enclosed):

1. In connection with Item 1 indicated above, he feels that Forms FD-237 and FD-238 do not show the needed information on the form itself, but refer to certain serials giving background information; should the Informant Clerk have the sole responsibility of reviewing the file to obtain this information, there is a greater possibility of error as this employee might overlook some change listed on another serial; in addition, it is a waste of clerical time as the Agent already knows the correct address, etc.; this information might also be set out in other types of correspondence rather than being listed on Form FD-209; each change would be listed on a different FD-209 and, in Security Cases, this form is not used until subject is approved by the Bureau.

(over)

Enclosures (3)

- 1 - Domestic Intelligence Division, Att.: (1) Mr. Donohue, 1244 (sent
(2) Mr. Lenz, 1244 direct)
(3) Mr. Lenihan, 2710
- 1 - General Investigative Division, Att.: (1) Mr. Woodcock, 4706 (sent
(2) Mr. Freund, 4706 direct)
- 1 - Special Investigative Division, Att.: (1) Mr. Fipp, 4264 (sent
(2) Mr. Brown, 4266 direct)

66-3482 JUL 10 1961

66-3482 JUL 10 1961

66-3482 JUL 10 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-1-53-168

Memorandum to Mr. Mohr
Re: PROPOSED FORM
INFORMANT AND SOURCE MATTERS
66-3482

2. With respect to Item 2, SAC Johnson indicates there would be no duplication of effort as the needed information must in some manner be passed from the Agent to the Informant Clerk. If the form is not used, the headings must be written out in longhand on a routing slip which obviously takes additional time.
3. Referring to Item 3, the proposed form would travel through the office in the perforated messenger envelopes or be personally carried by the Agent to the Informant Clerk, thus affording the very same security which is afforded other confidential material both at the Seat of Government and WFO.
4. In regard to Item 4, the important factor is making the information available to the Informant Clerk promptly, uniformly, and accurately. The Manual sets out the information desired, but does not indicate instructions as to the manner in which the information is to reach the Informant Clerk.

In addition, SAC Johnson points out that proposed form indicates a date of contact for sources of information only. It is necessary to recontact these sources on occasion to insure accuracy of information and to post any changes. The index card itself should not be furnished to the Agent as it is a permanent record. Using proposed form, the Chief Clerk's Office can list the necessary information on the form and give the form to the Agent who can indicate the contact and note any changes to be made on the source card. In the interest of efficiency, WFO is very desirous for approval of proposed form.

In view of the supplemental information furnished by SAC Johnson, the three aforementioned divisions have reconsidered their previous opinions and now recommend that the form be approved for use by WFO. The Forms Management Desk of this division concurs. If you approve, the enclosed letter has been prepared to be sent to WFO, and the Forms Management Desk will take the necessary steps to have the form printed for WFO.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That proposed form be authorized for WFO.
gpm was
2. That enclosed letter be forwarded to WFO.
gpm was
3. That Forms Management Desk arrange to have the form printed.
gpm was *Key* *WFO*

7

-GEN

(D) CONFIDENTIAL VOUCHERS - ⁰ SECURITY INFORMANTS - [CRIMINAL INFORMANTS -- In the audit of confidential vouchers it has been noted that a substantial number contain errors which either require a suspension or the return of the voucher to the field office for correction. In order to keep to a minimum the number of errors in confidential vouchers, the following items are set forth for your guidance:

RECEIPTS

1. Receipts for payments to informants should be obtained in all instances if possible. In the event a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
2. Receipts reflecting payment to informant should clearly reflect the date of payment, purpose, that is, whether for services or expenses or both and the amount for each. The period covered should be shown when the informant is paid on a period basis and the name of the Special Agent from whom the money was received. The receipt must be signed by the informant receiving the money and should not be witnessed by another Agent.
3. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not the Agent.

BLUE SLIPS

1. Each blue slip prepared in connection with payments to informants should reflect date of payment, Bureau case title, date of the authorization under which the payment was made, period covered and purpose of payment.
2. The first blue slips submitted in connection with a payment to an informant who has previously been used by another field division should reflect the identity of the other field division when known.
3. Vouchers and blue slips in the name of either the SAC or the ASAC must be signed by him personally. The name appearing on the voucher and the name appearing on the blue slip must always be in agreement. The

6/20/61
SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

- 2 -

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signature of the payee on the voucher must be in agreement with the typed name of the payee as reflected on the face of the voucher.

The above should be called to the attention of all employees of your office who have occasion to make payments to confidential informants or sources as well as those employees who handle the preparation of confidential vouchers.

As you are aware, upon request the Bureau must make available to the Federal courts receipts covering payments to informants who are used as witnesses. In view of this, it is imperative that receipts be submitted in good order. Unless immediate adherence to the Bureau's regulations concerning the preparation and execution of receipts is effected, it will be necessary to take administrative action against those employees who do not comply with these instructions.

6/20/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

(E) OFFICE SOCIAL ACTIVITIES -- I wish to emphasize the personal responsibility incumbent upon each division head to see that any outside social or recreational function sponsored by a divisional office is not attended by persons who may potentially cause embarrassment through their attendance at such functions. Each division head should be alert to see that no undesirable persons are invited to such functions and that they be held at respectable, reputable locations.

6/20/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: July 12, 1961

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS COVERAGE
(ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CP, IN EACH FIELD OFFICE) *En [signature]*

EVALUATION OF PROGRAM

Bulet 8-7-58 instructed each continental field division, except San Francisco and Los Angeles, to submit detailed survey of Communist Party (CP) organization within its territory setting forth organizational structure, identities of all officers and functionaries from club to district level, identities of each individual CP member, and current informant coverage. Copies of this letter were not directed to San Francisco or Los Angeles inasmuch as they had submitted current information of this type. Replies from the various field offices were thoroughly analyzed and results reflected over-all informant coverage to be good. Certain divisions had areas where additional coverage was needed and instant program inaugurated as a means of emphasizing to the field the necessity of expanding security informant coverage to cover these weak areas. Through the program the Seat of Government directs concentrated intensive efforts in those particular offices where the need for coverage is most urgent and assures continuous attention to make certain the necessary coverage is effected as rapidly as possible. Program involves eight offices which are set forth as follows: Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Miami, Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, Springfield, and Washington. Each of these offices has been separately instructed to take steps to obtain additional coverage in those areas needing attention.

RECOMMENDATION:

Since this program serves a definite purpose in guiding the field toward strengthening areas of weak informant coverage, it is recommended that it be continued with further evaluation again in six months.

66-2542-3

JDD:péb
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

62 JUL 19 1961

Tolson _____
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REC-23

EX-103

66-2542-3-1263

JUL 17 1961

Memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan
Re: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

This memorandum contains the results of a complete review and evaluation of this program and a recommendation that the program be continued.

1. ORIGIN

Bulet 8-7-58 instructed each continental field division, except San Francisco and Los Angeles, to submit detailed survey of CP organization within its territory setting forth organizational structure, identities of all officers and functionaries from club to district level, identities of each individual CP member, and current informant coverage. Copies of this letter were not directed to San Francisco or Los Angeles inasmuch as they had submitted current information of this type. Replies from the various field offices were thoroughly analyzed and results reflected over-all informant coverage to be good. Certain divisions had areas where additional coverage was needed and instant program has been carried on to emphasize to the field the necessity of expanding security informant coverage to cover these weak areas.

2. PURPOSE

The primary objective of this program has been to pinpoint areas in the field where informant coverage of the Party needs strengthening. It affords a means whereby the Seat of Government can direct concentrated, intensive efforts in those offices where this need for coverage is most urgent, and assures continuous attention to make certain the desired coverage is effected as rapidly as possible.

3. SCOPE

As delinquencies in this respect are overcome in an office, that office is dropped from this program. At present, the program is in effect in the eight following offices:

Boston
Chicago
Detroit
Miami

Pittsburgh
Salt Lake City
Springfield
Washington

Memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan
Re: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

Each of the above offices has been separately instructed to take immediate steps to obtain additional coverage within those areas needing particular attention.

4. TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This particular program ties in with our other programs whereby we are endeavoring to ascertain and identify membership of the CP and to determine the financial operations and apparatus of the CP, USA. An important adjunct of this intensified program, of course, is the development of additional informants who are in the position of producing valuable intelligence information on individual communists which is of great value to the Security Index Program.

5. CASE LOAD

Each field office maintain a control file for instructions and other communications relating to the program.

6. MAGNITUDE

Each individual office which is being followed under this program is closely supervised by the appropriate supervisor of the Security Informant - Special Records Desk.

7. PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

An analysis and re-evaluation of the program have not disclosed any weaknesses at the present time.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

Each of the eight offices presently being followed under this program is receiving close attention on a periodic basis by the appropriate supervisor. As each office reports its progress, the results are carefully analyzed and any necessary instructions and directions are transmitted to the field by the supervisor to make certain this program receives continuing attention.

Memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan
Re: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

9. ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of instructions which have been given to each of the field offices under the program discloses that they are adequate and current.

10. OVER-ALL VALUE

The primary purpose of this program is to pinpoint for the field those areas of security informant coverage which need strengthening. In addition, the field has been instructed to take steps to develop additional coverage in those particular areas which will result in obtaining more informants in the security field.

11. CONTEMPLATED ACTION

As each office develops the necessary coverage, it will be dropped from the program. At the same time we will remain alert for any additional areas in the field which may become weak and place such offices under the program to make certain those weaknesses are eliminated and the necessary coverage is obtained.

DATE OF MAIL

7/25/61

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Informants Gent. jbr

REMOVED BY 61 AUG 3 1961

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1264

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (66-2542-3)

DATE: August 15, 1961

FROM : SAC, San Francisco (66-1851 C)

SUBJECT: Security
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

Reurlet 8-9-61

Re: Security Informant will be added to the July list, and will be shown on the August report.

b7D

REC-23

66-2542-3-1265

cc 815 RB

2 - Bureau

1 - San Francisco

HFC:gc

13 AUG 18 1961

EX 104

63 AUG 23 1961

INT. SEC.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: August 8, 1961

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

SUBJECT: LONG-RANGE SECURITY INFORMANT
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Tolson ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☐
 Callahan ☐
 Conrad ☐
 DeLoach ☐
 Evans ☐
 Malone ☐
 Rosen ☒
 Sullivan ☒
 Tavel ☐
 Trotter ☐
 Tele. Room ☐
 Ingram ☐
 Gandy ☐

Security Informants - general

NY airtel 7-28-61 captioned "Solo, IS-C" stated that NY 694-S in connection with his activities in a "secret service school" in Moscow, and in discussions with the Soviet "Petrov," was advised by "Petrov" that NY 694-S "should consider finding a young person who someday can succeed you." NY 694-S advised "Petrov" that he had considered this matter, that he had it definitely in mind and that he was "looking around." NY 694-S will take no action in this regard without specific Bureau instructions.

We have anticipated the possibility of augmenting the coverage provided by NY 694-S and CG 5824-S on the highest levels of the CPUSA. This matter was thoroughly explored during our security informant conferences in October, 1960, and specific programs were set in motion. One plan involves the utilization of our present informants to bring along other informants in Party activity. The new informant will not know that the individual who is working him into top Party activity is also an FBI informant. Through this plan, the CP leadership will grow to trust the new informant, and in a relatively short time we should be able to continue our high-level coverage in the event anything should happen to our current top informant. In addition to this plan, we are also carefully screening as potential informants individuals who possess the qualifications for future leadership and we are choosing such prospects from the college and postgraduate levels in large metropolitan areas having active student organizations made up of individuals of radical tendencies. Also, we are continuing to utilize our Toplev Program as a means of approaching hard-core, active communists to determine if they would be willing to cooperate and continue in the Party on a high level for the Bureau.

The suggestion that "Petrov" made to NY 694-S to consider finding someone who could succeed the informant is exactly what the Bureau has had in mind and we are proceeding carefully in this direction to develop an individual or individuals who can be worked into this delicate high-level operation involving the innermost councils of the Communist Party, Soviet Union and Communist Party, USA. We must not jeopardize our present coverage, however, and we will make certain that any individual who is considered for involvement in this closely guarded network is carefully screened.

JDD:had
(5)

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AUG 17 1961

NOT RECORDED

AUG 17 1961

58 AUG 21 1961

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: August 17, 1961

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES
PAYMENTS

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

The following tabulation of expenditures represents payments made to security informants and sources on a monthly basis for the period of January, 1959, through June, 1961.

	1959	1960	1961
Jan.			
Feb.			
Mar.			
Apr.			
May			
June			
July			
Aug.			
Sept.			
Oct.			
Nov.			
Dec.			
TOTAL			
Monthly Average			

Monthly average January, 1959, through June, 1961 -

The above figures are recorded graphically on the attached page.

ACTION:

None, for your information.

Enclosure
BFR:cad (3)
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Rose

63 AUG 29 1961


F 77

REC-35

13 AUG 22 1961

12066
66-2542-3
JAN 1961

b7E



ENCLOSURE 66-9547-2 14

DATE OF MAIL August 28, 1961

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Info

61 SEP 14 1961

REMOVED BY

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-1267

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

DATE OF MAIL September 25, 1961

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Sec Info gen'l

REMOVED BY 61 OCT 16 1961

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1268

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

93
100

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: October 3, 1961

FROM : Mr. J. D. Donohue

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

General

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field has been submitting progress letters monthly under this program but, effective 4-14-61, letters are now being furnished to the Bureau by the field on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 5-31-61, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

	Three months ending 8-31-61	Three months ending 5-31-61	Total
A. Number of active communists contacted	220	201	6356
B. Number of other individuals contacted	377	483	23985
C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants developed	48	62	2238

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3-1269

66-2542-3

JDD:peb

(3)

REC-17

OCT 9 1961

56 OCT 11 1961

Memorandum to Mr. Baumgardner
Re: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and another memorandum be prepared by 12-25-61 showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current quarter, the preceding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.

J. J. B.

57 REC-72 66-2542-3-1270

October 9, 1961

PERSONAL

Mr. Roland W. Finley
Federal Bureau of Investigation
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Finley:

I have received your suggestion that a form be devised for use in requesting Bureau authority in certain matters. Your idea is receiving careful consideration and you will be advised if it is adopted.

The interest which prompted you to submit this idea to me is indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

- 1 - SAC, San Francisco
- 1 - Personnel file of SA Roland W. Finley
- ML:het (Suggestion #190-62 dated 9/29/61)
- (5)

NOTE: Referred to General Investigative, Special Investigative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions for views and recommendations.

Olson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Louch _____
Rans _____
Sizoo _____
Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

55 OCT 20 1961

MAILED 20
OCT 9 - 1961
COMM-FBI

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

XEROX

OCT 10 1961

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-3482-

#190-62

Date

9/29/61

To: Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name)
ROLAND W. FINLEY

Division of Assignment
SAN FRANCISCO

SUGGESTION

A form be devised for the justification of Security Informants, PSIs, Panel Sources and Sources of Information. Ten copies of a proposed form are submitted with the attached explanation of suggestion.

SECURITY INFANTS GEN.

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

Manuel of Instructions, Vol. IV, Section 107N, page 18.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (Include basis for estimate)

No field-wise basis for annual savings can be ascertained on information available at present to suggester. Advantages of a form such as proposed and the projected local office savings are contained in attached explanation.

Disadvantages of suggestion

No disadvantages appear obvious to suggester.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for any justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

☒ Mr. ☐ Mrs. ☐ Miss

Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

It appears that this suggestion has merit and would save Agent and steno time. Recommend it be adopted.

REC-72

Signature and Title

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

- 3 - Bureau (ENCLS. 10) Reg.
2 - San Francisco
1 - 66-1748

RWF/af
(5)

ENCLOSURE

XEROX
OCT 10 1961

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-3422-1091

RWF/af

Volume IV, Section 107N, Pages 18 and 19, sets forth the data required in requesting Bureau authority to pay informants on a continuing basis. This justification is used every four months for each paid Security Informant and is also used, where applicable, in connection with Potential Security Informants, Panel Sources and Sources of Information.

Based on the frequency of use of such justification, it is believed that a form which would include all required data would be of material value. Included in this memo is a suggested form which would appear to encompass the essential points required in a justification letter. It is recognized, however, that the writer may not be conversant with administrative problems which may exist at the Seat of Government and certain revisions may be necessary.

It is noted that similar types of forms are already in use, namely FD-142, Recommendation for Installation of Technical or Microphone Surveillance and FD-143, Recommendation for Justification for Continuation of Technical or Microphone Surveillance.

The suggested space allotment on the submitted form is based on a review of approximately 25 recent justification letters picked from the files of this office. This selection did include many of the most active informants in this division. In the event space allotment is insufficient to record all desired data under any given topic, it can be

SF
RWF/jmp

supplemented by the addition of a continuation page such as is now done in preparation of Fd-142 and Fd-143.

The manner of approval of this justification by the Bureau would remain the same by the use of an onion skin first page to be stamped for return to the submitting field office.

The advantages of the use of a form would:

- 1) Create absolute uniformity throughout the entire field.
- 2) Insure the coverage of all points required.
- 3) Simplify the preparation of dictation.
- 4) Save Agent dictation time.
- 5) Save stenographic time both in taking and transcribing dictation. In this connection it is pointed out that printed headings would also eliminate correction of any typographical errors which may be required at time of typing.

As of August, 1961, the San Francisco Office had 70 paid and unpaid Security Informants which required submission of justification letters each four months. In addition there were another 37 Bureau approved Potential Security Informants, Panel Sources and Sources of Information for a total of 107 matters in which a four months justification letter is used.

It is estimated that, at a minimum, a prepared form such as attached would save 10 minutes Agent dictation time per letter and 15 minutes stenographic time to take and transcribe this dictation. Time saved in actual preparation of dictation cannot be estimated and therefore is not included. Based on letters being submitted every four months, or three times yearly, this form would save a minimum of 58½ hours of Agent time and 86 ¾ hours of stenographic time in the San Francisco Office alone. Reducing this to more workable figures

SF
RWF/jmp

this amounts approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ weeks of Agent time and $2\frac{1}{2}$ weeks of stenographic time. Based on Agent pay of GS 13, it amounts to an approximate savings in this office of \$300 per year and on a basis of stenographic pay of GS 4, an additional \$175 per year. These figures, if applied to the New York, Chicago and Los Angeles offices would be increased greatly and when projected throughout the field would result in a savings of several thousand dollars yearly.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (Bufile)

DATE:

FROM : SAC, ()

SUBJECT:

☐ SI☐ PS☐ PSI☐ Source of
Information

Reference: (or leave space for reference)

1. RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend that authority be granted to
(continue, increase, decrease) payments to the above informant
to \$. per (month, week) for services, plus \$. per
(month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period
of months, effective (date).

2. RESIDENCE AND EMPLOYMENT:

☐ No change.☐ Residence changed to☐ Employment changed to

3. CURRENT MEMBERSHIP IN SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS:

(Equivalent of 14 spaces)

4. SUMMARY OF INFORMATION FURNISHED AND/OR
SERVICES RENDERED DURING PERTINENT PERIOD:

(Equivalent of 15 spaces)

Registered Mail

Bureau Approved _____

5. AMOUNT PAID FOR SERVICES AND EXPENSES BY MONTH:

Period	Services	Expenses.
--------	----------	-----------

(Equivalent of 6 spaces)

6. TYPE AND NUMBER OF MEETINGS ATTENDED AND OTHER ACTIVITY:

(Equivalent of 10 spaces)

7. NUMBER OF WRITTEN AND ORAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED
(List separately)

(Equivalent of 10 spaces)

8. INFORMATION FURNISHED OF UNUSUAL VALUE

(Equivalent of 10 spaces)

9. APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF PERSONS ON WHOM INFORMANT
FURNISHED COVERAGE AND IMPORTANCE:

(Equivalent of 10 spaces)

10. STEPS BEING TAKEN TO ADVANCE INFORMANT:

(Equivalent of 10 spaces)

11. STABILITY AND RELIABILITY:

(Equivalent of 8 spaces)

12. MISCELLANEOUS:

Every opportunity has been taken within this period to properly indoctrinate this informant against making any disclosure of his (her) relationship with the Bureau through any media.

All necessary action has been taken on information furnished by the informant.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Callahan

DATE: October 11, 1961

FROM : J. S. Johnson *JSJ*

J SUBJECT: MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
SECTIONS 107N and 108J
PROPOSED REVISIONS

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

As a result of recent instructions, in the form of SAC Letters, having been sent to the field relative to the preparation of receipts in connection with payments to security and criminal informants, it is felt that Sections 107N and 108J should be revised to incorporate these instructions. It is pointed out that Sections 107N and 108J concern security and criminal informants, respectively.

RECOMMENDATION:

GEN

That appropriate changes, which are attached, be made in Sections 107N and 108J of the Manual of Instructions.

Enclosure

11 12 11
RFD:efb
(4)

ENCLOSURE

encl with copy

Manual of Instructions - Revised

EX-116

XEROX

EC-23

66-2542-3-1271

57 OCT 19 1961

OCT 16 1961

10 OCT 16 1961

F-26 CC-66-1934

2-fmb

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

66-2542-1-
66-1934-

October 11, 1961

PROPOSED CHANGES IN
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
VOLUME IV

Section 107N, Page 20, Item 5, of the Manual of Instructions should be amended to read as follows:

5. Receipts

When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC's authority or prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so. In the event a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.

Section 107N, Page 20, Items 5c and 5d, of the Manual of Instructions should be added to read as follows:

- c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
- d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.

Section 107N, Page 20, Item 5c, of the Manual of Instructions should be changed to Item 5e.

Section 108J, Page 10, Item 12a, of the Manual of Instructions should be amended to read as follows:

- a. Receipts for payments to informants and sources should be obtained in every instance where possible to do so. In the event a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed. Receipts should be self-sufficient so that, if it is necessary to introduce receipts in evidence during course of a trial, receipts will not relate to other documents or files.

Section 108J, Page 10, Items 12c and 12d, of the Manual of Instructions should be added to read as follows:

- c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent.
- d. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent.

Section 108J, Page 10, Item 12c, of the Manual of Instructions should be changed to Item 12e.

Manual of Instructions
Revised
fmh

cc - 66-1934

1 XEROX

OCT 16 1961

ENCLOSURE

2-Bughran
66-2542-3-1271

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL October 25, 1961

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION~~
HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Sec Info general

REMOVED BY 61 NOV 2 1961

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1272

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

FM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: November 3, 1961

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS *SEC*

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Fox
- 1 - Mr. McNerney

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

From 10/20-23/61 inclusive, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Communist Party, USA, met at Communist Party (CP) headquarters at New York City to formulate future policies to be followed by the Party as a result of its requirement to register under the Internal Security Act of 1950. During this session, Gus Hall, CP General Secretary, pointed out the difficulties now facing the CP will bring defections and casualties among the membership and will probably result in the reactivation of stool pigeons and undercover enemies. Discussions among NEC members stressed that each club in each district should be specifically examined to ascertain the character and quality of its membership. Where any dubious member is found, steps should be taken to detach, isolate or quietly drop such person. In that connection, Hall stated that this should be done if the slightest doubt arose concerning anyone.

There is no question but that the CP will tighten its security measures to the utmost. In order to prevent our losing any sources as a result of this program, we should immediately instruct those offices in whose divisions Party membership exists to alert their Party informants concerning these plans of the Party. Section 107, Manual of Instructions, sets out in detail the procedure an informant should follow in the event suspicion is directed against him and these offices should be instructed to make certain each informant is aware of this procedure. At the same time, Party informants should be encouraged, if possible, to seize upon any such situation which develops to strengthen and promote their own positions within the CP.

The Bureau should be promptly advised when any information is received that a particular informant is under suspicion. Letters received in this respect should set out the circumstances involved, the steps being taken by informant to combat the allegations against him and the recommendation of the office handling the informant regarding future action to be taken in each particular case.

ACTION:

In line with the above, there is attached an appropriate letter to the 48 offices involved (Original on Plastiplate) setting forth the instructions above listed.

Enc: NOV 14 1961
 66-2542-3-17
 DJM:had (6)

REC-96 66-2542-3-17273
 NOV 14 1961

WCS
FJB
SEC
EX-115
gmc
5-115